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Unlike most of its NATO allies, Turkey did not emerge from the Cold War with 
enhanced security. The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic 
missiles by its neighbors in the Middle East—Iran, Iraq and Syria—creates a serious 
security concern for Turkey. This thesis analyzes the numerous threats posed to Turkey 
by its neighbors’ nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs and their ballistic 
missiles.  It evaluates Turkey’s defense options to counter these threats and examines the 
credibility of NATO’s security guarantees, including the nuclear guarantees the United 
States provides under NATO auspices. The thesis concludes that Turkey must acquire the 
capabilities to deny adversaries the benefits of these weapons. These capabilities—
including passive and active defenses as well as improved counterforce means—will 
enable Ankara to strengthen deterrence and provide an effective defense should 
deterrence fail. Improving its preparedness for WMD contingencies should be an urgent, 
new priority for Turkey. The Turkish Armed Forces should have the necessary 
capabilities to fight, survive and prevail in NBC environments. In addition, NATO’s 
security guarantees, which hinge ultimately on the U.S. nuclear presence and U.S. 
extended deterrence commitments in Europe, and Turkey’s own national defense and 
deterrence posture, must remain convincing to Turkey as well as to the WMD-armed 
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Unlike most of its NATO Allies, Turkey did not emerge from the Cold War with 
a sense of enhanced security. The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
and ballistic missiles by Turkey’s Middle East neighbors has become the leading security 
concern for Turkish leaders in the 21st Century. Turkey is completely exposed to WMD 
threats and to air and missile attacks on its southeastern borders. More than two thirds of 
Turkey’s territory, including the capital city Ankara, and Turkey’s other population 
centers, dams, power stations, air bases, communication facilities and military 
headquarters are within the range of Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian ballistic missiles. And 
because these missiles are capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads, Turkey 
feels very insecure.  
Fueled by a combination of external and internal motives or both, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria either already possess or are acquiring WMD capabilities, along with the means of 
delivering them. Iran already has a substantial chemical warfare capability and is 
pursuing nuclear and biological weapons. It also has an advanced long-range ballistic 
missile development program. Iraq’s WMD development programs are on hold while UN 
sanctions prevail, but it is widely believed that Iraq retains chemical and biological 
weapons production capability and that Baghdad is in a position to produce chemical and 
biological weapons quickly once international sanctions are lifted. Syria has chemical 
weapons and a biotechnical infrastructure to support a limited biological warfare 
program. Damascus increasingly relies on a strategic deterrent based on ballistic missiles 
and chemical warfare capabilities. Considering Turkey’s ongoing disputes with each of 
these three neighbors—fueled by their support for terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, 
and the long-standing unresolved water disputes with Syria and Iraq—the WMD 
proliferation problem on Turkey’s southeastern borders is acute. 
This thesis analyzes the numerous threats that Turkey faces from its southeastern 
neighbors’ nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs and the increased ranges 
of their ballistic missiles.  The thesis also evaluates Turkey’s various defense options and 
the adequacy of three particular options (counterforce, missile defense and passive 
defense ) to counter potential WMD and missile threats from Iran, Iraq and Syria.  
xx 
This thesis analyses the credibility of NATO’s security guarantees to Turkey, 
including the nuclear guarantees the United States provides under NATO auspices. It 
considers the possibility that NATO’s security commitments to Turkey—including U. S. 
nuclear guarantees—might be insufficient to deter WMD use against Turkey in a conflict 
with a Middle Eastern neighbor. Several obstacles to a comprehensive NATO response—
including NATO’s internal cohesion problems and the Alliance’s challenges in protecting 
its population, forces and territory (as defined in Article 6) against WMD and ballistic 
missile attacks—suggest that NATO’s Article 5 mutual-defense pledge may not be 
honored in all circumstances.  
Based on an evaluation of Turkey’s possible defense options, within the NATO 
force structure and defense planning and also outside NATO, this thesis concludes that 
Turkey should acquire the military capabilities required to deny an enemy the benefits of 
using WMD. These capabilities—ranging from active and passive defences to improved 
counterforce capabilities—would strengthen deterrence and would provide the best hedge 
against deterrence failure. Being prepared to counter the use of NBC weapons and 
missiles, and with an ability to mitigate and overcome their effects, is an essential 
element in deterring their use. Therefore, WMD defense should be an urgent new priority 
for the Turkish military in planning for future regional contingencies, force projection 
scenarios, expeditionary operations and peacekeeping operations. The Turkish military 
forces should have the necessary capabilities to prevail in military engagements that 
might involve NBC weapons. 
In the event that deterrence fails, Turkey should have military options developed 
in the framework of deterrence through denial and punishment capabilities. Turkey’s 
military posture should demonstrate to any potential adversary that Turkey will not be 
coerced or defeated by the threat or use of WMD and that Turkey has the will and ability 
to counter these threats. In addition, NATO’s security guarantees, which hinge ultimately 
on the U.S. nuclear presence and U.S. extended deterrence commitments in Europe, and 
Turkey’s own national defense and deterrence posture must remain credible to Turkey as 
well as to the WMD-armed states that threaten Turkey.  
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Unlike most of its NATO Allies, Turkey did not emerge from the Cold War with 
a sense of enhanced security. Since the end of the Cold War, multiple security threats and 
risks have emerged around Turkey, making the country the new frontline state within 
NATO. Ethnic and religious conflicts in the Balkans and also in the Trans-Caucasian 
territories of the former Soviet Union, coupled with the volatile and unstable situation in 
the Middle East, have left Turkey among the world’s most insecure countries. 
Simultaneously, residual risks from Russia’s more assertive behavior toward its 
neighbors and its gradual return to a spheres-of-influence policy in the “near abroad” 
have multiplied Ankara’s concerns. Moreover, Turkey’s two-decade struggle against the 
separatist Kurdistan Workers Party  (known by its Kurdish initials, PKK) and the 
increasing danger of Islamic fundamentalism have threatened Turkey’s unity and 
sovereignty internally.   Thus, it would be reasonable to conclude that no other member 
of NATO faces a similar range of external security challenges or such significant internal 
problems.  
A. BACKGROUND  
1. WMD Threats 
Although the presence of multiple military threats is not new for Turkey, an 
entirely new category of risks now threatens Turkey’s vital security interests.  The 
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile systems by 
Turkey’s Middle East neighbors constitutes the top security concern for Turkish 
policymakers and strategists.  
Fueled by a combination of external and internal motives or both, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria either already possess or are acquiring WMD capabilities, along with the means for 
delivering them. Iran already has a substantial chemical warfare capability and is 
pursuing nuclear and biological weapons. It also has an advanced long-range ballistic 
missile development program. Iraq’s WMD development programs are on hold while UN 
sanctions prevail, but it is widely believed that Iraq retains chemical and biological 
weapons production capability and that Baghdad is in a position to produce chemical and 
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biological weapons quickly once international sanctions are lifted. Syria has chemical 
weapons and a biotechnical infrastructure to support a limited biological warfare 
program. Damascus increasingly relies on a strategic deterrent based on ballistic missiles 
and chemical warfare capabilities.1 
Nowhere else in NATO are the disturbing effects of WMD proliferation felt more 
keenly than in Turkey. Turkey is completely exposed to WMD threats and to air and 
missile attacks on its southeastern borders. More than two thirds of Turkey’s territory, 
including the capital city Ankara, and Turkey’s other population centers, dams, power 
stations, air bases, communication facilities and military headquarters are within the 
range of Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian ballistic missiles. And because these missiles are 
capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads, Turkey feels very insecure.  
Because of these emerging threats, Turkey has been unable to reduce the heavy 
defense burden it carried as a southern flank NATO country playing a pivotal role in 
containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Turkey feels obliged to defend its 
security interests and deter aggression by relying mostly on its own military capabilities, 
but considering the seriousness of these new WMD threats, Turkey requires the support 
of its allies as well. Turkey’s unique geopolitical location does not provide it with the 
luxury of downgrading its deterrent capabilities and reducing its defense spending. 
Therefore, any further acquisition of WMD capabilities by potentially hostile actors in 
the region, whether states or non-state actors, will exacerbate the sense of vulnerability 
Turkey feels, and commensurately, increase Turkey’s sensitivity to the credibility of 
NATO’s security assurances. 
2. Why Turkey Feels Threatened  
Diverse military threats to Turkish security have been a fact of life for decades, 
but the sense of vulnerability to WMD threats has intensified since the 1990-1991 Gulf 
War. Several factors have exacerbated this sense of vulnerability. The ongoing debate in 
Europe concerning NATO’s role and relevance in the new international security 
environment, the exclusion of Turkey from the European Union’s emerging security 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, January 2001), p. 40.  Available online: www.defenselink.mil. 
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structures, increasing doubts about the credibility of NATO’s security commitments to 
Turkey in the case of a WMD attack on its territory, Turkey’s bitter experience during the 
1990-1991 Gulf War (including fear of a possible Iraqi Scud missile attack on Turkey in 
retaliation for Turkey’s major support to operations against Iraq) are the main factors that 
have affected Turkey’s security perceptions. Moreover, the recognition that it was ill-
prepared to protect its territory, population centers and deployed forces along the Iraqi 
border from a possible Iraqi NBC-tipped Scud attack further deepened Turkey’s sense of 
vulnerability. Since 1991 Turkish strategic planners have become increasingly concerned 
about the threats posed to Turkish territory and population centers by modified Scud and 
more advanced missile systems deployed or under development by Iran, Iraq and Syria.2 
Considering Turkey’s ongoing disputes with each of these three neighbors—
fueled by their support for terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, and the long-standing 
unresolved water disputes with Syria and Iraq—the WMD proliferation problem on 
Turkey’s southeastern borders is acute. Turkey has supported U.S.- led coalition 
operations against Iraq in various ways, any of which might have elicited an Iraqi 
response. In 1998 Turkey came to the brink of war with Syria over Syria’s harboring of 
PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and its continuing support for PKK terrorists. Syria might 
have employed NBC-tipped Scud B or Scud C missiles against Turkish targets if this 
crisis had escalated any further. Damascus also might conduct such attacks during a war 
if a significant amount of Syrian territory were lost or if the survival of the Assad regime 
were threatened.3  
Relations are no less tense with Iran. On several occasions in 1994 and 1999 
Turkey came to the brink of military confrontation with Iran. Iranian attempts to 
undermine Turkey’s secular order and Tehran’s support for Islamic terrorist organizations 
as well as the PKK became the main sources of tension between the two countries and 
still constitute potential flashpoints. The successful tests of Shabab-3 missiles that could 
reach large parts of Turkey and the Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons have 
                                                 
2 Ian  O. Lesser and Ashley Tellis, Strategic Exposure: Proliferation around the Mediterranean  (Santa 
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996) , p. 24. 
3 Ian  O. Lesser, NATO Looks South: New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean , (Santa 
Monica , Calif.: RAND, 2000), p. 38. 
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reminded Turkey of its insufficient anti-missile capabilities in a region where the 
acquisition of medium-range missiles is a growing trend. 
Both states and non-state actors in the region see WMD and related delivery 
systems as valuable tools to facilitate the pursuit of aggressive policies. As the possible 
scenarios mentioned above suggest, a WMD-armed Iran, Iraq or Syria could easily be in 
a position to intimidate, threaten or blackmail Turkey over long-standing disputes and 
conflicts.  NBC weapons are highly prized by these regimes as tools to deter outside 
intervention in the region, making it relatively safe for them to pursue their own 
aggressive designs. If their threats failed, these weapons still could be used as a means to 
inflict massive casualties on Allied forces. Faced with such threats, NATO forces might 
be forced to withdraw before honoring their pledge to defend Turkey in accordance with 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
B. ARGUMENT 
This thesis aims to evaluate the adequacy of Turkey’s defense options to counter 
potential WMD threats from Iran, Iraq and Syria. The thesis identifies current Turkish 
capabilities and policy gaps with regard to the WMD threats and offers recommendations 
concerning Turkish policy and required capabilities over WMD risks.   
Based on an evaluation of Turkey’s possible defense options, within the NATO 
force structure and defense planning and also outside NATO, this thesis argues that 
Turkey should acquire the military capabilities required to deny an enemy the benefits of 
using WMD. These capabilities—ranging from active and passive defences to improved 
counterforce capabilities—would strengthen deterrence and would provide the best hedge 
against deterrence failure. In addition, NATO’s security guarantees, which hinge 
ultimately on the U.S. nuclear presence and U.S. extended deterrence commitments in 
Europe and Turkey, must remain credible to Turkey and to the WMD-armed states that 
threaten Turkey.  
This thesis identifies the required capabilities and appropriate policies to respond 
to increasing WMD threats on Turkey’s immediate periphery. Indeed, being prepared to 
counter the use of NBC weapons and missiles, and being able to mitigate and overcome 
their effects, is an essential element in deterring their use. This can be only accomplished 
5 
by maintaining a comprehensive military capability spanning active and passive defenses 
to counterforce capabilities. Being prepared for chemical and biological and nuclear 
contingencies should be an urgent, new priority for the Turkish military in planning for 
future regional contingencies, force projection scenarios, expeditionary operations and 
also for peacekeeping operations. At a minimum, Turkish military should have the 
necessary capabilities to prevail in military engagements that might involve NBC 
weapons.  
C.  ORGANIZATION  
The issues mentioned above are analyzed in six subsequent chapters. Chapters II, 
III and IV examine the WMD threats posed to Turkey by Iraq, Iran and Syria 
respectively. This section of the thesis analyzes the publicly available evidence about 
programs to develop or improve WMD capabilities in Iraq, Iran and Syria.  To form an 
assessment of the likelihood of WMD use against Turkey, this section of the thesis 
attempts to discern intentions on the basis of published policies as well as behavior in 
previous conflicts and crises.  This analysis provides a basis for conclusions about how 
these intentions might evolve into WMD use against Turkey in a confrontation. 
In Chapter V, NATO’s deterrent posture against WMD threats and the credibility 
of NATO’s security guarantees are analyzed. By reviewing NATO’s defense capabilities 
to counter WMD threats and the explicit commitments made by the United States under 
NATO auspices, and U.S. capabilities to honor these commitments, this section of the 
thesis identifies the essential elements of NATO’s deterrent posture and security 
guarantees to Turkey. The analysis then assesses the credibility and reliability of these 
guarantees in Turkish eyes as well as in the eyes of the potential adversaries.  
Chapter VI analyzes Turkey’s national defense capabilities as well as its overall 
deterrent posture against WMD threats. By reviewing Turkey’s current and projected 
active and passive defenses and its medical and intelligence capabilities against WMD 
attacks on its territory and population centers, this analysis specifies the main elements of 
Turkey’s deterrent posture vis-à-vis WMD threats. It also identifies Turkish capability 
gaps with regard to NBC defense and the required WMD defense capabilities needed for 
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an effective counter-proliferation strategy to deter adversaries from attacking Turkey, 
with or without WMD. 
The concluding chapter evaluates Turkey’s possible defense options to counter 
increasing WMD threats—including its unilateral defense posture as well as its NATO 
defense strategy. By considering Turkey’s current and proposed capabilities and by 
outlining the advantages and shortcomings of these defense options, the thesis aims to 
































II. IRAQ’S WMD THREAT TO TURKEY  
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Numerous contentious issues dominate the relations between Turkey and Iraq. 
Turkish concerns about Iraq’s expansionism and search for hegemony in the region, Iraqi 
support for PKK terrorism, Turkey’s many anti-PKK incursions into northern Iraq, the 
Iraqi quest for weapons of mass destruction, the conflict over sharing the waters of the 
Euphrates and the Tigris rivers, and Turkish control of the Iraqi oil pipeline to the  
Mediterranean all constitute sources of tension and confrontation between Turkey and 
Iraq. The latter two issues not only represent critical points of friction but also could 
become instruments of hostile action in the event of a deterioration of bilateral relations 
on other grounds.4   
Yet, there may be more problems to come. The future of northern Iraq is 
unsettled. The growing political and security vacuum in northern Iraq and its effect on the 
stability of Turkey’s southeast continue to remain major areas of conflict. Moreover, 
Iraq’s quest for power in the region brings it inevitably into conflict with Turkey, 
especially now that Iraq views its power in terms of possession of weapons of mass 
destruction. The presence of such weapons in Iraq is fundamentally intolerable to 
Turkey’s leaders, in view of the implications for the nation’s interests. If Iraq was able to 
acquire such weapons, without any further challenge from the external powers upholding 
the nonproliferation regime and the UN Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq, and 
if Ankara deemed NATO guarantees (including their nuclear dimension) insufficient, 
Turkey could be driven to seek comparable weapons, if only on defensive basis. Facing a 
strategic dilemma, Ankara could feel compelled to respond to the increasing WMD and 
missile threats to its security by developing deterrent capabilities of its own.  
Iraq’s huge non-conventional warfare capability and its repeated threatened use 
and actual employment of some of these weapons raises enormous challenges for Turkey, 
as well as for other countries in the region. This chapter focuses on Iraqi WMD 
                                                 
4 Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From Balkans to Western China 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 60. 
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capabilities and potential threat scenarios. It analyzes four questions about the perceived 
Iraqi WMD threat to Turkish security:  
· What are Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capabilities?  
· Why was this arsenal acquired?  
· What is the status of Turkey’s relationship with Iraq and what are the 
flashpoints?  
· To what extent and under what circumstances could these potential 
sources of conflict trigger WMD use against Turkey?  
Many reasons could spark a Turkish-Iraqi conflict. This chapter argues that the 
current tension in relations and the potential sources of conflict between Baghdad and 
Ankara could trigger CBW use against Turkey. In this sense, understanding the level of 
WMD pressure on Turkey, and the relative importance of the need in Iraq’s strategic 
calculus to deter Turkey, helps to specify the circumstances under which Iraq could use 
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons against Turkey. 
B.  CAPABILITIES 
Iraq’s immense weapons of mass destruction acquisition efforts were made clear 
when its Scud and Al-Hussein missiles were fired against civilian and military targets in 
the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. The level of the Iraqi 
arsenal prior to the Gulf War is summarized by Timothy McCarthy and Jonathan Tucker:  
By the time of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraq had amassed the most 
extensive arsenal of chemical and biological weapons in the developing 
world, together with a ballistic missile force capable of delivering 
conventional and nonconventional payloads to theaterwide targets. 
Baghdad also maintained an ambitious nuclear research and development 
program, and by 1990 the Iraqis were perhaps one year away from 
deploying a nuclear device. Saddam Hussein thus sought a robust 
capability in all categories of unconventional weapons and was prepared 
to invest enormous financial and human resources to achieve this goal. 5 
Iraqi attempts to seek asymmetric means to outset their adversaries’ superior 
conventional capabilities is analyzed below. 
                                                 
5 Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, “ Saddam’s Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological 
Weapons in the Gulf Wars,” in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz, eds., Planning the 
Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2000),  p. 47.  
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 1.   Nuclear Weapons Program 
Although a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iraq had a clandestine 
nuclear weapons development program prior to Operation Desert Storm. Iraq sought to 
build an implosion-type nuclear explosive device and test its nuclear components. For 
this purpose, following the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Iraq embarked on a 
“crash program” to develop a nuclear device by extracting weapons-grade material from 
safeguarded research reactor fuel. At the same time, Iraq was developing ballistic 
missiles project to deliver its nuclear arms. Iraqi nuclear weapons aspirations were kept 
under intensive scrutiny by IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) / UNSCOM 
(United Nations Special Commission on Iraq) inspections and monitoring  between 1991 
and 1998.6 All detected weapons-usable fissile material that Iraq had obtained for 
running research reactors was placed into IAEA custody and eventually removed from 
Iraq.7 According to the 2001 U.S. Department of Defense report, Proliferation: Threat 
and Response, the danger of Iraqi nuclear weapons still exists: 
Although Iraq claims that it destroyed all of the specific equipment and 
facilities useful for developing nuclear weapons, it still retains sufficient 
skilled and experienced scientists and engineers as well as weapons design 
information that could allow it to restart a weapons program. Iraq would 
need five or more years and key foreign assistance to rebuild the 
infrastructure to enrich enough material for a nuclear weapon. This period 
would be substantially shortened should Baghdad successfully acquire 
fissile material from a foreign source.8 
Therefore, it is highly likely that Iraq—which prior to the 1991 Gulf War was close to a 
nuclear capability—may have reconstituted these efforts since the departure of UN 
inspectors from Iraq in late 1998. 
2.   Chemical Weapons Program 
Iraq also has a record of using chemical weapons against not only enemy troops, 
but also against its own unarmed Kurdish population. Iraq’s chemical weapons 
production had continued until December 1990, with sufficient quantities of precursor 
                                                 
6U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 




materials for almost 500 tons of the nerve agent “VX” and several chemical weapon 
agents, including mustard gas and the nerve agents tabun (GA), sarin (GB), cyclosarin 
(GF), some of which may remain hidden. 9  Most of these agents were placed in a wide 
range of delivery systems—155 mm “artillery and mortar shells, 250-and 500-kilogram 
aerial bombs, 122 mm surface-to-surface rockets, and 90 mm air-to-surface rockets 
(mounted on helicopters)”—and were ready for combat use.10 UNSCOM “destroyed a 
total of 28,049 Iraqi chemical munitions and more than 481,000 liters of chemical 
warfare agents and precursors” between 1991 to 1994.11 
While developing and deploying chemical warheads for its long-range Al-Hussein 
missiles, Iraq also pursued the use of chemical weapons to achieve strategic objectives on 
the battlefield. At least fifty chemical warheads were produced and ready to be deployed 
for the long-range Al-Hussein missiles.12 UNSCOM’s discovery of the evidence of “VX” 
in Iraqi missile warheads in 1998 supports these judgments.13   
Iraq’s doctrine for using chemical weapons evolved during the 1980-1988 Iran-
Iraq War. During the different stages of the war, including the “War of The Cities,” 
chemical weapons were used as a tactical weapon as a part of Iraqi offensive operations. 
Various delivery means, including aerial bombs, long-range artillery shells, rocket 
launchers, tactical rockets and aircrafts and helicopters carrying spray tanks (for aerosol 
dissemination), were used by Iraqi forces to deliver CW against Iranian forces.14  
As Table 1 shows, Iraq is the most recent user of weapons of mass destruction in 
the region. According to Intelligence sources, the following uses of chemical weapons 
were reported during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War: 
 
 
                                                 
9 McCarthy and Tucker, “ Saddam’s Toxic Arsenal,” p. 52. 
10 Ibid, p. 52. 
11 Ibid, p. 52. 
12 Ibid, p. 52 
13 Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 40. 
14 Ibid, p. 42. 
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Date Area Type of Gas Approximate 
Casualties 
Target 
August 1983 Haij Umran  Mustard Less than 100 Iranians/Kurds 
October-
November 1983 
Panjwin Mustard 3,0000 Iranians/Kurds 
February-March 
1984 
Majnoon Island  Mustard 2,500 Iranians  
March 1984 Al-Basrah Tabun 50-100 Iranians 
March 1985 Hawizah Marsh Mustard/Tabun 3,000 Iraninas 
February 1986 Al Faw Mustard/Tabun 8,000-10,000 Iranians 
December 1986 Umm ar Rasas Mustard 1,000s Iranians 
April 1987 Al Basrah Mustard/Tabun 5,000 Iranians 
October 1987 Sumar/Mehran Mustard/Nerve 
Agents 
3,000 Iranians 
March 1988 Halabjah Mustard/Nerve 
Agents 
Hundreds Iranians/Kurds 
 Note: Iranians also used poison gas at Halabjah and may have caused some of the 
casualties. 
 
Table 1:  Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons during the 1980-88 Iran–Iraq War.15 
 
Since the Gulf War, some officials have been concerned that Iraq might have 
rebuilt key portions of its industrial and chemical production infrastructure. By not 
becoming a state party to CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention), Iraq has reinforced 
these concerns. It should be recalled that Iraq retains the necessary expertise and 
sufficient skills, and Iraq’s facilities could be converted quickly to the production of CW. 
Therefore, depending on the type of agent, procurement of dual-technology and 
                                                 
15 Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (Washington D.C.: CSIS, July 2001), p.  47.  
Available Online: http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/me_wmd_regionaltrends.pdf. 
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availability of foreign assistance, the Iraqi CW arsenal may reach to pre-Desert Storm 
levels in a very short time.  
3.   Biological Weapons Program 
Iraq also produced and weaponized significant quantities of biological warfare 
agents prior to Operation Desert Storm. Having first decided to acquire BW by 
developing botulinum toxin for covert use against the regime’s enemies in late 1972, Iraq 
developed a capability to produce a wide array of biological agents, “including 
pathogenic bacteria (anthrax, plague, and Clostridium perfringens…), potent toxins 
(butolinum toxin, afla-toxin, ricin, and trichothecene mycotoxins), an anti-crop agent, and 
three incapacitating viruses (hemorrhagic conjunctivitis, rota-virus, and camel pox)” by 
1986.16 After the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, “Baghdad initiated a ‘crash’ 
program of large-scale production and weaponization.” It produced “at least 19,000 liters 
of concentrated botulinum toxin, 8,500 liters of a concentrated slurry of anthrax spores …  
and 2,200 liters of concentrated aflatoxin,” despite being a party to the BTWC 
(Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention).17  It was also “suspected to be capable of 
producing dry anthrax spores, which have a much longer shelf life and can be 
disseminated as an aerosol cloud over greater distances.”18 
During the Gulf War, Iraqi forces claim “ to have filled 157 aerial bombs and 25 
Al-Hussein missile warheads with biological agents” and to have dispersed them in 
forward storage positions and airfields for rapid employment.19 These weapons were 
intended for use against Israel and coalition forces in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.  
UN experts believe that “Baghdad has the ability to reconstitute its biological 
warfare capabilities within a few weeks or months.”20 With the abrupt end of UNSCOM 
inspections and monitoring in 1998, Baghdad may have resumed producing and 
stockpiling biological warfare agents.21 
                                                 
16 McCarthy and Tucker, “ Saddam’s Toxic Arsenal,” p. 52. 
17 Ibid, p. 53. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid, p. 54.  
20 Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 40. 
21 Ibid. 
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  4.   Ballistic Missile Program  
Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had many short-range ballistic-missiles, including a 
stockpile of Soviet-supplied, single-stage, liquid-fueled Scud-B’s, with a 300 km range 
and 1,000 kg payload, and three indigenously produced variants of the Scud-B, the Al-
Hussein Short, and the Al-Hijarah, all three with an approximate range of 600-650 km.22 
Since then, Iraq likely possesses a limited number of launchers and Scud-variant SRBMs 
capable of striking neighbors, including Turkey, as well as various parts and assembly 
infrastructure necessary for the reestablishing a long-range missile.23 Despite its poor 
accuracy, Iraq fired nearly 90 Al-Hussein missiles at Israel and the Arabian Peninsula 
during operation Desert Storm.24 However, Baghdad might have improved the accuracy 
of its missiles since then. 
During 1999, within the 150-kilometer range restriction imposed by the UN, Iraq 
embarked on the indigenous production of two short-range ballistic missile systems: The 
liquid-propellant Al-Samoud, and the solid propellant Ababil-100 SRBMs are modified 
Scuds designed by Iraq.25 Iraq maintains the proficiency for longer-range missiles. Once 
the 150-kilometers range restriction is lifted, these missiles could easily be converted to 
longer-range missile systems missiles, thereby giving the Iraqis the ability to threaten 
Turkey, Israel and Iran as well as much of the Arabian Peninsula.26 Iraq may have 
retained a very small “ stockpile of land- launched short-range anti-ship cruise missiles 
and air launched short-range tactical missiles” that may be potential means of delivery for 
NBC weapons.27 
U.S. intelligence officials believe that Iraq might be hiding dozens of Scud-class 
missiles with a range of 650 kilometers.28  The regime of president Saddam Hussein 
                                                 
22 Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz, Tracking 
Nuclear Proliferation:A Guide in Maps and Charts,1998 (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace,1998), p. 192. 
23 Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 42. 
24 Ibid, p. 41. 
25 Ibid, p. 42  
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 “Iraq Maintains Medium-Range Missile Arsenal, ” Middle East Newsline, 29 August 2001.  
Available online: www.menewsline.com. 
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might have rebuilt most of its production facilities and might be continuing to develop 
new missiles. The recent statement of CIA deputy director, John McLaughlin, best 
reflects the increasing worries over Iraqi missile capabilities: “We also believe that 
Saddam is hiding a small force of Al-Hussein SRBMs [short-range ballistic missiles] 
with a range of 650 kilometers, capable of targeting Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and 
Turkey.” 29 
 
Figure 1:  Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Iraqi Ballistic Missiles.30 
 
As addressed in Figure 1, Turkey’s major cities including Ankara, Adana, and 
Iskenderun is within the range of Iraqi ballistic missiles. Therefore, it is possible that Iraq 
might have upgraded its secret arsenal of medium-range missiles since the abrupt end of 
UNSCOM inspections in December 1998. According to some experts, the Iraqi goal may 
be to achieve long-range and intercontinental ballistic missile capability and to strike 
targets as far as the United States.  
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 41. 
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C. POTENTIAL FLASHPOINTS 
Turkey has numerous issues with Iraq that remain unresolved and risk 
confrontation. Most Turkish decision makers still recall Saddam Hussein’s belligerent 
posture against Turkey. Only three months before the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, 
Saddam Hussein had threatened the visiting Turkish Prime Minister, Yildirim Akbulut, 
stating that diminishing U.S. Middle East involvement would leave Turkey without an 
ally in the region: “NATO is disintegrating. Your friend, the United States is losing 
power…. Nobody listens to the U.S. anymore. She cannot help you.”31 Even if the 
Saddam regime were to change, the memory of Turkey’s Gulf War role and the disputes 
over the Euphrates and Tigris are likely to remain potential irritants, and thus potential 
triggers for Iraqi use of WMD, in future Turkish-Iraqi relations. The current status of 
relations and the potential sources of conflict between Baghdad and Ankara, which could 
trigger a CBW use against Turkey, are analyzed below. 
1.  Turkey’s Role in the Gulf War 
During the Gulf War, Turkey played a crucial role in forcing Iraq out from 
Kuwait by enabling U.S. aircraft to fly sorties against Iraq from Turkish airbases, as well 
as by establishing of a safe heaven for Iraqi Kurds north of the 36th parallel under 
Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) launched in April 1991.32 This also meant that for the 
first time in Turkey’s republican history Iraq was attacked from Turkish soil; although 
Turkish forces did not participate in the military actions.33 
                                                 
31Saddam Hussein’s statement to Turkish Prime Minister Yildirim Akbulut, quoted in, Kemal Kirisci,  
“Post Cold-War Turkish Security and The Middle East,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Issue 
no.2, 1997, p.  3.  
Available online: https://www.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/olj/meria/meria797_kirisci.html.    
For a background anlysis, see Kemal Kirisci, “The Future of Turkish Policy toward the Middle East,” in 
Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci eds., Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Regional Power  (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 2001),  pp.  93-113. 
32 During the 1991 Gulf War, by bringing the parliament to pass an extended war powers bill on January 
17, 1991, President Turgut Ozal even opened the way for the establishment of a second front from the 
north. The threat of Turkish intervention by the deploying thousands of Turkish troops to the Iraqi border 
was both aimed at tying down tens of thousands of Baghdad’s troops in the northern Iraq and deterring a 
potential Iraqi missile attack on Turkey. For a detailed analysis see, Kemal Kirisci, “The Future of Turkish 
Policy toward the Middle East,”  
33 Heinz, Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p.119. 
16 
 Since then, Turkey’s role in the Gulf War has deeply affected its relations with 
Iraq. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein repeatedly has accused Turkey of treason and 
treachery by assisting the coalition against Iraq in the war.  This Iraqi resentment, in itself 
largely explains the Iraqi support for the PKK.  Saddam Hussein has been critical of 
Turkey’s policy of permitting the Incirlik airbase to be used by U.S. and British planes 
striking Iraqi targets. Turkey’s role in expelling Iraq from Kuwait instilled bitter 
grievances in the Iraqi mindset.  
2.   Iraqi Support for PKK Terrorism 
Saddam Hussein’s belligerent posture against Turkey is not limited to threatening 
statements. He has not hesitated to support the PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) terrorist 
groups by allowing it operate from Iraqi soil, and by letting them establish training camps 
and bases in northern Iraq. In 1998, Saddam openly allowed the PKK to open an office in 
Baghdad and has been extending his growing support to it. According to intelligence 
sources PKK agents are also being provided military and logistical support form the 
Saddam regime to operate against Kurds in northern Iraq loyal to Ankara.34 Iraq also 
repeatedly criticizes Turkey’s many occasional anti-PKK incursions into northern Iraq, 
arguing that it violates Iraq’s territorial integrity. For example, in March 1995,Turkey 
staged a large military offensive in northern Iraq to clear the area of the PKK presence.35 
This caused much Iraqi criticism. Complaining of the violation of its territory, it 
demanded the quick withdrawal of the 35,000 Turkish troops from the region. Despite 
strong criticism from the Iraqi government and various Arab countries, by May, Turkey 
started another of its large military operations to destroy PKK bases in northern Iraq. For 
more than six weeks, Turkey continued the operation with about 50,000 troops and strong 
air support. It can be assumed that since then a small number of Turkish troops has stayed 
in Iraqi territory and from time to time have been reinforced for operations against the 
PKK bases. 
In return, Iraq sought to mobilize Arab support against the repeated incursions 
into northern Iraq of the Turkish Army with the declared aim of fighting the PKK.   
                                                 
34 “Turkey Ends Military Mission In Northern Iraq,” Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 346, 3 September 
2001. Available online: www.menewsline.com. 
35 Heinz, Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 117-129. 
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Turkish military incursions, the most recent of was in September 2001, target PKK 
terrorists in northern Iraq harbored by the regime of President Saddam Hussein and 
include air and ground attacks by thousands of Turkish troops on suspected PKK 
installations in northern Iraq. 36 The potential future tension over Iraqi support for PKK 
terrorism and Turkish military operation in northern Iraq suggests that a PKK-related 
clash with Iraq, which could trigger the deployment of NBC-tipped Iraqi missiles against 
Turkey, is not beyond imagining. 
3.  Use of Turkish Bases  
In December of 1998, Saddam’s regime once again had become a threat to Turkey 
and its neighboring countries, so Turkey has permitted the use of its airbases by U.S. and 
British planes. The use of Incirlik airbase in bombing Baghdad and suspected WMD 
production facilities in Operation Desert Fox as well as the United State’s constant 
bombings of the Iraqi military installations, received harsh criticism from the Iraqi leader 
and brought the two countries on the brink of confrontation.  
In February 1999, Iraq actually threatened to attack Turkey if it continued to 
permit the United States and Britain to use its bases and territory. 37  The UNSCOM 
inspections were interrupted. As a result, the efforts to eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction capabilities have only been partly successful and it became obvious to 
everyone that Iraq had succeeded in retaining some its warmaking capabilities. Thus, 
Turkish authorities for the second time requested air defense assets since the 1991 Gulf 
War, and a battery of Patriot missile systems was deployed permanently to Turkey in 
January 1999.38 
4.  Water Conflict 
The ongoing water dispute over water sharing of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers 
continues to deteriorate the two countries’ relations. Both Iraq and Syria is heavily 
dependant on the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, and the impact of the Southeastern 
                                                 
36 “Turkey Ends Military Mission In Northern Iraq,” Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 346, 3 September 
2001. Available online: www.menewsline.com  
37 Kemal Kirisci, “The Future of Turkish Policy toward the Middle East,” in Barry Rubin and Kemal 
Kirisci, eds., Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Regional Power  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001),  
p. 94. 
38 Heinz, Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington: 
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Anatolia Project (GAP) could ultimately reduce the flow of fresh water to Syria and Iraq, 
as it approaches full development. 
Security conditions in the Tigris-Euphrates basin are unstable and the potential for 
“water wars” is still present.39 In fact, such a scenario came close to reality when Turkey 
stopped the flow of the Euphrates to Syria and Iraq in January 1990 for one month in 
order to fill the Ataturk Dam. It alarmed and agitated Iraq and Syria. They called upon 
the Arab world to adopt a unified collective stand against Turkey. Iraqi analysts described 
it as an “act of war” and stated that, “Turkey could not be the friend of some Arabs and  
the enemy of the others. ” 40 
The water dispute has far-reaching political and strategic ramifications, since Iraq 
and Syria responded by escalating their support for PKK terrorism by proxy against 
Turkey with the aim of inducing Turkey to solve the water problem in their favor. With 
the water issue, Turkey began to be seen as an immediate and direct threat to Arab 
security—especially to Syria and Iraq.41 
5.    Turkish-Israeli Military Cooperation 
The Turkish-Israeli Alliance that materialized in 1996 caused Iraq to see Turkey 
as more tangible and more immediate strategic threat to its security. The Turkish-Israeli 
military cooperation virtually brought Israel to border of Iraq since Israeli reconnaissance 
flights near the Turkish-Iraqi border in the Turkish airspace and the reported installation 
of Israeli Intelligence and listening posts in northern Iraq could easily monitor the mobile 
Iraqi missile launchers as well as Iraqi troop movements which would be necessary for 
Israeli counterforce operations against Iraq. In July 1997, President Saddam Hussein 
accused Turkey of doing everything  “ to keep the (Iraqi Kurdish) region outside the 
control of the Iraqi state, by hosting and aiding the armies of the U.S., Britain and France 
and by facilitating the task of Western and Zionist spies to roam in that part of Iraq.” 42  
                                                 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p.195. 
39 Frederick M. Lorenz and Edward J. Erickson, The Euphrates Triangle: Security Implications of the 
Southeastern Anatolia Project (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1999), p. 1. 
40 Ofra Bengio and Gencer Ozcan, Arab Perceptions of Turkey and its Alignment with Israel, Mideast 
Security and Policy Studies, No.48, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies,  (Ramat Gan, Israel: 
Bar-Ilan University, 2001), p. 63. 
41 Ibid,  p.65. 
42 Ibid, p. 66. 
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The Turkish-Israeli Alliance caused Iraq to bring rapprochement to its archenemy, Iran, 
and its long-standing rival, Syria, arguing that the Alignment endangered all three 
countries. Hence there was a need to mend fences and unite forces against the Turkey-
Israeli Alliance.43  
D.   THE LIKELIHOOD OF WMD USE AND POTENTIAL TARGETS 
Iraq’s acquisition of WMD capabilities threatens Turkish security. Several issues 
are worth highlighting: 1) the likelihood of Iraqi CBW use against Turkey; 2) the most 
likely targets for CBW and missile use; and 3) the strategic and operational implications 
of Iraqi CBW use for Turkish policy and freedom of action. 
The current “reach” of ballistic missiles deployed by Iraq suggests that Turkey as 
a regional neighbor could be one of the most likely victims of WMD use.44  When the 
overwhelming significance of potential sources of conflict and the rivalry between 
Turkey and Iraq is considered, the prevailing Iraqi WMD threat is even more apparent. 
Recent history points to the relatively unconstrained Iraqi use of ballistic missiles 
and chemical weapons in regional conflicts within Turkey’s southern periphery, 
including the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War. Moreover, Iraq’s experience with flagrant 
CW use during the Iran-Iraq War and the international community’s failure to punish Iraq 
for its use of CW in the Iran-Iraq War, most likely emboldened the Iraqi decision makers 
and may have contributed to Baghdad’s pugnacity. That may also have fostered Iraqi’s 
aggressiveness toward its neighbors to pursue its objectives. In addition, this attitude may 
be reinforced by the belief of some senior Iraqi leaders that aggression in the region 
against its neighbors would be tolerated, as long as Iraq did not directly threaten U.S. or 
Western interests and its conduct of CBW use did not exceed certain thresholds, such as 
using CW against its own innocent Kurdish population. 45 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ian O. Lesser and Ashley Tellis, Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean (Santa 
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996), p. 24. 
45 Javed Ali,  “Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance”, 
Nonproliferation Review 8(1): 43-58. 
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  From a military perspective, Iraqi doctrine for CBW use justifies Iraq’s 
intentions to use them when necessary. 46 Iraqi doctrine focuses on how to deliver these 
weapons on strategic targets and how to operate in a contaminated environment, 
suggesting that Iraqis might be considering of using CBW in future contingencies.47 
According to McCarthy and Tucker, during the final phases of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq 
War, Iraqi commanders integrated chemical weapons into Iraqi offensive battlefield 
operations: 
 The Iraqis laid down persistent mustard agent in the Iranian forces’ rear 
area and then bombarded the front with the nonpersistent nerve agent 
sarin, so that Iranian troops retreating from the sarin-contaminated area 
would be exposed to the mustard agent as well … Iraq also employed VX 
nerve agent during the battle of Al Fao in long-range artillery shells and 
bombs dropped from aircraft, causing panic among the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards. Iraq’s most devastating use of chemical weapons 
took place on Majoon Island in June 1988, when front- line Iranian 
defensive positions were subjected to an artillery barrage delivering a 
mixture of hydrogen cyanide, nerve agent, and high explosives. Iraqi 
helicopters and fighter aircrafts joined the attack, dropping mustard and 
nerve agent on command centers, logistics sites and reserve forces in the 
Iranian rear.48  
Moreover, the forward deployment of chemical weapons munitions and 
decontamination sites into certain parts of Iraq during the 1990-1991 Gulf War indicates 
that at some point Iraq was considering using CW against the Coalition forces.49  Should 
any contingency arise in the future, the Iraqis possibly would follow the same procedures. 
Therefore, determining under what circumstances Iraqi operational doctrine for CBW use 
might be applied to Turkey requires the following scenario-based analysis:  
                                                 
46 Iraqi military manuals suggest that Iraq had an operational doctrine for the use of chemical as well as 
incapacitating and lethal biological weapons. Moreover, the Iraqi CBW doctrine and strategy indicates that, 
during the Gulf War, Iraq had the capability to carry out chemical and biological weapon strikes against 
Coalition targets. In addition, during the Gulf War, according to some Iraqi officials, authority to launch 
missiles was predelegated to field commanders in the event that Baghdad was hit by nuclear weapons. For 
a detailed analysis see, Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, “ Saddam’s Toxic Arsenal 
Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars,” in Peter Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz, 
eds. , Planning the Unthinkable, pp. 47-78. 
47 McCarthy and Tucker, “ Saddam’s Toxic Arsenal,” p. 62. 
48Ibid, p. 65.  
49 Ibid, p. 72 
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1.   Large-Scale WMD Use against Turkey in a Regional Conflict  
Turkey supported the Coalition’s Operations in various ways during the Gulf War 
and allowed the use of the Incirlik Airforce base during Operation Desert Fox. Any of 
these actions might have elicited an Iraqi response, including missile strikes carrying 
chemical and biological warheads against Turkey. A frustrated Saddam Hussein—
determined not to tolerate U.S. and British strikes originating from Turkish bases—could 
have decided to launch chemical or biological war-headed Scuds on specific strategic 
targets, such as the Incirlik airbase. In addition to retaliatory response, these missiles 
could have been used for tactical purposes to prevent decapitating strikes on Iraqi 
strategic targets. Indeed, in February 1999, such a scenario came very close to reality 
when Iraq threatened to attack Turkey if it continued to permit the United States and 
Britain to use its bases and territory to bomb Iraq.50 
  In the future, similar contingencies might occur. This could be either as a result 
of the Iraqi noncompliance with the UN sanctions or as a result of Iraqi violation of the 
U.S. mandated no-fly zone to the north of the 36th parallel. Should the Turkish bases 
again be used for strikes against Iraqi installations, the prospects for Iraqi retaliation 
against Turkey would be much higher, possibly this time with NBC-tipped Iraqi missiles.  
In the same manner, political turmoil in Iraqi could well result in a general 
deterioration of relations between Turkey and Iraq. Against this background, Turkey’s 
growing exposure to the retaliatory consequences of Iraqi missiles in theory could 
become a real vulnerability in practice. Once the Turkish cities and strategic assets 
become hostage to Iraqi retaliation and once Saddam Hussein is convinced that he has 
established the strategic equality to Turkey’s conventional superiority, he could exert a 
more aggressive stance against Turkey. This could be aimed at inducing Ankara to solve 
the water problem or other problems at hand. The deterioration in relations, as a result, 
might instigate old animosities. 
All these events can act as a pretext or a trigger for a large-scale CBW attack on 
Turkey. Chemical or biological weapons could be used against Turkish troops on the 
extended battlefield. Iraq could employ different chemical or biological agents for both 
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military and political objectives. Since any kind of confrontation with Turkey might 
possibly invoke a NATO response under Article 5 of the NATO provisions, Saddam 
Hussein could resort to chemical or even more likely biological weapons to disrupt 
regional NATO military operations and to prevent formation of an effective NATO 
military coalition that could challenge or reverse Iraq’s aggression against Turkey. 
2.   Lethal or Non-Lethal CBW Use against Deployed Turkish Forces  
In one of Turkey’s regular anti-PKK incursions designed to clear the area of the 
PKK presence in northern Iraq, a revengeful Saddam Hussein might consider the 
operation as a Turkish provocation and a violation of Iraq’s territorial integrity or at the 
very extreme point, a pretext for “Turkey’s designs” to take back the oil- rich Kirkurk-
Mosul region. 51 In such a mindset, he might decide to employ chemical or biological 
weapons in retaliation against Turkish forces whose number sometimes reaches 50,000 
troops. By using non-lethal CW or incapacitating biological agents against Turkish troops 
operating in northern Iraq, Saddam Hussein might attempt to decisively delay or disrupt a 
national-based response by Turkish forces to his highly repressive activities. According 
to McCarthy and Tucker, “Iraqi forces have the operational expertise on CW use, with an 
ability to tailor the delivery of chemical agents to specific tactical situation.”  52  In this 
regard, chemical warheaded missiles or aerial-bombs might be used against logistic 
assets, assembly areas and command and control nodes in Turkish rear during the large 
PKK-related Turkish offensives into northern Iraq. This action could be aimed at cutting 
the logistic and communication lines of Turkish troops operating deep inside northern 
Iraq and put them in risk of being encircled by Iraqi forces or even PKK terrorist groups.  
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A small number of Turkish troops stay in northern Iraq and is reinforced for 
operations against the PKK bases from time to time.53 In the outbreak of the hostilities, 
Saddam Hussein might predelagate the chemical release authority to his field 
commanders to deny the Turkish troop presence. He might also approve his field 
commanders’ chemical fire requests to prevent the reinforcement of these troops. In this 
way, Iraqi chemical weapons also could be used as strategic weapons to demoralize and 
provoke fear on Turkish forces rather than inflicting battlefield casualties. By firing 
chemical munitions and artillery rounds on these troops, Saddam Hussein might want to 
send a signal both to Turkey and United States to take seriously Iraq’s determination to 
fight the outside forces—who were trying to keep northern Iraq outside the control of the 
Iraqi state.  
Also according to McCarthy and Tucker, Iraqi doctrine for biological weapons 
suggests that Iraqis might be planning an offensive use of biological agents as a force 
multiplier for countering a conventionally superior adversary, such as Turkey. 54 In the 
same chapter, McCarthy and Tucker contend that,  
Iraqi military manuals suggest that Iraqi military strategists seek to inflict 
nonfatal casualties so as to overburden the enemy and damage troop 
morale. These manuals also suggest that Iraqi military considers covert 
biological weapons operations behind the enemy lines.55  
Keeping the Iraqi operational doctrine for BW use in mind, the Iraqi leader could 
even consider early use of incapacitating agents such as Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis 
(VEE) and Q Fever or lethal biological agents, such as anthrax by contaminating the 
natural water resources in Northern Iraq before Turkish troops enter the region.  
3.  Terrorist Use of CBW 
Terrorism might be another way in which Saddam Hussein could use as a proxy 
to deny the Turks from the region. As the recent Anthrax cases in the United States 
suggest, it is almost impossible for an adversary to deny the terrorist use of an 
incapacitating or lethal biological agent. Thus, BW use through third party is much more 
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likely to be the path chosen by Saddam Hussein in a proxy war against Turkey. He could 
easily deliver some biological agents to PKK terrorists. These terrorists could 
contaminate the water and other natural resources to inhibit advancing Turkish troops. 
Since Turkish operations usually take place to clear the area of PKK presence every fall 
and spring, looking at the earlier troop movements when and from which direction the 
troops will enter northern Iraq can easily be predicted. As Khidir Hamza, the author of   
Saddam’s Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological 
Weapons Agenda, recently put it, “What will keep Saddam Hussein from delivering some 
BW agents to a PKK terrorist by putting it in a truck and delivering it to the terrorists in 
Turkey?”56 
 Saddam Hussein also may cons ider dispersing two non- lethal biological agents-
VEE and Q Fever simultaneously. 57 Since the incubation period for Q Fever would be 
within the recovery period for VEE, this would extend the period in which Turkish troops 
would be incapacitated. The use of two non- lethal agents simultaneously would also 
complicate diagnosis and treatment. This would give sufficient time for Saddam to 
prepare for an offensive against the incapacitated Turkish troops. 
Saddam Hussein might prefer the use of non- lethal agents such as VEE or Q 
Fever to limit the risk associated with creating large-scale fatalities among Turkish 
troops. This could be aimed at preventing a harsh NATO or bilateral U.S. and Turkish 
response. By releasing sufficient amounts of combined dry agents or VEE at each water 
source in the region just days before Turkish troops come to the region, the Iraqis could 
incapacitate or kill the majority of the troops operating in the region as well as the 
innocent Iraqi Kurdish population living in the area. Either Iraqi NBC teams or PKK 
terrorists trained by Iraqi officials for this mission might use BW agents in such a way. 
One should recall that Saddam Hussein did not hesitate to use chemical weapons against 
his own Kurdish population in Halabjah in 1988. Therefore it would be reasonable to 
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contend that harming the civilian Kurdish population would not be a high concern for 
Saddam. For him, ending the constant Turkish military operations in Northern Iraq would 
possibly be a more important priority. 
Some experts believe that such a scenario is highly unlikely, arguing that Iraq 
would be constrained from using BW fearing costly repercussions. However, Turkish 
strategic planners should not dismiss such a possibility while planning operations in the 
region. According to Khidir Hamza, a direct CBW use by Saddam Hussein against 
Turkey in such a way is quite unlikely except indirectly by supporting the terrorist use: 
I doubt that Saddam will use CBW in such a condition. Its repercussions 
could be very bad. However, there is the evidence that Saddam used CW 
[against the Iranians] when he could. But the Iranians were inside Iraq at 
that time and didn’t have the retaliation capabilities. 58 
The evidence suggests that if Saddam Hussein used such weapons because Iran 
was within the Iraqi territory and Iran lacked the retaliation capabilities in kind, then he 
might use it against Turkish forces operating in northern Iraq, for Turkey also lacks the 
same retaliation capabilities. 
In the current U.S.-led war on terrorism, the threat of WMD use by terrorists is 
even more likely. As a sign of its full support for the U.S.- led war on terrorism, Turkey 
has allowed the use of its airspace for U.S. and British warplanes heading for 
Afghanistan. At the same time, U.S. and British jets have also increased their patrols of 
the northern Iraq no-fly-zone from the Turkish airbase in Incirlik. There is also a 
possibility that U.S. may strike the terrorist cells in Iraq, if Washington is convinced that 
the Iraq supports, the terrorist organization, Al-Queda. Under such a circumstance, 
Saddam Hussein may use the current offensive against Afghanistan as pretext to attack 
Turkey–this time with weapons of mass destruction. Defense analysts now report that 
Turkey feels vulnerable to a missile attack amid the U.S.-led offensive in Afghanistan. 
According to intelligence reports Saudi billionaire fugitive Osama bin Laden has as many 
as 100 agents in Northern Iraq near the Turkish border.59 Recently, Ankara is concerned 
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that forces aligned with terrorist Osama bin Laden could strike Turkey with missiles.60 In 
fact, the United States is worried about such a possibility, too. Washington has officially 
warned Baghdad against moving any troops toward the Turkish border in the Kurdish 
autonomous zone in northern Iraq and attacking its neighbors with weapons of mass 
destruction and thus, against exploiting the current situation in Afghanistan. 61 
4. Conventional or NBC-tipped Missile Attacks against GAP Facilities 
The most likely WMD use against Turkey could occur as a result of the ongoing 
water dispute. If Turkey reduces or cuts off the water of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers in 
order to fill the new constructed dams, as was the case in 1990, tension between the two 
countries could increase, resulting in a concerted Iraqi and Syrian hostility and even an 
ultimatum to pressure Turkey to stop reducing the flow of water. Already confident about 
his WMD capabilities, Saddam Hussein might directly threaten to strike the dams and 
hydropower plants of the GAP project, arguing that he would no longer tolerate the 
Turkish water policies. Such a confrontation could generate “water wars” in the region, 
with the involvement of Turkey, Iraq and Syria. If such a situation arose, Ankara is well 
placed to achieve an operational success against a conventionally inferior Iraq. If the 
situation worsens, Saddam, recognizing that defeat was inevitable, might trigger Iraqi 
CBW use against Turkey. Therefore, conceivably, Iraq might employ NBC-tipped Scud 
missiles against Turkish targets, possibly including Ankara. In this case, Adana and 
Iskenderun would be extremely vulnerable to Iraqi missile attacks, including NBC-tipped 
Scuds.62 
In the case of Ankara’s curtailing the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers 
either by filling the existing dams or by diverting water to the irrigation channels or (as a 
part of potential contingency planning) to the Mediterranean, Iraqi regime might deliver 
lethal biological agents such as anthrax to the PKK terrorists and these resurgents could 
contaminate the dams of the GAP, including the largest Ataturk Dam, which supplies the 
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water of the whole Southeastern Anatolia, and claim that if the Iraqi people can not use 
the Turkish water, neither can the Turks.  
Some Iraqi experts believe that if there is any threat to Turkish dams in the GAP 
region, a Turkish contingency plan will divert the water to the Mediterranean. In such a 
case, Saddam Hussein might be planning covert use of BW agents to contaminate the 
Turkish dams to deny these resources to Turks in the region. As Khidir Hamza put it, “if 
there is a contingency between Iraq and Turkey, Iraq may strike the Turkish dams 
possibly with missiles. ” 63 
E.   IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKISH POLICY AND FREEDOM OF 
ACTION 
 Increased Turkish security exposure to Iraqi WMD threats may have operational 
as well as diplomatic consequences. In addition to the perceived threats from an Iraqi 
WMD arsenal and its direct impact on military defense and planning, the political 
implications of such worst-case scenarios becoming an inevitable reality are more 
alarming than the perceived vulnerability- especially in the case of a nuclear Iraq.  
A nuclear bomb in the hands of Saddam Hussein would be totally intolerable to 
Turkey. Nuclear weapons would inflate his self-confidence and encourage Saddam 
Hussein to adopt a more aggressive attitude toward Turkey. First of all, he would not be 
as tolerant as he is, to Ankara’s current policies of allowing the West use to Turkish 
airbases to strike Iraqi targets, or to Turkey’s water policies or military operations in 
northern Iraq, all of which are considered as direct threats to Iraqi interests.  
According to Khidir Hamza, Saddam Hussein would more aggressive and 
intolerant: 
 I doubt the Turks would use water weapon against Iraq … I doubt the 
Turks would conduct military operations in northern Iraq, and I doubt the 
Turks would allow the use of its airbases and facilities to strike Iraq by 
U.S. and Britain, if Iraq had the nuclear bomb. Saddam would openly 
support the Kurdish minority in Turkey in various ways and use terrorism 
as a proxy against Turkey. Turkey would not dare to confront Iraq. A 
nuclear bomb would give Saddam impunity for what he does.64 
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Moreover, should a future crises similar to the Gulf War erupt in the region, 
unlike in 1990-1991, Turkey’s freedom to fully implement the UN sanctions and its 
active support for Coalition operations would be quite limited even with full NATO 
backing and sufficient confidence in the NATO security guarantee, including its nuclear 
dimension. In the case of a nuclear Iraq, Turkey would probably face a more pronounced 
strategic dilemma, which would result in Turkey assuming a more conservative posture 
with the U.S. and NATO policies in the region. At the same time, the increased exposure 
of cities to Iraqi retaliation would complicate the prospects for the U.S. access to Turkish 
facilities for expeditionary operations in northern Iraq, leaving the United States without 
one of the secure rear areas from which to project power. Even, short of war, during the 
increasing hostilities, as a result of Turkey’s geographic proximity and thereby of 
vulnerability, Saddam could be selected Turkey as a target to strain the Alliance’s 
cohesion when, for example, a joint exercise is conducted in the Mediterranean. 
Similarly, in the context of  “force projection” scenarios, finding a staunch regional ally 
like Turkey would be much more difficult for U.S. and the West in general, as Ankara 
would be concerned about a potential Iraqi retaliation. The prospects for access to 
Turkish bases would then depend, in part, on providing reasonably effective air defenses 
to Turkey against potential Iraqi missile attacks.65  
Ankara’s concerns about Iraqi intentions and WMD and missile risks from Iraq 
surfaced in the recent U.S. confrontation with Iraq. Ankara has been tolerant but 
unenthusiastic about allowing the use of the Incirlik airbase for offensive air operations in 
the Gulf. Even the Allied aircraft strikes within the rules of engagement of Operation 
Northern Watch were viewed with concern by Turkey’s leadership. Thus, Turkish 
policymakers have tolerated, but are clearly uncomfortable with the use of Incirlik 
airbase for strikes against Iraqi targets.66  Overall, the Turkish reluctance results from the 
Turkish desire to avoid unpredictable regiona l consequences of a conflict with Iraq.67 
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All of the potential scenarios analyzed above suggest that, although highly 
unlikely, Iraq could resort to WMD against Turkey under certain circumstances. As past 
evidence of Iraqi WMD use proved, Iraqi leaders lack morals when it comes to power 
politics. No matter who is in power, be it Saddam Hussein or someone else, Iraqi regime 
might use asymmetric means to pressure Turkey. Iraq is desperately short of access to a 
sea and thus, is strategically dependent on Turkey for its oil exports as a source of 
revenue. Therefore, Baghdad would probably use its asymmetric WMD capabilities to 
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III.    IRANIAN WMD THREATS TO TURKEY 
A.    INTRODUCTION 
Of Turkey’s neighbors believed to be pursuing weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and advanced missile programs, Iran poses unique dilemmas for the strategic 
calculations of Turkey. On the one hand, defense analysts believe that Iran’s pursuit of 
WMD and advanced missile programs stems from its serious, and somewhat legitimate 
concerns with neighbors, namely Iraq, Israel and Afghanistan. Thus, Iran’s intentions are 
not directed against Turkey explicitly. On the other hand, Turkish concerns heighten as 
reports of Iranian attempts to acquire long-range delivery capabilities for WMD use are 
revealed, suggesting that Iran’s motives exceed the innocent rationale of homeland 
defense. Iranian capabilities and intentions force Ankara to consider Iran a part of 
Turkey’s security equation. Some analysts now argue that since Iran is set to replace 
Syria as the leading regional threat, Iran has also become a planning factor for the 
Turkish military. 68  
Many of the Turkish concerns with Iraq could also apply to Iran, even in the event 
of a PKK-related clash. Over the last few years, the crises came to the brink of military 
confrontation on a number of occasions. From time to time tensions heightened between 
Tehran and Ankara as a result of Turkey’s discontent with Iranian support for the PKK, 
reported Turkish strikes against PKK targets in Iranian territory, the competition for 
influence between Turkey and Iran (fueled by the dangers of Azeri separatism), and the 
clash of rival Islamic Iranian and Turkish secularist ideologies.69 Any of these sources of 
friction could lead to a Turkish-Iranian armed conflict, especially in the south Caucasus. 
Given the possibility of a Turkish-Iranian military clash, Iranian officials might  consider 
weapons of mass destruction as a credible deterrent against Turkey. 
Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs are a definite source of growing 
concern in Turkey. These concerns reinforce Ankara’s interest in intelligence and missile 
defense cooperation with Israel and the United States. Ankara’s increasing exposure to 
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Iran’s longer-range ballistic missiles also encourages a conservative view of NATO’s 
defense posture, including its nuclear policy, and a strong interest in counterproliferation 
as a part of the new Turkish security agenda.70  
This chapter focuses on Iranian WMD capabilities and potential threat scenarios. 
Thus, it addresses some key questions that confront Turkish defense planners:  
· What is Iran doing in the NBC and delivery system arena, and why is it 
pursuing these objectives?  
· What is the status of Turkey’s relations with Iran and what are the 
potential flashpoints?  
· What is the likelihood of Iranian WMD use against Turkey? Under what 
circumstances might Iran use nuclear, biological and/or chemical weapons 
against Turkey?  
· What are the implications of these capabilities for Turkey? 
 
B.   CAPABILITIES 
Iran claims to be in full compliance with its treaty obligations. However, recent 
intelligence reports on proliferation describe Iran as “one of the most active countries 
seeking to acquire WMD and advanced conventional weapons technology from 
abroad.”71  However, Iran’s WMD and missile efforts are at different stages and pose 
different concerns for the neighboring states. Some programs are in preliminary stages 
and provide Tehran an option to develop an operational capability and the ability to 
export weapons and production capability. 
Iran has developed several lines of artillery rockets, ballistic missiles and 
unmanned aerial vehicles as potential systems for NBC delivery, and—although Tehran 
is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—it maintains a robust chemical 
weapons capability. Experts also believe that Iran may be working to acquire nuclear 
weapons technology and offensive biological warfare capabilities. 72 
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As a victim of WMD aggression and missile attacks, Iran seeks to deter its 
opponents as well as to gain more power in the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea regions by 
acquiring and developing WMD capabilities.73 Tehran’s motives for seeking nuclear 
weapons also include its rivalry with Iraq and its desire for a deterrent against a major 
power intervention. Turkey’s NATO membership and its close strategic alliance with 
Israel are also interpreted by Tehran as potential threats. 74 
Iran's WMD programs significantly affect the strategic environment in the entire 
Middle East. In addition to undermining the international non-proliferation norms, these 
programs pose a direct military threat to Iran’s neighbors, such as Turkey, as well as to 
U.S. military forces deployed there. Turkey is considered to be one of the potential 
regional targets of Shabab-3, a 1350 km-range ballistic missile which was successfully 
test- fired for the second time in July 2000.75   
Some analysts believe that Iran would only resort to weapons of mass destruction  
when the regime’s survival is in question, yet evidence throwing light on Iranian 
intentions calls such an argument into question. Iran's development and use of chemical 
weapons in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and its storage of chemical weapons on Abu 
Musa, an island in the Persian Gulf off the coast of Dubai, suggest that Tehran would use 
such weapons long before the regime's security is in doubt. Even if Iran’s clerical leaders 
might consider WMD as a legitimate defense requirement, by merely sustaining offensive 
nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities and by implicitly stating that it has the 
ability to retaliate with unconventional means, Iran might be expecting to gain leverage 
over the neighboring states.76 
1.   Nuclear Weapons Program 
Iran has “an organized structure dedicated to developing nuclear weapons.” To 
this end, Iran is “trying to establish the capability to produce both plutonium and highly 
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enriched uranium” in an effort to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon. 77  At the 
same time, Iran seeks to acquire fissile material and nuclear technology from foreign 
sources such as Russia, China and North Korea. In recent years, in an attempt to shorten 
the timeline to produce a nuclear weapon, Iran has launched a parallel effort to purchase 
black-market fissile material, mainly from sources in the former Soviet Union, including 
Kazakhstan. 78   
China and Russia have been Iran’s main suppliers of nuclear technology. 79  
Russia has signed an agreement with Iran and is expanding civilian nuclear cooperation, 
paving the way for the delivery of a nuclear reactor. According to Russian sources, 
Moscow is building a 1,000-megawatt VVER-1,000 nuclear power reactor for Iran at 
Busher. The accord recently signed between Moscow and Tehran includes delivery of a 
nuclear reactor for Iran’s Busher nuclear facility in November 2001.80 Some experts are 
concerned that this could trigger additional sales of Russian nuclear facilities to Iran. 
According to intelligence reports, Russian companies continue to help Iran develop 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, in some cases by allowing Russian scientists 
to work at Iranian nuclear facilities.81  
China has also been active in supplying nuclear technology to Tehran but pledged 
in 1997 not to sell a key facility and other nuclear technologies to Iran. 82 Beijing  “also 
agreed to terminate cooperation on a uranium conversion project,” which could “have 
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allowed Iran to produce uranium hexafluoride or uranium dioxide, … the feedstock 
materials for the manufacture of weapons grade plutonium.”83 
Iran has a parallel effort to acquire “a heavy water-moderated, natural uranium-
fueled nuclear reactor and associated facilities suitable for the indigenous production of 
weapons-grade plutonium.”84 The primary goals of Tehran’s efforts are  to obtain  more 
sensitive nuclear technologies from Russia and to develop the necessary expertise and 
infrastructure in related nuclear technologies. 
According to Proliferation: Threat and Response, “ Iran’s success in achieving a 
nuclear capability will depend, to a large degree, on the supply policies of Russia and 
China or on Iran’s successful illicit acquisition of adequate quantities of weapons-usable 
fissile material.”85 Nevertheless, the presence of hundreds of tons of poorly secured 
weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union 
suggests that the danger that Iran may be able to obtain such sensitive materials still 
remains. Therefore, assuming that the current trends of foreign assistance continue, Iran 
should be expected to become a nuclear power equipped with a long-range missile 
delivery system. 
2.   Chemical Weapons Program 
Although a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Iran has the most 
active chemical warfare program in the developing world.86 Iran is most advanced in 
chemical weapons, with a capability use these weapons in war and also to export them. 87 
According to Proliferation: Threat and Response, “Tehran has manufactured and 
stockpiled blister, blood and choking chemical agents, and weaponized some of these 
agents into artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and aerial bombs.”88 
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Tehran started its chemical weapons program in 1983 and produced its first agent 
in 1984, during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War in retaliation against Iraqi CW use. Recent 
unclassified reports of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) suggest that Iran is 
continuing to expand and to diversify its chemical weapons program. CIA Intelligence 
reports also estimate that Tehran currently controls a chemical weapons (CW) stockpile 
of several thousand tons of sulfur, mustard, phosgene, and cyanide agents, and has the 
potential of producing 1,000 tons of these agents each year.  89 It is also believed that Iran 
is conducting research on nerve agents and has yet to produce more advanced nerve 
agents such as Soman, Tabun, Sarin, or VX. 90 
Iran also has first-hand experience with chemical weapons in war. Having 
developed chemical weapons during the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq war as a “deterrent” 
against Iraq, Iran’s military has the tactical expertise to deliver CW to intended targets. 
From an Iranian perspective, self-sufficiency in armaments and the ability to retaliate are 
major requirements for deterring any type of future aggression against the country. 91 
Therefore, regardless of the extent of its bitter wartime experiences in employing CW, 
Tehran has developed a large, self-sufficient CW production capability.  
As a past victim and later on user of chemical weapons during the 1980-88 Iran-
Iraq War, Iran must be credited with vast experience in CW use. Tehran might offer its 
knowledge of chemical warfare to other countries of proliferation concern. Moreover, as 
a country already aware of the operational, tactical, strategic and psychological 
advantages of using chemical weapons against enemy troops, “Iran could employ these 
agents during a future conflict in the region. Lastly, Iran’s training, especially for its 
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3.   Biological Weapons Program 
According to U.S. Department of Defense, “Iran has a growing biotechnology 
industry, significant pharmaceutical experience and the overall infrastructure to support 
its biological warfare program.”93 Tehran’s efforts include seeking considerable amount 
of dual-use biological materials, equipment and expertise from sources in Russia and 
elsewhere, including some Western European companies. 
 Iran has an active biological warfare program, which is believed to have begun 
during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Since then, Tehran seems to be pursuing offensive 
biological warfare capabilities. Also, its knowledge of and battlefield experience in 
biological warfare has increased considerably, resulting in some capacity to produce BW 
agents and the means for delivering them. 94 In this regard, Iran has conducted research on 
more lethal agents like anthrax, foot and mouth disease, and biotoxins and may have 
begun active weapons production technology to make dry storable and aerosol weapons. 
This would allow Iran to develop suitable missile warheads and bombs and covert 
devices. 95  
Recent intelligence reports indicate that Iran may have weaponized both live 
agents and toxins for artillery and bombs and may be pursuing biological warheads for its 
missiles. Tehran’s BW activities could also involve individual saboteurs, artillery, or 
spray tanks on trucks, aircraft, and RPVs.96 Russia and China has been implicated in 
supporting aspects of Iran’s CW and BW activities. According to a December 1998 New 
York Times report, given the Iranian ties to Russian expertise, Iran might adopt agents 
such as Marburg, smallpox, plague, and tularemia, developed by the former Soviet BW 
program.97  Nevertheless, foreign assistance and participation will be the decisive factor 
in assessing the level of Iran’s BW program. Given the dual-use character of the 
materials and equipment sought by Iran, identifying and even more difficult, preventing 
Iran’s BW program is difficult.     
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4.   Ballistic Missile Program 
Iran has one of the largest and most capable ballistic missile inventories in the 
Middle East. Tehran’s arsenal mainly consists of Russian designed Scud rockets as well 
as modified Scuds based on a North Korean design.  Currently, Iran possesses two 
versions of the nuclear-capable North Korea supplied Scud ballistic missile: the Mod. B 
(300 km range) and Mod. C (500-km range). Tehran also possesses Chinese-made CSS-8 
SRBMs with an estimated range of 150 km in its inventory.98 Iran has more than 400 
surface-to-surface missiles in its inventory: including about 25 CSS-8 launchers with 200 
missiles, and about 10 Scud launchers with 210 Scud-B and Scud-C missiles. These 
missiles have sufficient range to hit targets in Turkey, Iraq and the other states bordering 
the Persian Gulf.  
Iran is also striving to indigenously produce its own ballistic missiles and to 
become a missile technology supplier state. Iran’s Shehab-3 missile, a 17-ton medium-
range ballistic missile (MRBM) with the capacity to carry a 1.2-ton payload and an 
estimated range of 1,300 kilometers, was first tested in July 1998 and became operational 
following a second successful test launch in July 2000. 99  
According to Proliferation: Threat and Response, Iran has the capability to 
deploy limited numbers of Shabab-3 by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC)100: 
Iran has built openly and publicly displayed prototypes of this MRBM 
[Shabab-3] and may have achieved an emergency operational capability 
for it. That is, it could deploy a limited number of the missiles in an 
operational mode during a perceived crisis.  … In July 2000, just prior to 
the missile’s second flight test, the commander of Iran’s Revolutionary 
Guard Corps stated that Iran had formed Shabab-3 units and built 
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launching pads for the missiles. While this may overstate Iran’s current 
capabilities, it clearly demonstrates Iran’s intent. 101 
 
 
Figure 2:  Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Iranian Ballistic Missiles.102 
 
Iran's development of the Shahab-3 is significant for two reasons. First, as can be 
seen in Figure 1, it gives Iran a delivery system able to strike every important U.S. ally—
like Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia in the region. Second, it is clearly designed as a 
delivery system for weapons of mass destruction. With the Shabab-3 missiles, Iran would 
be one of the leading missile powers in the Middle East. This could significantly alter the 
military equation in the Middle East, given Tehran’s ability to strike strategic targets in 
Israel, Saudi Arabia, and most parts of Turkey. 103 
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SYSTEM Range Number of 
Launchers 
Number of Missiles 
 CSS-8 150 km 25 150 
Scud B/C 300/500 km 10 300 
Shabab-3 (Tested, not 
fully deployed)  
1,300 km <5 N/a 
   
Table 2:  Iran’s Major Missile Systems.104 
Despite a slowdown in Russian aid, Iran also continues developing its long-range 
Shabab-4 missile. According to recent intelligence sources, China has been identified as 
the main partner in Tehran’s 2,400 kilometers-ranged Shabab-4 project. In recent years 
China has provided Iran with technology for solid-fuel engines, specially treated missiles 
and simulation testing. Intelligence officials now believe that Shabab-4 missiles could be 
ready for testing as early as next year.105 Tehran also has publicly mentioned the 
governments’ plans for developing Shabab-5 with a range of 5,500 kilometers. This 
missile may either be designed as an IRBM or a space launch vehicle.106 In addition, over 
the next 10 to 15 years, Tehran is likely to test an intercontinental ballistic missile that 
could strike the United States.107  The increasing availability of technology, foreign 
assistance, cross-fertilization of proliferant programs suggests that Iran will be able to 
pursue more capable and more ambitious missile programs in the near future. 
C.   POTENTIAL FLASHPOINTS 
Secular Turkey and Islamist Iran appear to be polar opposites. Each sees the other 
as an unwelcome source of inspiration to subversives within its own society. But current 
Turkish unhappiness with Iran goes well beyond philosophical disagreement.  
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1.   Islamic Fundamentalism 
Turkish officials are convinced that an Iranian hand in Turkish politics is trying to 
interfere in Turkey’s secular political system. 108  In recent years, Ankara is increasingly 
concerned about the growth of Iranian- led Islamic fundamentalism in the country. The 
government has frequently expressed its discontent with Iranian officials’ active 
involvement in fueling the “Islamist fundamentalist movements,” which are deemed as 
the greatest internal threat to Turkey’s security. 109  Turkish security authorities have 
repeatedly stated the evidence of Iranian links with the Islamic fundamentalist groups and 
accused Iran of attempting to undermine the secular order of Turkey through furthering 
Islamist propaganda and even through training and support of Islamist terrorist 
organizations, such as the Hizbollah. 110 There has also been growing evidence of Iran’s 
involvement in political violence and assassinations within Turkey. 111 Anti-Turkish 
remarks and anti Turkish-demonstrations organized by some Iranian officials reveal a 
persistent anti-Turkish attitude in the official Iranian circles. As a result, constant tensions 
and accusations arise between the two countries, including official protests and 
extradition of Iranian diplomats suspected of being involved in terrorist activities or 
fundamentalist movements in Turkey. 112 
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2.   Iranian Support for PKK Terrorism 
Turkish officials are also convinced that Iran has emerged as the region's leading 
supporter of the PKK, while providing long-time support for fundamental Islamist 
movements within Turkey. Turkish officials believe that Iran provides the PKK with 
weapons, training, and funds, and that it hosts up to fifty PKK camps on the Turkey-Iran 
border where its fighters prepare for terrorist actions and receive medical treatment. 
Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit recently claimed that, “after Syria halted its support of the 
PKK to a certain extent, Iran took over Syria's role [as the PKK's leading state 
supporter].” 113 
Continued PKK attacks in areas adjacent to the border frequently produce tension 
between the two countries. Over the last few years, Turkey and Iran were close to 
military confrontation a few times, as the PKK and Turkish military operations near the 
Iranian border intensified. In 1994 and again in 1999, Turkish fighter planes, in their 
pursuit of the PKK, damaged Iranian border villages used as sanctuaries. It has even been 
rumored that the Turkish government, frustrated by Iran’s support of anti-Turkish 
terrorism, considered a military attack on PKK bases in Iranian territory in May 1995.114 
In July 1996, the PKK attacked a Turkish military post on the Iranian border. Turkish 
President Suleyman Demirel visited the border and criticized Iran bitterly. 115 Just days 
after the bombing, yet another crisis erupted when Iran apprehended two Turkish soldiers 
who allegedly crossed into Iran during an operation against the PKK. Hence, the prospect 
of a potential armed conflict—once remote—has come to the fore as a result of the cross-
border incidents and increased tension between Ankara and Tehran. Some analysts now 
argue that Iran has become a planning factor for the Turkish military. 116 
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3.   Rivalry for Influence in the Caucasus  
Aside from Iranian support for terrorism, other bilateral disputes exist. Turkish-
Iranian rivalry, geographically speaking, has widened considerably in recent years, now 
encompassing northern Iraq, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. There is a longer-term risk 
that the competition for influence between Turkey and Iran fueled by the dangers of 
Azeri separatism, “the Nagarno-Karabagh conflict,”117 and the clash of rival Islamic and 
Turkish secularist ideologies could lead to a Turkish-Iranian armed conflict in the south 
Caucasus.118   
Turkey and Iran once again came to the brink of confrontation over the Caspian, 
in August 2001. After an Iranian warship fired warning shots toward an Azeri oil 
research vessel in the disputed waters of the Caspian Sea and Iran’s constant violations of 
Azeri airspace, the Turkish government in Ankara has launched a serious of military 
steps to stop Iran from pressing claims against Azerbaijan in the Caspian, including 
sending harsh warnings to Iran against fomenting tension in the oil-rich Caspian Sea. In 
response to the Turkish warnings, an Iranian Foreign Ministry official stated that, “We do 
not view Turkey as a frightening power … However, this adventurous gesture will be 
given a retaliation …. ”119 Iran could definitely be relying on its WMD and advanced 
missiles capabilities to pursue an aggressive stance toward its neighbors. The situation in 
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the Caspian is likely to constitute a further tension between Iran and Azerbaijan, which 
could involve Turkey, Armenia and Russia if an armed confrontation is likely to occur. 
4.   Turkey’s Western Orientation and Its Alliances  
Another potential source of conflict between Turkey and Iran results from 
Turkey’s Western orientation and its alliances. Iran sees Turkey as pro-U.S., and since 
the 1996 Turkish-Israeli Military Agreement, pro-Israeli, and a regional rival of growing 
strength. Officials in Tehran see Turkey as an agent and potential launching pad for 
Iran’s enemies, acting under orders from the United States. 120 The Iranians constantly 
criticizes the 1996 Turkish-Israeli military cooperation agreement that permits Israeli jets 
to exercise in Turkish airspace. Tehran is concerned that Turkey has brought the once-
distant Israeli enemy to the edge of the Iranian border since Turkey and Israel are 
cooperating in intelligence gathering and electronic surve illance, primarily against Syria 
and Iran. 121  
D.  THE LIKELIHOOD OF WMD USE AGANIST TURKEY  
Turkish strategic planners are increasingly concerned about Iran’s activities 
involving missile technology and weapons of mass destruction. The successful test of a 
medium-range Shabab-3 missile in February 2000 that could reach large parts of Turkey 
increased the country’s vulnerability. It also reminded the Turkish defense planners of 
their country’s insufficient anti-missile capabilities. The evolving Iranian potential 
complemented by a Shabab-4, gains its full threatening meaning for Turkey, particularly 
when Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability is also considered.  
Iran has several alternatives uses for Its NBC capabilities against Turkey. Iran 
could use the weapons to deter Turkey and its ally U.S. from getting involved in a 
conflict with Iran. To implement such a strategy, Iran could threaten to use its weapons 
against Turkish troops deployed to the border during a crises or against U.S. forces 
deployed in Turkey. Tehran could even threaten covert use of weapons against the targets 
in Turkey. If Turkey’s conventional or U.S. extended deterrence commitments to Turkey 
fails, the weapons could be used to limit the scope of actions against Iran and the regime. 
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Thus, Iran could threaten use of its arsenal if certain thresholds are crossed. At least in 
this way, Iran could ensure that the war remains limited.   
In the case of a conflict with the United States, Iran’s weapons also could be used 
to drive a wedge between the United States, Turkey and its NATO Allies. By suggesting 
that countries hosting the United States might come under attack from Iranian NBC 
weapons, Iran could ensure that Turkey do not support U.S. military actions and that 
Turkey do not allow the United States to operate from facilities in Turkey. Finally, the 
weapons could be used as a part of a war fighting strategy to compensate for Iranian 
conventional weapons deficiencies. Thus Iran could target Turkish military forces, key 
facilities supporting Turkish forces, or critical reinforcement nodes. 
1.   CBW Use in a Regional Conflict 
Iran’s wartime experience and current threat perceptions make nuclear, biological 
and chemical weapons essential to Iran’s national security. After being repeatedly 
exposed to Iraqi chemical weapon attacks during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, Iranian 
leadership is already aware of the value of chemical weapons and its disproportionate 
psychological effects, especially when used effectively against poorly defended 
adversaries. 122 
Moreover, as Hashemi Rafsanjani’s suggested in a speech in parliament in 
October 1988, the Iranians see the ability to retaliate with a sufficient nuclear, biological 
and chemical capability as the main requirement for deterring any type of future 
aggression against Iran:  
 With regard to chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons 
training it was made very clear during the war that these weapons are very 
decisive. It was also made very clear that the moral teachings of the world  
are not very effective when war reaches a serious stage; the world does not 
respect its own resolutions, and closes its eyes to the violations and all the 
aggressions which are committed on the battlefield …we should fully 
equip ourselves in the defensive and offensive use of chemical, 
bacteriological and radiological weapons. 123 
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Considering the current “reach” of Iran’s long-range ballistic missiles, which can 
carry chemical and biological warheads, these weapons might easily be used against 
Turkey in a military confrontation. Turkey is increasingly frustrated by Iran's support of 
anti-Turkish terrorism. Thus, given Turkey's more assertive regional policies of recent 
years, Ankara is likely to press Tehran increasingly over time—with threats or even 
limited use of force—if the Iranians do not alter their behavior and rein in the PKK.124 As 
was the case in 1995 and 1999, the Turkish government—determined to stop Iranian 
support for PKK terrorism—could again strike the PKK bases in Iran. Given Tehran’s 
emphasis on its ability to retaliate with unconventional means, Iran could retaliate by 
striking strategic Turkish facilities and military targets as far as Ankara.  
Furthermore, even though the evidence of Iranian CW use against Iraq during the 
1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War suggests that Tehran would not be the first to use nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons, if the conflict escalated to a certain point, the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)125 could resort to CBW use against Turkey. With its 
emphasis on asymmetrical war-fighting strategies, the IRGC may choose an 
asymmetrical escalation option, either to preempt or to respond to a Turkish air strike of 
the PKK bases in Iran. 126 Currently, Tehran is more preoccupied on other fronts—Iraq, 
the Gulf, Azerbaijan, and  Afghanistan—and is conventionally rather weak because of the 
effects of the crippling sanctions imposed during and after the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. 
Moreover it has very little leverage over Turkey. Therefore, in the case of an armed 
conflict, Iran is in no position to openly confront Turkey conventionally. 127 However, in 
such a case, the Iranian military might employ chemical and possibly biological weapons 
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on the battlefield to compensate for their conventional weaknesses. According to Giles, 
Iran’s military has the capability to do that: 
Iran’s military is capable of employing chemical weapons on the 
battlefield, at sea, and against strategic targets deep in the rear. It can do so 
using a variety of delivery systems, from mines, tube, and rocket artillery 
to rotary-and fixed-wing aircraft, naval vessels, and long-range ballistic 
missiles. Iran has adopted virtually every major type of weapon system to 
deliver chemical agents. The modification of delivery systems also may 
apply to biological and nuclear weaponization efforts. 128 
Moreover, the current training patterns provides clues about Iranian intentions to 
use nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons against a conventionally superior enemy. 
Since the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian military has made an extensive effort to 
improve its ability to operate in an NBC environment. The regular military and the IRGC 
routinely train in nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare. In fact, the increase in the 
number of Iranian exercises after Operation Desert Storm indicates that the Iranian armed 
forces are expecting to use nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons to offset the 
adversary’s advantage in conventional weapons.129  Therefore, under certain 
circumstances, Iran might consider using CBW against Turkish forces as a part of its 
counterforce doctrine of balancing a conventionally superior military. This may be 
simultaneously aimed at sending a signal not only to Turkey but also to its NATO Allies 
that any military adventurism against Iran may have unpredictable repercussions.  
With the increasing possibility of a Turkish-Iranian armed conflict in the south 
Caucasus, an actual CBW use against Turkish forces deployed to Turkish-Iranian border 
should not be dismissed. The spillover effects of an Iranian-Azeri armed clash due to 
Iranian claims in the Caspian Sea or ethnic Azeri separatism in Iran carry the risk of 
precipitating a direct Turkish military intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. 130 In such an 
event, although Iran most likely will be constrained from using CBW against Turkey, a 
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potential for CBW use against Turkish forces either by a false warning or by 
unauthorized use still exists.  
Azerbaijan has strong cultural and ethnic ties with Turkey and is regarded as the 
closest ally of Turkey. Therefore, there is a high risk that an intervention on behalf of 
Baku could spill over into conflict involving Turkey and Iran. In fact, past evidence 
during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1992-93, suggest that Turkey’s neighbors—
particularly Russia and Iran—are taking the possibility of a Turkish intervention 
seriously by taking countermeasures:  
Russia began to amass forces and leverage to become the sole and decisive 
arbiter of the Nagorno-Karabakh war and to defeat Turkey’s grand 
design…. Moscow aided insurgents aga inst an anti-Moscow Azeri 
government, supported the Armenian forces fighting Azerbaijan, and 
deterred, by nuclear threats, any Turkish plans to act on behalf of Baku. 131 
If the increasing Azeri separatism assumes a threatening character for Iranian 
territorial integrity, Iran might blame both Baku and Ankara for the Azeri activities in 
Iran. During the escalation period, owing to its determined pursuit of organizational 
autonomy and its disregard for wider national policy, the IRGC could use chemical or 
biological weapons—although it may be unauthorized by the Iranian leadership—against 
Turkish forces dispatched to the border.132 Iraq’s surprise invasion in 1980 might have 
encouraged Tehran to delegate more authority over control and use of nuclear, biological, 
and chemical weapons to IRGC forces and under certain circumstances to the regular 
military. Thus, the IRGC forces, acting under more authoritative and delegative 
command and control procedures, might employ CBW either as a result of a false 
warning or fear of a Turkish preemptive airstrike. Therefore, in a potential future conflict 
involving Iran, Turkish strategic planners must strongly consider the risk of an 
inadvertent escalation.  
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2.   Unconventional Weapons Use in Retaliation 
Under the 1996 Military cooperation agreement, Israel has access to the vast 
Turkish airspace to train its pilots for long-range missions, which could be employed 
against regional weapons-of-mass-destruction sites and would enhance its ability to 
collect intelligence against arch-foes Iran, Iraq and Syria.133 Although Turkish-Israeli 
military cooperation is a powerful deterrent to any aggressive action against Turkey, 
Ankara is taking most of the risks. It is far from clear, indeed probably unlikely for now, 
that Turkey would allow Israel to stage attacks from its territory, that Israel and Turkey 
would plan a joint operation, or that Israel or Turkey, lacking a direct interest, would join 
a war involving the other. Nevertheless, neighboring Iran (also Syria and Iraq) might be 
considering and planning for these possibilities or planning for less overt forms of Israeli-
Turkish cooperation during hostilities.134  
In this regard, concerns about a possible Osirak-type strike by Israel or other 
potential adversaries are also a factor in Iranian defense planning. 135 Israel's military co-
operation agreement with Turkey has heightened Iranian fears that Israel will launch an 
attack against Iran's nuclear facilities.136 For example, during a visit to Turkey in January 
2000 Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazzi reportedly raised Iranian concerns about 
the potential for attacks by Israeli military aircraft that train in Turkey and fly close to 
Iran's borders.137  During the Iraqi crises of February 1998, the Turkish ambassador to 
the United States stated that Turkey would consider allowing Israel to use Turkish 
airspace for retaliation should Iraq launch missile attacks on Israel.138 As Efraim Inbar, 
director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, has recently observed, Turkish 
airspace could be used for retaliation against Iran and Iraq by Israeli Air Force:  
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Israeli combat aircraft flying in Turkish airspace near the Iraqi and Iranian 
borders enhance Israeli deterrence against missile attacks from these 
countries. The chances of the Israeli Air Force dealing effectively with 
such weapons are better when the distances involved in airstrikes are 
smaller.139 
By openly stating that it has the ability to retaliate with unconventional means, 
Tehran constantly sends warning signals to Israel and its allies. As the Iranian nuclear 
weapons program nears completion, Israel might consider a conventional military strike 
on the Busher nuclear facility as it did against the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981. 
Although unlikely, due to its geographical proximity to Tehran, Israeli preventive strikes 
on Iran’s unconventional weapons infrastructure might be conducted from Turkish 
airbases. 140  However, this might trigger an Iranian retaliatory response possibly with 
modified Scud missiles and long-range Shabab-3 missile equipped with nonconventional 
warheads. Even, in the absence of Turkish involvement, Iran may decide to punish 
Turkey for cooperating with Israel by maintaining Israeli intelligence installations along 
the Turkish-Iranian border or by allowing Israeli spy planes to gather- intelligence about 
Iranian nuclear facilities from Turkish airspace. In such a case, the most likely targets 
would be the reported Israeli intelligence installations on Turkish soil and the Turkish 
strategic installations in the area. Similarly, any wounded Israeli aircraft landings on 
Turkish territory could be another catalyze for Iranian retaliatory strikes.  The following 
assessment by Michael Eisenstadt supports the likelihood of such a scenario: 
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For Iran, Israeli-Turkish military cooperation has brought Israel to its 
border. Israel has reportedly established intelligence listening posts there, 
and Turkish cooperation would greatly facilitate Israeli air strikes on Iran's 
nonconventional weapons infrastructure, much of which is located near 
Tehran. Israeli aircraft could stage from and/or refuel over Turkey, greatly 
increasing their striking range.141 
Turkey’s assistance to Israel under the “Turkish-Israeli Military Cooperation 
Agreement” accords could legitimately justify and thus trigger an Iranian WMD use 
against Turkey.  
3.  Terrorist Use of CBW 
The Islamic Republic of Iran may also use chemical and biological weapons in 
acts of terrorism against Turkey. By allegedly supporting-harboring, financing and 
training-Islamic militant groups in Iran and by successfully masking all these activities, 
Iran has been able to pursue undeclared war against Turkey without any military 
reprisals. Iran is also behind the hundreds of suicide bombings against Turkish 
government and security officials and unresolved killings by Hisbollah militants for 
decades.142 Thus, Tehran may even consider chemical weapons as useful terrorist 
weapons. In response to potential Turkish strikes against PKK camps in Iran, Tehran may 
deliver biological and chemical weapons to the PKK or to extremist Islamic groups 
without having to face the repercussions. Terrorist groups such as the PKK or the 
Hisbollah could employ these weapons in densely populated Turkish cities like Istanbul 
and Ankara, resulting in mass killings. According to Giles, reports verify Iran’s intention 
to use CBW in terrorist attacks: 
Press reports claim that Iran has developed a biological weapons aerosol 
for terrorist use and that Iran leaders used a poison to assassinate three 
opponents of the regime in 1996.143   
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In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on U.S. territory, the risk of 
biological weapons use by the Islamic militants has increased. To show its determination 
to fight terrorism with every means possible, Ankara has allowed U.S. and British planes 
to use Turkish air space and the government has approved the deployment of troops 
abroad, particularly to Afghanistan. However, Turkey now fears an anthrax attack from 
Islamic insurgents connected to Saudi billionaire fugitive, Osama Bin Laden, and from 
the Islamic groups in Iran. 144    
 
E.  IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKISH POLICY AND FREEDOM OF ACTION 
Iran’s acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and advanced delivery 
capabilities could have dramatic implications for Turkish policy and security.  First of all, 
realizing Turkey’s vulnerability to missile attacks, Iran would possibly use these weapons 
as a source of intimidation or blackmail. These weapons could be used to coerce Turkey 
and to deter its NATO allies from responding to aggression against one of its allies, 
which may invoke an Article V responsibility.  By giving Tehran the ability to put 
Ankara and in the near future Bonn, London or Paris at risk, these weapons could impede 
an effective NATO response to Iranian aggression against Turkey. At least, Iran’s 
possession of nuclear weapons would certainly complicate coalition building within the 
NATO Alliance. 
In the event of a potential confrontation with the United States, Iran could use its 
WMD arsenal to prevent Turkey from supporting its closest ally, as Ankara did during 
the 1990-1991 Gulf War. By openly threatening or blackmailing Ankara, Iran might want 
to ensure that Turkey can not support U.S. military actions, and that will not allow the 
United States to conduct preemptive strikes against Iran from Turkish facilities.    
In the event of a nuclear Iran, Turkey’s strategic dilemma would be even more 
pronounced. Most of all, in future crises, a nuclear-powered Iran will be able to influence 
Ankara by limiting its freedom of action and by constraining Turkey from taking actions 
against Iranian interests, especially in the Caucasus. Turkey may not be able to take 
decisive actions such as striking terrorist bases in Iran or such as openly warning Iran for 
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its aggression against Azerbaijan. Ankara may not be able to wield its military and 
economic assets to end Tehran's allegedly growing support of anti-Turkish organizations, 
as it did in the past. At least, Ankara faces a monumental task, for if Iran is armed with 
WMD, Turkey’s economic and military leverage over Tehran will diminish perilously.  
The prospects for a direct intervention to an Azeri-Iranian armed conflict would also be 
very limited. Similarly Iran would easily be able intimidate or practice political blackmail 
against Turkey in periods of crises.  
Iran could even use these weapons to import its Islamic revolution. The following 
statement of Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, a prominent Turkish scholar, perhaps best reflects the 
existing Turkish concerns about Iranian WMD capabilities: 
A nuclear-armed Iran would be in a position to claim leadership of the 
Islamic world, and to exercise increased influence on Turkish domestic 
politics to the detriment of Turkey’s Western-type secular democratic 
regime and western-oriented foreign policy. 145   
It would be fair to conclude that Iran’s aggressive stance and anti-Turkish 
attitudes toward Turkey might be originating from Tehran’s reliance on nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons. Hence, Turkish policy makers and defense planners 
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IV.     SYRIAN WMD THREATS TO TURKEY                                        
A.   INTRODUCTION 
Turkey's long southern border with Syria is an area of tension. In recent years, the 
risk of conflict with Syria has increased. This has increased Turkey’s attention to Syria as 
a security challenge.146 Numerous issues have strained Turkey’s relations with Syria. For 
example, continued Syrian territorial claims to Turkey’s Hatay province,147 disputes over 
sharing the waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates, Syrian criticisms of Ankara’s military 
cooperation with Israel, weapons of mass destruction and above all, Damascus’s support 
and sheltering of the PKK and its leaders. Of these concerns, the last has been proximate 
and consistently more dangerous. Ankara has periodically threatened to strike PKK 
camps in Syrian-controlled parts of the Bekaa Valley. And finally, in October 1998, the 
crisis over Syria's alleged support for the PKK brought the two countries to the verge of 
war when Turkey threatened Syria with armed action. Growing tension between the two 
countries has heightened the existing fears that a military conflict could erupt in the 
region. Potential hot pursuit incidents across the border or an even more serious 
confrontation between forces still seem a very real possibility at times.148 
Syria’s ballistic missile capabilities and its possession of weapons of mass 
destruction have also been a major worry for Turkey. Syria is continuing its policy of 
building CW and ballistic missiles to provide a strategic deterrent capability against 
potential regional adversaries.149 Since the Gulf War, concern about Syria has grown in 
Turkish security circles and now the concern is even more prominent as Syria expands its 
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ballistic missile and chemical weapons capabilities while attempting to develop offensive 
biological weapons. Recent intelligence reports reveal that Damascus hopes to use 
chemical and biological warfare agents on its Scud C and D missiles. These missiles can 
strike large areas of Turkey. This increased Turkey’s exposure to any aggressive behavior 
from Syria. Since 1998, the potential for conflict with Syria has been reduced but not 
eliminated by the expulsion of Abdullah Ocalan from Damascus. This suggests that 
Turkey might be one of the victims of Syrian WMD use. Unable to achieve conventional 
military parity with Turkey, Syria’s weapons of mass destruction could help the Assad 
regime counter a potential Turkish attack on Syrian territory while continuing its proxy 
war against Turkey.  
As can be seen in the above section, Syrian  CBW and missile capabilities and the 
likelihood of these weapons being used against Turkey are a grave threat to Turkey.  
Therefore, a closer analysis of Syria’s capabilities should be discussed in detail.   
B.    CAPABILITIES 
Syrian chemical weapons development has been largely spurred by its disastrous 
conventional military defeats by Israel. After Syria's air force was routed by Israeli jet 
fighters in Lebanon in 1982, Syria sought to bolster the country’s strategic capabilities by 
pursuing by developing chemical weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems.150 Syria 
has developed the weapons as a counterweight to Israel's superior conventional military 
and nuclear arsenal. Naturally, these weapons also intimidate potential regional 
adversaries such as Turkey. Syria apparently decided that surface-to-surface missiles 
could counter Israel’s and Turkey’s (since the early 1990’s) air superiority. 151 From a 
strategic perspective, long-range missiles, such as the Scuds, offer a means to deliver 
chemical weapons in response to Israeli nuclear threats and to Turkey’s recent threats to 
use force.152  
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Therefore, Syria will likely continue to develop an extensive chemical and 
biological weapons arsenal and will also invest in upgrading the accuracy of its missile 
systems and conventional warheads to supplement its CBW programs. 
1.   Nuclear Weapons Program 
Intelligence reports claim that Syria currently is not pursuing the development of 
nuclear weapons. Although Syria has an ongoing nuclear research effort and has a small 
Chinese-supplied research reactor, no evidence of major progress in the development 
effort exists.153 
2.   Chemical Weapons Program 
Of the Arab nations, Syria has the largest and most advanced CW capability in the 
Middle East.154  Syrian efforts to acquire chemical weapons begun as early as 1972. By 
1986, Syria reportedly possessed a large arsenal of both blister and nerve agents. By the 
1990s, the Syrian chemical weapons arsenal included hundreds of tons of chemical 
agents. Weaponized agents include blister (mustard) and nerve (sarin, VX), and can be 
delivered in aerial munitions, artillery and rocket shells.155 
 Analysts believe that by the late 1980s, Syria had armed many of its modern 
missiles, including Scuds, with chemical warheads. While Syria's existing CW capability 
is principally based on Sarin nerve gas, the officials believe that Syria is investigating VX 
nerve gas in an effort to obtain an effective CW capability. 156 Today, Syria maintains a 
wide rage of delivery systems including shells, bombs, and nerve gas warheads for 
multiple rocket launchers. Damascus is also believed to have binary weapons and cluster 
bomb technology suitable for delivering chemical weapons. Syria’s CW capabilities 
include warheads filled with sarin for the Scud-B and Scud-C missiles, and bombs filled 
with much more persistent VX that can be delivered by Su-24, MiG-23 or Su-20/22 
aircraft.157 Syria began producing its Sarin-based CW warhead in the mid-1980s and 
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developed other delivery means, including gravity bombs for its strike aircrafts and 
possibly artillery rounds for its ground forces.158 Syria is believed to have flight-tested a 
Scud-B short-range ballistic missile carrying a warhead designed to disperse VX in 1998. 
Defense analysts are now worried that VX can be deployed in the Soviet-supplied SS-21 
surface-to-surface missile and the North Korean-developed Scud-C missiles.159  
Syria is also capable of producing precursor chemicals used for producing 
mustard, and probably sarin as well. So far, three Syrian production sites have been 
identified as producing CW agents. According to a recent report by Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS), one of the CW production facilities is located in a 
suburb north of Damascus. A second is near the industrial city of Homs and is the likely 
source of petrochemical derivatives for ethylene, a mustard precursor, and alcohols, 
which are used to produce nerve agents. A third facility in Hama is said to be producing 
VX, a heavy gas regarded as being immune to wind shifts. According to the same report, 
hundreds of agent tons¾including nerve and mustard agents¾are produced by these 
facilities.160 
Syria has recently purchased earth-boring equipment to build deep bunkers for 
CW and to shelter their military and political leaders against a potential Israeli or Turkish 
strike.161 There are also unconfirmed reports of sheltered Scud missiles with unitary 
Sarin or Tabun nerve gas warheads¾now being replaced by cluster warheads with VX 
bomblets¾deployed in caves and shelters near Damascus.162  
 According to Israeli defense sources, currently Syria is able to produce advanced 
warheads indigenously. Damascus has launched an effort to use the chemical and 
biological warfare agents for deployment on Syria's Scud C and D missiles, which have a 
range of nearly 600 and 700 kilometers, respectively, and can strike anywhere in Israel 
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and in large areas of Turkey. 163 Although US officials said the weaponisation efforts are 
being conducted indigenously, a recent Central Intelligence Agency report stated that 
Syria's CW efforts "remain heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor 
chemicals and other key CW-related equipment. 164  
In the future, Syria should be expected to continue to improve its chemical agent 
production and storage infrastructure. However, to maintain key elements of its chemical 
warfare program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment, Syria 
needs to acquire related materials from foreign sources.165 
3.   Biological Weapons Program 
Syria is also believed to be pursuing biological agent development and possess 
sufficient biotechnical infrastructure to sustain an offensive biological weapons 
program.166 Several unconfirmed reports indicate that Damascus appears to be close to 
successfully engineering some viral agents. These reports indicate that, “it is highly 
probable that Syria is developing an offensive biological capability.”167 There are reports 
of at least one underground biological production plant based in Cerin. This plant 
probably has a production capability for anthrax and botulinum and possibly other 
agents.168  Intelligence sources claim that Syria weaponized the Botulin and Ricin toxin 
and possibility a small amount of anthrax in the early 1990s. Syria may also be 
developing or testing biological variations on ZAB-incendiary bombs and PTAB-500 
cluster bombs and Scud warheads. 169  
Experts believe the design of biological bombs and missile warheads with the 
lethality of small nuclear weapons may now be within Syrian capabilities. These 
capabilities also include the design of UAV, helicopter, cruise missile, or aircraft-borne 
systems to deliver the agent slowly over a long broad area.170   
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Syria also has attempts to obtain BW agents from foreign sources and is 
contracting assistance from China and from Western companies.171 The evidence of 
foreign help is also revealed in a recent CSIS report stating that, “ Syria's principle 
suppliers of CBW production technology includes large chemical brokerage houses in 
Holland, Switzerland, France, Austria, and Germany, including many of the same 
companies that were supplying Iraq.”172  However, without significant foreign assistance, 
that Syria could manufacture significant amounts of biological weapons for several 
decades is unlikely. 
4.   Ballistic Missile Program 
After Iran, Syria has one of the largest missile capabilities in the Middle East with 
a limited number of Scud warheads.173 Today, Syria possesses missile technologies 
capable of striking the population centers and industrial targets of Israel and its regional 
adversaries, offering a strategic deterrent against any kind of military action against itself. 
Currently, the bedrock of Syrian strategic capabilities is based on the Scud-B and Scud-C 
missiles, which allow Syria to attack neighboring countries’ population centers and 
strategic assets.174  Due to Syria's reliance on the Scud, Damascus has taken precautions 
to protect these missile systems by burying them in concrete, deep beneath hillsides, so 
that they are invulnerable to air raids.175 
According to U.S. (DoD) officials, to carry the CW warheads, Syria has also 
fielded “a couple of SSM brigades of Scud-Bs and Scud-Cs, comprising several hundred 
missiles.” 176  Each of these brigades is believed to be equipped with 12 mobile launchers 
and slightly more than 100 missiles. 
Syria also acquired new long-range North Korean Scud Cs and these weapons are 
reportedly deployed in the northern part of the country. The Scud Cs have ranges of up to 
550-600 kilometers. Reports claim that Scud-C nerve gas warheads using VX cluster 
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bomblets seem to have been in production since early 1997. Meanwhile, cooperation with 
North Koreans, which began in the early 1990s, has given Syria the capability to 
indigenously produce complete Scuds as well as to upgrade their ranges from the 300km 
Scud-B to the 500km Scud-C. More recently, Syria is reportedly trading a reduction in 
958 kg payload to approximately 350-450kg, as well as degraded accuracy, for the 
increased range—which gives them the ability to strike strategic targets deep in the 
adversaries’ territories.177  
Syria flight-tested its Scud-D version late in September 2000, a range of about 
600km.178 Analysts believe that due to the missile's light payload and poor accuracy, it is 
likely to have only a unitary warhead, which most probably would carry the more lethal 
VX agent to put opponents' population centers at risk. Once complete, the greater range 
would allow Damascus to fire the Scud-D from further within its own territory, thereby 
making the task of locating the launchers and conducting a pre-emptive strike against 
them more difficult. Moreover, it would allow Syria to bring Turkey's capital Ankara 
within range, thereby putting its second strategic threat (Turkey) under increased 
exposure. 179  
In addition to the Scud missiles, Syria possesses FROG-7, and the SS-21 SRBMs 
acquired from the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Moreover, there are reports of 
Chinese deliveries of M-11, M-9 missiles.180  Syria also obtained chemical warheads, 
filled with VX nerve gas for its Scud-B and FROG-7 missiles from the former Soviet 
Union.181 
There were reports in May 2001 that Syria was also looking to procure the 
Iskander-E (SS-X-26) tactical ballistic missile system from Russia.182 The missile has a 
range of 280km and has a quicker reaction time and better defensive maneuvering than its 
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Scud predecessors. The missile is believed to have multiple-warheads and the system 
would certainly increase Syria's missile capabilities. 
Damascus continues to acquire Scud-related equipment and materials from Iran 
and North Korea, including considerable North Korean help in producing Scud Cs. A 
missile test site exists 15 km south of Homs where Syria has tested missile modifications 
and new chemical warheads. According to some reports, during 1999 Syria  built two 
missile plants near Hama, one for solid fueled rockets and the other for liquid fueled 
systems. 183  Nevertheless, Syria can now build both the entire Scud B and Scud C and 
experts believe Syria has sheltered and/or underground missile production or assembly 
facilities at Aleppo, Hama and near Damascus.184 The most likely role for the Scud C is 
to deliver a chemical warhead to create mass casualties and havoc. Syrian Scud-C 
deployments Hama include a relatively high ratio of launchers to missiles in order to 
deliver an overwhelming first strike, and this enables Syria to launch most of its ballistic 
missiles in a few salvos. 185  
Some experts believe that Syria began storing some surface-to-surface missiles 
armed with chemical weapons in concrete shelters in the mountains near Damascus and 
in the Palmyra region no later than 1986, and plans to deploy them forward in an 
emergency situation have existed since that date.186 As can be seen in Figure 3, Syria’s 
Scuds allow it to threaten all of Israel and most portions of Turkey. 
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Figure 3:  Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Syrian Ballistic Missiles.187 
 
Ultimately, intelligence officials believe that Syria could be seeking a medium-
range ballistic missile, possibly based on North Korea's No-Dong, to meet Damascus' 
deterrent requirements against Israel, Turkey and Iraq.188 Syria could also eventually 
seek a future option to develop a modern solid fueled SRBM due to their greater military 
utility and ease of handling.  
C.   POTENTIAL FLASHPOINTS 
Given the missile capabilities and CBW arsenals of Syria, a serious Turkish-
Syrian clash could have unprecedented consequences for Turkey. An open conflict or 
even a protracted period of brinkmanship could result in Syria’s employing NBC-tipped 
Scud B and Cs against Turkish targets, possibly including Ankara. NBC-tipped Scuds 
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could also be employed against Turkish troops at the initial stages of a potential PKK-
related Turkish offensive into Syrian territory or during the Syrian troop advancements 
prior to occupation of the historically claimed Hatay province.189 In the case of a large-
scale intervention, the prospects for escalation would increase, as would the incentives 
for Damascus to explore asymmetric strategies—including using chemical and biological 
weapons against Turkish targets. This prospect, once remote, has come to the fore as 
Syria has sought a significant CBW capability as well as increased accuracy and range 
for its ballistic missiles, which are now capable of striking most parts of Turkey including 
Ankara. Therefore, assessing the circumstances under which CBW might be employed 
against Turkey is necessary. 
1.  Support for PKK Terrorism 
Turkey’s relations with Syria have been adversely affected by Syrian support for 
the PKK. Syria has periodically used its support for the PKK to pressure Turkey. PKK 
leader Abdullah Ocalan had been based in Damascus, and Syria has facilitated PKK 
operations in Turkey both financially and logistically.190 
Ankara periodically has warned Syria to stop supporting PKK and threatened to 
strike PKK camps in Syrian-controlled parts of the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon from which 
they have conducted anti-Turkish cross-border operations.191 There have also been 
constant hot-pursuit incidents between Syrian and Turkish forces pursuing PKK guerillas 
on the border.192 
Ankara's patience with Damascus broke in September 1998, when the Turkish 
government reportedly deployed 10,000 reinforcements to the Syrian border and 
threatened military action to force an end to Syrian support for the PKK. The Turkish 
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military chief-of-staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu’s accused Syria for using terrorism to wage an 
"undeclared war" against Turkey.  193  Ankara then made it clear that the support for the 
PKK would no longer be tolerated. As Atilla Ates, then, the commander of Turkish Army 
sated in October 1998: 
Because of Syrian support for the PKK there actually exists a state of 
undeclared war between Turkey and Syria. Turkey has been patient, but 
our patience has limits … Support for the PKK will no longer be 
tolerated.194   
With a growing capacity for mobile operations and combat experience from years 
of cross-border campaigns in northern Iraq, Turkey was determined to use every means 
possible including the use of force to halt Syrian support for the PKK. Immediate armed 
clash was averted when Syria acquiesced and agreed not to provide the PKK with arms, 
logistic and financial support and further agreed to expel the PKK leader Abdullah 
Ocalan.195 The Turkish government also stated that it reserved the right to resort to force 
if Syrian reneged on the agreement. Since then the PKK activity in Syria has diminished 
greatly and shifted to Iran, although PKK activity in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebonan 
persists.196 Over the years, Ankara has had to occasionally warn Syria that it would 
“suffer the consequences” if it continued to support the PKK.197 However, it should be 
recalled that Syria's track record of reneging on pledges to cease supporting the PKK is 
not very promising. For this reason, the prospects for a Turkish military action over this 
issue will remain as an option for the Turkish defense planners in the foreseeable future. 
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However, unlike other occasions over the past decade when Turkey sporadically warned 
Syria to cease supporting PKK but went no further, Turkey's rhetoric and reported troop 
mobilization on the Turkish-Syrian border was significant in showing Turkey’s 
unprecedented resolve to take military action if necessary. This should be regarded as 
evidence of Turkey’s newfound willingness to use force when it feels directly threatened 
by its neighbors.  
2.   Water Conflict 
Turkey and Syria are also embroiled in a long-standing dispute over the sharing of 
the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. The source of contention between Turkey 
and Syria is the huge development project called the Southeastern Anatolian Project 
(GAP), which envisaged the damming of the Euphrates and integrating a number of 
hydraulic projects.198 Syria perceives GAP project as “ a strategic threat” not only to 
itself and to Iraq but  to all countries in the region. 199 Syria fears that the GAP dams along 
the Euphrates will allow Turkey to use water for political blackmail and will create an 
ultimate dependence on Turkey. Given Turkey’s ability to cut off water supplies in 
wartime, the Syrians also fear that Turkey might deprive them of adequate water supplies 
during times of tension or hostilities. 200 Syria constantly raises the water issue in Arab 
organizations to ask for support against Ankara and mobilizes the Arab world to take a 
common stand against Turkey. The controversies between Turkey and its neighbors over 
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water are not isolated from other conflicts in the region. Clearly, the 30 year-old water 
dispute, has far reaching political and strategic ramifications, the most important of which 
is the Syrian escalation of the PKK’s war by proxy against Turkey to induce it to solve 
the water problem. 201  
As the GAP project comes closer to completion and as the hydropower plants and 
irrigation plans constrain Turkey’s flexibility on water release to its downstream 
neighbors, the friction over sharing the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers 
could easily turn contentious.  Therefore, in the future an increasing potential for conflict 
must be expected between the two states. This might not necessarily lead to a water war, 
although under adverse circumstances such a possibility cannot be excluded.202 
3.  Syria’s Territorial Claims on Hatay  
Syria’s territorial claims on Hatay are another source of resentment, which could 
surface if relations further deteriorate over the PKK and water issues. For decades 
Damascus has had claims on the Turkish province of Hatay. Syria has felt aggrieved over 
Hatay’s joining Turkey in 1939 under the terms of self-determination. Damascus regards 
Hatay as a territory Turkey has stolen from Syria, and like the Golan Heights, its 
recovery is a national priority. 203  Syrians still consider Hatay as a part of Syrian territory 
and they show Hatay as a part of Syrian territory on official Syrian maps and in Syrian 
textbooks. 204 In 1997, Syria made alleged attempts at subversion in Hatay by massing 
40,000 Syrian troops along the Turkish-Syrian border. 205 Ankara has long demanded that 
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Syria drop its irredentist claims on Hatay. As a result of the continuing Syrian claims on 
Hatay, the border has become increasingly militarized, with Syria’s deploying troops to 
the border and Turkey reinforcing its army in Hatay.  
Since Syria’s independence in 1936, the subsequent Syrian leaderships have used 
traditional claims on Hatay as a tool to build domestic support for the regime.206 As a 
result, this dispute has long corroded the Turkish-Syrian relations and there have been 
times when relations have further deteriorated between the two countries. The same may 
happen with future issues similar to that of the Tigris and Euphrates water supply 
problem, carrying the risk of a Turkish-Syrian military clash. 
4.   Turkish-Israeli Military Cooperation 
No country sees itself more directly threatened by the emerging Israeli-Turkish 
military axis than Syria. The alignment stood to impact Damascus both on the military 
and political level. Militarily speaking, Damascus is particularly concerned about the 
possibility that Turkey could assist Israel in wartime with Syria. 207 In return, Damascus 
suspects that Israel is providing Turkey with satellite images of Syrian ground and air 
defenses.208 These concerns are further aggravated by a possible scenario of a pincer 
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movement from the north and the south by the two strongest armies in the region. 209 
Some analysts now argue that in the future Damascus could face the possibility of 
fighting Israel in the Bekaa and/or the Golan, while having to maintain a portion of its 
troops along the Turkish border. 
Politically speaking, Syria appeared to be the main casualty. Damascus is now 
worried that the alignment would further strengthen both Jerusalem’s and Ankara’s 
bargaining power against Syria. This cooperation engendered a sense of strategic 
encirclement in Damascus, leading Syria to mobilize regional opposition to the Turkish-
Israeli Alliance.210  
From the beginning, not only Syria and Iran and Iraq but also more moderate 
Arab states vehemently criticized the “nascent alliance,” as they characterized the 
Turkish-Israeli military cooperation. 211 Furthermore, this trend also initiated dangerous 
efforts at establishing alliance networks throughout the region, characterized by an Israel-
Turkey-Jordan-Azerbaijan axis, on one hand and an Armenia-Greece-Syria-Russia axis 
on the other.212 In reaction to Turkey’s rapprochement toward Israel, Syria also moved to 
improve its frozen relations with Iraq and to bolster relations with Iran. For this purpose, 
intelligence reports indicate that Iraq and Syria have rapidly developed a military 
cooperation by signing a mutual defense pact in August 2001 and this cooperation is also 
linked to Iran. 213  In the north, Syria signed a military defense cooperation with Armenia 
in late August 2001 and is improving its defense ties with Russia, including recent efforts 
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to buy S-300 air defense missiles.214 Moreover, Syrian efforts to develop defense 
cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, accompanied by allegations that Syria was granting 
landing rights for Greek warplanes, attracted the concerns of Turkish officials.215  
Syria continues to regard the alignment between Israel and Turkey as a serious 
threat to its security. Therefore, the prospects for Turkish involvement in a conflict with 
Syria as well as the potential for Syria’s retaliatory actions against Ankara has 
dramatically increased since 1996. 
5.   Implications of the Middle East Peace Process 
It is quite possible that after a settlement with Israel, Syria may eventually use the 
conflict with Turkey as an excuse to maintain a large army and security apparatus.  
Ankara is especially concerned that after such an event Syria might turn its military 
potential against Turkey to realize its claim on Hatay. 216 In fact, the Syria’s ambassador 
to Washington, made Syrian intentions clear, in May 1998, “after the Golan Heights are 
taken back from Israel, the time will come to take Hatay from Turkey.” 217 
Moreover, once it has secured its southern front, Damascus’ hand will also be 
strengthened in the dispute with Turkey over water rights. Damascus might try to enforce 
its position in the water dispute by military threats after Syria is relieved of its military 
precautions against Israel. After a potential Syrian-Israeli understanding of trading their 
common water problem with respect to the Jordan river, an American-backed Israeli-
Syrian pressure on Turkey for surrendering in to Syrian demands on the Euphrates’ water 
allocation should also be expected.218  
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D.    THE LIKELIHOOD OF CBW USE AGAINST TURKEY 
Syria would likely refrain from using chemical or biological weapons aga inst 
Turkey, given its fear of a potential NATO response unless the regime survival is at 
stake.219 While it is most likely that Syria would use CBW only as a last resort in a 
conflict with Turkey, if such a conflict were to erupt it may choose to use such weapons 
in the earlier stages of such a conflict. 
A number of flashpoints still have the potential for CBW use. Syria could use 
chemical weapons prior to reoccupying the historically claimed Hatay or to stem a 
potential incursion by Turkey into Syria during the early phases of war.220  
1.  Use of CW to Regain Hatay Province 
Syria would have several viable options to use CBW against Turkey. Syria could 
use chemical weapons to depopulate the mostly Turkic Arab dominated Hatay province 
prior to reoccupation. CW could also be employed against Turkish troops in the initial 
stages of combat to assist Syrian troop advancement. This would most likely occur if 
Syrian forces were intent on swiftly invading Hatay.  
The tactical and strategic potential of Syrian chemical weapons suggest that Syria 
might prefer using chemical weapons at the initial stage of the combat. It should be 
recalled that by using a combination of volatile (e.g., sarin) and more persistent agents 
(e.g., mustard, VX), Syria has the capability to use CW in very different tactical 
scenarios.221 Sarin is extremely deadly, but it evaporates about as rapidly as water. A 
Syrian attack to retake Hatay using this agent could inflict high casualties on the Turkish 
troops near the battlefront. Moreover, because sarin dissipates quickly it could permit the 
attacking Syrian forces to seize the Hatay province without a major risk to its own troops.  
A Syrian attack to retake the Hatay might include the use of sarin munitions. It 
should be recalled that the Turkish-Syrian border is heavily massed with Turkish troops 
and whether all the Turkish troops deployed in the area are well equipped with chemical 
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defense equipment suitable for CW environment is not certain.222 Even if the Turkish 
troops are well equipped, the Hatay region is a densely populated area, so it is 
questionable whether the civilians living in the region would have a sufficient amount of 
protective equipment.  
Compared to VX nerve agent, sarin is also relatively easy to disseminate. Due to 
its viscous nature, VX requires some sort of aerosolization. However, prior to Hatay’s 
invasion, Syria could use VX most effectively to attack Turkish rear areas, including 
military installations and logistical networks such as the naval ports, airports and train 
stations in the Iskenderun region. Most people whose skin comes into contact with as 
little as one drop of VX will most likely die in minutes, unless they receive very swift 
medical intervention. Furthermore, this nerve agent would remain hazardous in the region 
for at least several days, requiring labor- intensive and time-consuming decontamination 
procedures.  
It should also be recalled from the capabilities section of this cahpter that Syria’s 
Scud-C missiles, which were originally purchased from North Korea, are being armed for 
long-range chemical weapons delivery. In 1997, Syria was reportedly in the process of 
developing cluster bomblets designed for loading nerve agents in Scud-C warheads.223 
Two Scud-C brigades, each equipped with 18 missile launchers, are reportedly deployed 
approximately 25 km east of Hama. Some 200 Syrian Scud-B missiles reportedly could 
be armed with conventional ordinance or with chemical warfare agent payloads, 
including VX.  
Syria might prefer using Scud-Bs to strike strategic targets and border security 
units near the border since the Scud-B has much shorter range (300 km) but has 985 kg 
payload, which allows Syrian forces to contaminate a large area in a short time by firing 
the Scud-Bs in a few salvos.224 Furthermore, because Scud-B missiles are more accurate, 
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they may be better suited for direct attacks on Turkish military targets in the Hatay 
region. Because of the low accuracy but long range of the Scud-C system, prior to the 
occupation, Syria may adopt the strategy of using Scud-C missiles to deliver chemical 
warheads on broader areas where Turkish military forces would be deployed to gathering 
points and to naval ports in Iskenderun, Moreover, depending on where the 500 km-
ranged Scud-Cs and (successfully tested but not deployed) 600 km-ranged Scud-Ds are 
deployed within Syria, the comparatively longer ranges of these missile suggests that 
they could be used to strike most, if not all, strategic military and civilian targets in 
Turkey, including the capital Ankara. 
3.   Use of CBW to Stem a Potential Turkish Offensive in Syrian 
Territory 
Another scenario would be Syria's use of CBW to counter a Turkish offensive 
aimed at ending Syrian support for the PKK. This could mostly happen as a result of 
Turkey’s newfound willingness to use force to when its interests are directly threatened 
by its neighbors. In recent years, two trends have prevailed in Ankara’s current policy 
toward Damascus. The first trend is Ankara’s growing frustration with Syria's support for 
Kurdish separatists. This frustration is compounded by Turkey’s growing anxieties over 
the water dispute and Damascus’s territorial assertions on Hatay. This anger at Syria over 
its support for the PKK has been percolating in Turkey since 1984 when the PKK 
initiated its fight against Turkey. This conflict has taken more than 35,000 lives on all 
sides. The second trend is Turkey's perception that the military gap between itself and 
Syria is steadily growing in its own favor. For a long time, Ankara lacked the self-
confidence that it could make Damascus pay for its support of the PKK, which Turkey 
considers a direct threat to its territorial integrity.  
 Indeed, Some reports now suggest that, since Syria bowed to Turkish PKK-
related demands in 1998, Turkey is more convinced that the threat of force is an effective 
tool against Damascus.225 Motivated by this notion, if Turkey is convinced that Syria is 
reneging on the 1998 Adana agreement and continues to provide the PKK with arms, 
logistic and financial support, Turkey could consider a military action aganist Syria. 
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Turkey could strike the PKK bases in the PKK controlled Beka Valley in Lebonan and 
follow with a ground-based Turkish offensive into Syria to punish the Assad regime for 
its hostility. 
In an armed confrontation, Ankara is well placed to achieve an operational 
success. Syria is preoccupied on other fronts, the Golan Heights and Lebanon, and is in 
no position to confront Turkey openly.226 Turkey's ground forces are twice as large as 
Syria's and more combat-experienced, and most of Syria's ground orders of battle are 
pinned down on the Golan or in Lebanon. 227  Moreover, according to some analysts, 
Turkey reckons that Damascus, fearing Turkish-Israeli military coordination, would feel 
uncomfortable redeploying significant forces to its border with Turkey. Therefore, 
Turkey could easily make a quick advance in days deep inside Syrian territory, and the 
Syrian army could suffer enormous casualties. If Syrian forces are unable to halt the 
Turkish offensives, then it is highly possible that Syria might consider using weapons of 
mass destruction to stem Turkish incursions into Syrian territory. 
A serious PKK-related Turkish-Syrian clash in this manner could have significant 
consequences for Turkey. Although a large-scale Turkish intervention aimed at toppling 
the Syrian leadership is unlikely, an unequivocal Syrian ground-defeat might well 
weaken the current regime and perhaps change the dynamics in the Middle East peace-
process in favor of Israel. 228 The situation could easily evolve into a directly threatening 
character for the survival of the Assad regime. After being defeated on three occasions on 
the conventional battlefield in 1967, 1973 and 1982, Syria might consider using WMD 
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against Turkey if the Syrian leadership deemed a total defeat inevitable or the survival of 
the regime is at stake. 
According to Ian O. Lesser, under such conditions, use of WMD against Turkey is 
a distinct possibility: 
In the case of an open confrontation, if significant amount of Syrian 
territory is lost or the survival of the Assad regime is threatened, it is not 
beyond imagining that Syria might employ Scud B and Scud C missiles 
against Turkish targets, possibly including Ankara. Adana and Iskenderun 
would be particularly vulnerable. In this case the prospects for escalation 
would increase, as would the incentives for Turkey to explore future 
deterrent strategies outside a NATO framework.229 
However, there are costs for using such weapons, both politically and militarily. If 
attacked by Syrian CBW, Turkey might retaliate massively with its superior airforce 
capabilities and more importantly; this might invoke a NATO Article 5 response. This 
scenario alone gives the Assad regime and Syria's other security elite an incentive for 
caution against Turkey. However, Turkish defense planners should not dismiss a 
potential Syrian CBW use because, if the regime in Damascus is convinced that a NATO 
response is not forthcoming, Syria would most likely consider using CBW against 
Turkish forces under certain circumstances.  
5.   CBW Use in Retaliation  
Syria has many grievances against Turkey, including the water issue and, more 
recently, relations with Israel. Resentment also remains at a slow burn over Hatay. 
Damascus uses the PKK to press Turkey to meet its demands on these issues. However, 
in the event of a potential war with Israel, Syria may seek to use CBW in retaliation 
against Turkish assistance to Israel or at least to punish Ankara for failing to meet 
Damascus’ demands on the above issues. 
Syria’s chemical weapons give Damascus a strategic option to deter—or 
preemptively attack—its northern nemesis, Turkey. Fearing a strategic encirclement by 
Israel and Turkey, Syria is very much concerned that Turkey and Israel can take a 
common military action against it. At least, Syrian strategists are seriously concerned 
about the possibility of Turkey’s assistance to Israel in wartime. Syrian leadership might 
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consider striking Turkish strategic targets calculating that they could be eventually used 
for supporting of Israel’s wartime effort. Such a move could also be aimed at preventing 
third party (Turkish) involvement or limiting the scope of Turkey’s assistance to Israel.  
Although the extent of Turkish military assistance to Israel in the event of a war 
with Syria would be situation dependent, albeit not openly, there is still a possibility that 
such an assistance could be a pretext of an eventual Turkish-Israeli common military 
action. Such an eventuality cannot be ruled out given Syria’s intensified CBW arsenal 
and missile acquisition efforts, which is regarded as a threatening action both by Turkey 
and Israel.230  In the event of war with Syria, Israeli aircraft and warships may operate 
from Turkish territory. 231 By quietly rendering assistance to the Israeli war effort, 
providing intelligence, missile early-warning data, and refuge for damaged Israeli aircraft 
or warships, Ankara could be willing to assist Israel to punish a troublesome neighbor. 
However, this could make Turkey a target for Syrian retaliation possibly with missiles 
carrying chemical warheads. By threatening to use chemical weapons, Syria may also 
seek to prevent Turkey from opening a second front in the north. In such a situation, a 
Syrian CBW employment in the theater could create a dramatically psychological impact 
on populations of both countries, thereby introducing an element of uncertainty into the 
Turkish and Israeli military calculations. 
Even though no direct a conflict with Syria has occurred since the 1996 Turkish-
Israeli military cooperation agreement, there is a new possibility that CBW might be used 
against Turkey in retaliation for Ankara’s cooperation with Israel—even if no actual 
assistance occurred. Thus, the Turkish-Israeli cooperation could become a Syrian excuse 
to punish Turkey by asymmetric strategies. 
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V.   NATO AND TURKEY:  WILL NATO’S SECURITY 
GUARANTEES BE SUFFICIENT TO DETER WMD USE AGAINST 
TURKEY?                                         
 
A.   INTRODUCTION                                                                            
One of NATO’s fundamental tasks, based on Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, 
is to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of a NATO 
member state. According to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: 
The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all 
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense 
recognized by Article-51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the 
use of  armed force, to restore  and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area.232 
During the Cold War, NATO military planning focused on a well-defined 
traditional Soviet threat and Turkey, occupying NATO’s southeastern flank, provided a 
bulwark against Soviet expansion. Turkey contributed to the policy of credible deterrence 
in the European theatre. In return, NATO’s collective defense system guaranteed 
Ankara’s national security. Confident about NATO’s security guarantees, Turkish 
military planners assumed that their Middle Eastern neighbors would be deterred from 
attacking Turkey since that would invoke a NATO response.233  
However, the momentous changes in Europe since the end of the Cold War, 
accompanied by a complete reconsideration of NATO strategy, have raised questions 
about the efficacy of this approach. In contrast with its European allies, Turkey is the 
only NATO ally that faces several serious potential territorial threats from (Iran, Iraq and 
Syria), as well as proximate risks from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and 
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ballistic missiles—all definable as Article 5-type contingencies.  Additionally, 13 out of 
the 16 potential crisis scenarios identified by NATO analysts are in Turkey’s 
geographical vicinity.234   
Therefore, it should be noted that the Alliance continues to have important Article 
5 responsibilities in the south, particularly on Turkey’s borders. Some key contingencies 
for the Alliance could involve the defense of Turkey itself. 235 Deterring and defending 
against these risks should be among the core objectives of NATO strategy and will be 
certainly an important test for the Alliance’s credibility. As David Yost put it, “Yet there 
are grounds to question whether and to what extent the Allies can sustain the centrality of 
collective defense in the absence of an overriding and substantial threat to Alliance 
security, such as the Soviet Union once posed.”236 
Indeed, doubts are often expressed about whether NATO would come to Turkey’s 
defense if Turkey’s security was threatened by developments in the Middle East. Among 
Turkish security elites, for the first time, the question of whether the “strong link” to the 
Western security system, namely NATO, can still be regarded as a reliable and credible 
element of the country’s security is now discussed frequently. 237  A general feeling has 
emerged in Turkey that the alliance has a limited ability to guarantee the country’s 
security against the new risks in the Balkans and the Middle East. Additionally, NATO’s 
search for a new role, strategy, and organization has created a certain uneasiness about  
the real political value of Turkey’s existing Alliance bonds. As a result, in recent years 
while Turkey’s threat perception has heightened, its trust in NATO or U.S. extended 
deterrence commitments has diminished.238 This new context and doubts about the 
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credibility of NATO’s security guarantees have opened the way to a new defense strategy 
such as the close Israeli-Turkish cooperation, which offers a deterrence dividend. 
Turkey’s growing engagement in the Middle East could lead to collective defense 
challenges for the Alliance. Many European allies strongly oppose broadening NATO’s 
area of responsibility and want the Alliance to focus on security threats to the Euro-
Atlantic area.  Some allies, particularly Germany, France and possibly Italy and 
(obviously) Greece, might balk at aiding Turkey if it became involved in a skirmish with 
one of its Middle Eastern neighbors, such as Iran, Iraq or Syria. 239  However, a failure of 
NATO to come to Turkey’s aid in such a case could create a crisis in Turkey’s relations 
with NATO and could even prompt Turkey to withdraw from the Alliance. Moreover, a 
clash with any of Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors, in which NATO support was not 
provided, would jeopardize the Alliance’s cohesion and credibility. 
This chapter analyses the credibility and reliability of NATO’s security 
guarantees, including the nuclear guarantees the United States provided under NATO 
auspices. This chapter analyzes five questions:  
· If Turkey came under attack by a WMD-armed adversary such as Iran, 
Iraq or Syria, would the other NATO allies interpret this as a case 
involving the Article 5 mutual defense commitment? Or would the Allies 
fail to respond due to a declining sense of commonality of interests within 
the alliance?  
· To what extent can one differentiate among adversaries and circumstances 
to reach judgments about the probable effectiveness of NATO’s overall 
deterrent posture?  
· Will NATO’s security guarantees be sufficient to deter WMD use against 
Turkey?  
· What are the obstacles to an effective—and timely—NATO response to 
NBC-backed aggression against one of the allies?  
· What are the implications of the Alliance’s collective defense challenges 
for Turkish security? 
This chapter considers the possibility that NATO’s security commitments to 
Turkey—including U. S. nuclear guarantees—might not be sufficient to deter WMD use 
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against Turkey in a potential Middle Eastern contingency. Given the possibility of a 
limited regional conflict as a result of aggression against Turkey, NATO’s Article 5 
mutual-defense pledges may not be honored in all circumstances. Indeed, many obstacles 
to an effective NATO response may be analyzed in two categories: NATO’s internal 
cohesion problems and NATO’s challenges in protecting its population, forces and 
territory (as defined in Article 6) against nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and 
ballistic missile attacks.  
B.  NATO’S INTERNAL COHESION PROBLEMS 
1.  The Alliance’s New Roles and Emphasis on Non-Article 5 Missions  
The Alliance’s new functions in support of collective security raise questions 
about its long-term cohesion.  The shift of the Alliance’s emphasis from the defense of 
members’ territory to the defense of common interests, particularly non-Article 5 
activities including crisis management and peace operations in support of collective 
security, “could have ambivalent effects on the Alliance’s collective defense posture.”240   
Indeed, controversial crisis management and peace operations could seriously 
undermine the alliance’s cohesion and solidarity. This could undermine NATO’s unity 
and thus the conditions necessary for maintaining its ability to carry out its ultimately 
more vital mission of collective defense. Moreover, these operations may require 
capabilities, training, and command and control procedures and thus resources different 
from those needed for large-scale Article 5 (collective defense) contingencies. This 
means that in a time of decreasing defense budgets in most NATO European members, 
allies have been dedicating already scarce resources to non-Article 5 activities instead of 
the collective defense missions of deterring aggression or coercion against. Indeed, there 
are increasing concerns among some NATO allies about the decline in the Alliance’s 
high- intensity combat capabilities. 241  
NATO’s failure to honor vague “security is indivisible” pledges or some NATO 
members’ expectations that the Allies would in certain circumstances form coalitions and 
commit forces to intervene could erode the Alliance’s cohesion, causing frustration and 
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disillusionment in some of the Allies. Indeed, the initial reluctance of NATO Allies, 
particularly the United States and some European Allies, to take military action in Bosnia 
to stop the ethnic conflict caused some frustration in Turkey about the selectivity of their 
approach—even though Bosnia represented a non-Article 5 security challenge. In 
Turkey’s view, Article 5 has been undermined by NATO’s recent focus on peacekeeping 
and humanitarian operations as well as by NATO’s initial reluctance to take action in the 
Kosovo conflict.242 
Maintaining the proper balance between sustaining the Alliance’s core function of  
“collective defense” and its new “collective security” roles is significant for Turkish 
security. In contrast with its European Allies, Ankara continues to regard threats to its 
borders as a serious concern. Therefore, there is a notable divide within the Alliance 
between Turkey and its European allies on the question of traditional Article 5 missions 
oriented toward the defense of territory versus non-Article 5 missions aimed at the 
defense of common interests. NATO’s shift in emphasis, its diversion of its scarce 
resources and efforts from traditional Article 5 missions of collective defense to activities 
in support of collective security, worries Turkish security elites. Ankara does not support 
the dilution of the Alliance’s traditional emphasis on collective defense (Article 5) and 
has been uncomfortable with the Alliance’s emphasis on the new missions and non-
Article 5 contingencies.243  The Alliance’s collective security commitments might 
complicate the pursuit of other NATO priorities—e.g., ballistic missile defenses.  
The expansion of NATO’s commitments beyond the mutual defense pledges 
expressed in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty could also erode the Alliance’s 
coherence.244 Indeed, deep disagreements between the United States and its major 
European Allies in 1992-95 over NATO’s responsibilities in dealing with the conflicts in 
the former Yugoslavia suggest that it would be more difficult for NATO to maintain the 
Alliance’s cohesion in future contingencies. Some analysts now argue that “the Alliance 
may be taking on too many new roles, thereby creating expectations that cannot be 
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satisfied.”245 Some further “argue that NATO may suffer from a loss of focus and a 
dispersion of effort” as it accepts responsibility for collective security roles.246 According 
to David S. Yost, NATO’s shift in emphasis to non-Article 5 missions could pose 
genuine risks for the Alliance: 
One of the fundamental risks is that the new roles may weaken the 
Alliance’s cohesion and undermine its ability to carry out the core 
traditional mission of collective defense. Each of the new roles holds the 
potential for a divergence of interests among the NATO countries and 
NATO’s new partners in the Partnership for Peace and other 
institutions.247 
However, these activities must not prevent the Alliance from sustaining its core 
function of  “collective defense” while conducting its new “collective security” roles. 
Future demands for NATO involvement in crisis management and peace operations could 
nonetheless create new resentments and debates among the Allies.  The Alliance’s 
cohesion therefore might become even more difficult to maintain.248 
2.  Downgrading of NATO’s Collective Defense Function 
 Limited regional contingencies, particularly on Turkey’s eastern borders, could 
pose great challenges for the Alliance’s cohesion.  Most NATO European allies strongly 
oppose the idea that Turkey’s involvement in Middle Eastern affairs and its current 
problems with its three neighbors should be considered potential Article 5 cases, fearing 
that this approach might lead to out-of-area threats to Europe. They argue that many of 
these problems originate in the deeply rooted mutual antagonisms and historical rivalries 
that existed long before Turkey joined NATO. Given the disagreements between Turkey 
and the EU over the latter’s efforts to create a rapid reaction force, friction over Turkey’s 
application for EU membership, the Cyprus problem, and controversies over the PKK 
and Kurdish issues, some European Allies might hesitate to accept responsibility for 
Turkey’s defense. However, the Alliance’s failure to address Turkey’s security concerns 
could damage the already problematic relations between Turkey and its European Allies. 
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According to David Yost, limited regional collective defense contingencies could present 
distinct challenges for the Alliance:  
A limited, subregional collective defense contingency could present 
problems for Alliance cohesion and decision making greater than those 
foreseen during the Cold War. It might be a challenge to convince some 
Allies that the crisis should indeed be regarded as an Article 5 case, and 
that their obligations under that article should be honored. The sense of a 
commonality of interest has declined with the disappearance of the 
unifying threat represented by the Soviet empire.249 
Turkey is increasingly concerned about the application of Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty. Ankara lacks confidence that European NATO members would 
respond with military action if Ankara invoked Article 5—a suspicion that surfaced 
during the 1990-1991 Gulf War.250 Most NATO European members contend that 
Turkey’s growing exposure to risks in the Middle East could create problems for 
Turkey’s relations with NATO and could drag NATO into potential conflicts, in which 
“it has very little direct interest.”251  There is growing evidence that the European 
members of NATO no longer believe that Turkey is vital to their security and, because of 
commitments established under the Washington Treaty, see Ankara as a potential liability 
and drag on their own military strength. 252  
In contrast, Turkey continues to regard threats to its borders as a serious concern 
and thus retains a more conservative view of maintaining the Alliance’s emphasis on 
collective defense responsibilities. However, disagreements among the Allies over 
NATO’s geographic boundaries and Article 5 responsibilities may have significant 
implications for Turkey. The unwillingness of some Allies to commit resources to 
prepare for subregional contingencies may constitute a serious impediment to the conduct 
of the Alliance’s collective defense missions. As Yost has observed, this might be 
especially true in a regional contingency involving Turkey:   
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[S]ome Allies may be unwilling to assume risks and contribute forces if 
certain contingencies actually arise. For example, some Allies might 
question whether a conflict between Turkey and one of its neighbors in the 
Caucasus, the Middle East, or the Mediterranean should be interpreted as 
an Article 5 case. 253 
Ankara’s bitter experiences during the 1990-1991 Gulf War suggest that Alliance 
cohesion problems could pose serious obstacles to an effective and timely NATO 
response to NBC-armed aggression against Turkey.  NATO’s failure to provide a 
determined response to the Turkish requests for reinforcement units from NATO’s 
multinational rapid reaction force, including air defense assets, strongly reinforced the 
existing Turkish concerns and suspicions about “selective solidarity.”254 The German 
reluctance to provide Turkey with Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force-Air 
(AMF) reinforcements provoked bitter reactions in Turkey, and Ankara accused 
Germany of being an unreliable Ally.255  The experience resulted in ill will and made 
Ankara highly sensitive to restricting the meaning of Article 5.256  Despite the initial 
reluctance, Germany sent an AlphaJet squadron to Turkey in January 1991 as a part of 
Allied Command Europe Mobile Force reinforcement and German air defense units 
followed the next month. 257  However, since then, many members of the Turkish security 
elite have expressed serious concerns and doubts about the robustness of the Allied 
commitments. 
This incident suggests that political considerations and domestic concerns of some 
Allies might well become a serious impediment to the Alliance’s ability to act 
collectively on behalf of a threatened ally.258 The debate in the German parliament about 
whether to send reinforcements to Turkey in 1990-1991 was remarkable in this regard. It 
revealed how diverse allied perceptions about responsibilities under Article 5 of the 
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Washington Treaty might be, especially in sub-regional contingencies in which European 
interests may not be directly involved. Moreover, the debates at the time offer some clues 
about how limited the Allied contributions might be when Allies are asked to make actual 
defense commitments, especially if the threatened Ally is regarded as no longer vital to 
their security interests. As Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher have observed: 
Virtually all leaders and experts in the SPD [the Social Democratic Party], 
as well as some representatives of the governing coalition parties, stated 
that by allowing U.S. planes to operate against Iraq from Turkish bases, 
Turkey had provoked Iraq.  Therefore, a possible Iraqi attack, or 
“retaliation,” against Turkey could not lead to the discharge of German 
obligations to assist in the defense of Turkey under Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty.  In the words of opposition leader Hans Jochen Vogel, 
otherwise NATO would be turned into an alliance for the support of 
offensive operations (Angriffsoperationen)…. Those who rejected German 
support in the hypothetical case of a so-called “provoked NATO 
obligation” (provozierter Bündisfall), even under conditions of a UN 
mandate, increasingly appeared to run away from any German political or 
moral obligation whatsoever, let alone political debt.  In fact, Germany 
was only asked to grant a small fraction of the support which it had itself 
received over four decades and to which it owed its freedom and its 
prosperity, as well as its recent unification. 259 
In other words, Turkey’s “experiences during the 1990-91 Gulf War suggest that 
genuine Alliance cohesion problems could arise in subregional collective defense 
contingencies.”260 As Germany’s hesitant response suggests, some Allies might refuse to 
take responsibility for the defense of Turkey, questioning whether a conflict between 
Turkey and one of its neighbors in the Middle East should be regarded as an Article 5 
case.  
As Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser and F. Stephen Larrabee recently observed, 
incidents like this could undermine the Alliance’s credibility: 
Germany’s hesitant response to Turkey’s request for Allied Mobile Force-
Air reinforcements during the Gulf crisis highlights this problem. To many 
Germans, deterring a possible attack by Iraq was not what NATO was all 
about. To many Turks, on the other hand, Germany’s ambivalent response 
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called into question the validity of the Article 5  (collective defense) of the 
Washington Treaty and raised broader doubts about the utility of NATO 
membership.261 
Ankara’s doubts and suspicions about the Alliance’s reliability in fulfilling its 
responsibility toward Turkey could further fragment the Alliance, thereby creating 
serious collective action problems in future contingencies. As a former senior NATO 
officer at a RAND conference recently concluded, “ NATO responsibility toward Turkey 
was a very contentious issue during the Cold War, and there is no doubt that Turkey’s 
future role in Europe’s security structure will again be contentious.”262  During a crisis, 
this could create serious uncertainties in Ankara about whether the Alliance would be 
committed to defend Turkey against aggression.  This might also send a 
counterproductive message to the potential adversaries in the Middle East, and they 
might calculate that NATO might not back Turkey in a potential clash with them. This 
might even encourage the aggressors to pursue a more determined and vigorous policy 
against Ankara while attempting to dictate their preferred solutions to the problems. If 
convinced of the fragility of the Alliance’s commitments to Ankara, the aggressor might 
use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons  (perhaps delivered with ballistic missiles) to 
strain the Alliance’s cohesion, thereby limiting the possibility the Alliance’s intervening 
on behalf of Turkey.  The aggressor might assume that European countries vulnerable to 
missile attacks would not take risks for the defense of Turkey at a time when they are 
already questioning the validity of their responsibilities toward Ankara.    
3.  NATO Enlargement 
NATO’s further enlargement might have direct implications for the Alliance’s 
cohesion as well as for its ability to carry out its traditional mission of collective defense.  
Turkey fears that a larger NATO could be an alliance with more conditional and less 
automatic security guarantees for its members.263 There is high sensitivity in Ankara 
about the longer-term effect of enlargement on NATO’s security guarantees. Turkey’s 
concerns center on the likely dilution of the Alliance’s attention and resources, and the 
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shift of Alliance influence to eastern portions of the Euro-Atlantic region, but with 
particular repercussions for the allies in the south.  This consideration is also enhanced by 
the widespread concern in Turkey that the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic could strengthen Central and East European—especially German—influence in 
European and transatlantic affairs, reinforcing an eastward- looking bias in NATO 
strategy. 264  Indeed, as David Yost recently put it, some NATO observers on both sides 
of the Atlantic are also concerned about certain potential negative implications of an 
enlarged Alliance: 
Some observers hypothesize that in an enlarged Alliance it may become 
more difficult to gain and maintain an acceptance of responsibility for the 
defense of others, particularly for new Allies contemplating contingencies 
located far from their traditional area of political-military activity and 
cultural identification. For instance, some observers have asked, will the 
Poles feel responsible for the defense of Turkey? If Syria or Iraq attacked 
Turkey, would Hungarians ask, “What is that to us?” The fragmentation of 
the Alliance may be increasingly hard to resist in limited, subregional 
collective defense contingencies, to say nothing of  “optional “ non-Article 
5 cases involving crisis management and peace operations.265 
 Turkey, with multiple security risks on its borders, is especially concerned about 
reaffirming the Allies’ Article 5 commitments in the light of the enlargement process, 
which is widely seen as introducing a new spirit of conditionality in Alliance security 
commitments. Some European observers have expressed similar concerns about NATO’s 
enlargement: 
How credible would Article 5 collective defense guarantees be in an 
expanded Alliance? … Are the West Europeans prepared to make Article 
5 commitments only because the putative Russian threat is now minimal, 
and because the United States is seen in both Eastern and Western Europe 
as the ultimate guarantor of the Alliance’s collective defense pledges? 
Would new allies honor their Article 5 commitments if they felt exposed 
to Russian pressure?266 
Indeed, there are grounds for Turkey’s reservations regarding NATO’s further 
enlargement. For example, although NATO contingencies remain in the south on 
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Turkey’s borders, most Alliance resources remain north of the Alps.267 Additionally, the 
costs associated with the integration of the new NATO members tend to squeeze the 
already tight European defense budgets and may inhibit meeting the requirements for 
permanently based assets in the south, especially in Turkey, which would probably 
provide NATO staging areas during a potential crisis.   
4.  Other Obstacles  
Budget constraints as a result of the current trends of reducing defense spending 
in most NATO European countries, the lack of an immediate threat perception, the 
prominence of social priorities other than national defense, the Western aversion to 
casualties, and the EU’s proposed European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) might 
also constitute genuine obstacles to implementing NATO’s collective defense 
commitments.  As far as threat perceptions are concerned, the evidence suggests that the 
threat perceptions among the European allies are not as acute as those in Turkey and the 
United States and thus there is no sentiment of being threatened. 
The Western (especially U.S.) aversion to casualties could also become an 
important impediment to an Alliance decision to become involved in risky sub-regional 
contingencies, especially against an NBC-armed aggressor. Indeed, no Western country 
has suffered major civilian casualties on the home front from an external military source 
since the end of World War II.268  Therefore, in case of armed aggression against Turkey, 
the prospects for a NATO response would probably depend in part on how heavily U.S. 
and European casualty aversion would weigh on Western decision makers. Operation 
Desert Storm (1991) and Operation Allied Force (1999) suggested to many observers that 
Western military forces might be able to fight wars in the future without suffering large-
scale losses. However, this might be a cause of Western inaction in future NATO 
contingencies involving a WMD-armed adversary.   Such sensitivity could be seen during 
the Kosovo conflict in 1999 when at the outset President Clinton announced that no 
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American ground troops would be sent into combat in Kosovo.269 According to a poll 
during the conflict in Kosovo:  
 About half of all Americans say they are unwilling to lose any American 
soldiers to help bring peace to Kosovo. Even a third of those who favor 
sending in ground troops would reconsider if it meant Americans would 
die. The poll also suggests that support for ground troops would plummet 
sharply as casualties mounted. Only three in 10 would be willing to accept 
the loss of 100 U.S. soldiers to win the peace.270  
Concerns about the U.S. aversion to casualties were also reflected in the following 
statement by General Philippe Morillion, Commander of the UN Forces in Bosnia: 
Desert Storm left one awful legacy; it imposed the idea that you must be 
able to fight the wars of the future without suffering losses. The idea of 
zero-kill as an outcome has been imposed on American generals. But there 
is no such thing as a clear or risk-free war. You condemn yourself to 
inactivity if you set that standard.271 
 Moreover, conflict resolution in Kosovo showed a European casualty aversion. 
Most NATO European Allies excluded the employment of ground forces in combat and 
relied solely on the use of combat aircraft.272 Thus, in a high-risk environment in which 
an adversary might possibly employ chemical and biological weapons against deployed 
NATO forces, the prospects for a determined NATO military response to a WMD attack 
against a member state might be highly limited. 
The European Union’s effort to create a new rapid reaction force independent of 
NATO also has the potential to undermine Alliance cohesion. The European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP) has the potential to virtually shut Ankara out of the key elements 
of European Union’s security policy and planning.273 Thus, Turkey, under wider stress, 
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could be further alienated from the West, putting the prospects for credibly relying on 
NATO’s security guarantees into question. The central concern in Ankara is the potential 
damage to NATO. EU efforts that divert the Alliance’s focus from the traditional core 
mission of NATO could diminish support for U.S. engagement in Europe and could make 
military cooperation even more difficult.274 The European Union initiative also carries 
the risk of creating a caucus of European member states within NATO, which could be 
detrimental to decision-making in both the Alliance and European Security and Defense 
Policy.275 According to a recent analysis by Kori N. Schake, a caucus 
[c]ould make consensus building more difficult if states were unwilling to 
compromise on elements that represent hard-won EU internal consensus. 
Finally, it could slow the pace of decisions if Alliance consultations were 
prevented until EU states agreed to a position to present in NATO 
counsels.276    
Turkey’s refusal to approve EU proposals that the proposed force have automatic 
access to NATO military planning facilities could result in the EU creating a separate 
military planning mechanism. This would mean that NATO European Allies might not 
want to be involved in Turkey’s Middle Eastern problems unless vital European interests 
are at stake.  Therefore, although the ESDP may not be wholly blamed for the divergence 
among NATO Allies, it carries the risk of aggravating existing problems within the 
Alliance.277 Turkey is especially concerned about a potential—or de facto—U.S. 
“decoupling” from European security affairs as a result of an autonomous ESDP outside 
of the NATO framework. For Ankara, any change in NATO that points to more European 
influence at the expense of U.S. engagement or that promotes the role of European Union 
institutions could well result in a less credible and reliable NATO. 
Moreover, the debate over the EU’s efforts to create a rapid reaction force could 
split the Alliance wide-open, causing identity crises within NATO.278 Conflict over 
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Turkey’s role in NATO and Ankara’s exclusion from political, economic and security 
organizations could cause a rift between Turkey and its European allies. Even the conflict 
among the Allies over NATO’s geographic boundaries could spread to disagreement over 
its very mission, challenging the alliance’s survival. This could lead to a renationalization 
of Ankara’s security strategy to counter rising threats from its Arab neighbors and Iran. 
Ankara thus opposes any weakening of NATO’s role and efforts to transfer planning and 
decision making over defense matters to the EU.  
C.  RISKS POSED BY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
1.   Use of WMD: A Challenge to NATO? 
WMD poses a direct military threat to the Alliance members, particularly to those 
already within the range of missile attacks and to their deployed forces dispersed all over 
the world. There are increasing indications that states of security concern see weapons of 
mass destruction, in particular chemical and biological weapons and their delivery means, 
as a viable means of countering NATO’s conventional military superiority. For instance, 
at least a dozen countries are believed to maintain active offensive BW programs, and 
many with the political will and requisite scientific base could therefore produce and 
ultimately use biological weapons.279  Moreover, many nations known to be developing 
chemical and biological weapons are also developing or acquiring effective longer-range 
ballistic missile systems.  Therefore, the threat to the Alliance is expected to broaden and 
deepen over the next decade.  
Limited sub-regional conflicts and interventions beyond the Euro-Atlantic region 
could increase the risk of facing adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD).  The strategic rationale for regional actors using WMD could primarily be to 
deter Western forces from becoming involved in regional conflicts by influencing public 
opinion, so the dispatch of Western troops in a risky environment is put into question, 
with the eventual aim of causing their total withdrawal. A hostile country on NATO’s 
periphery could threaten or actually employ chemical or biological agents against Allied 
territory, population, or forces. This could undermine NATO’s ability to conduct 
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essential defense missions, both in protecting Alliance territory and populations and in 
out-of-area regional conflicts.280  
However, NATO’s vulnerability to chemical, biological and missile attacks could 
have grave consequences for Turkey. Turkey is now the NATO ally most exposed to 
missile and WMD attacks, and it is only a question of time before West European cities 
can be attacked with missiles armed with WMD from the states on Europe’s southern 
periphery. 281 Thus, chemical and biological weapons might have considerable impact in 
the force building stage of a NATO out-of-area operation and during the warfighting 
stage. The early use of these weapons, particularly biological weapons, in a conflict, or 
even before conventional hostilities begin might provide greater leverage for the 
aggressor. By employing biological weapons against NATO’s strategic assets, including 
forward mounting bases, sea and airports, and other logistic and command, control and 
communication facilities in the exposed members’ territory, the aggressor could alter the 
Alliance’s calculations and disrupt its ability to intervene on behalf of the attacked 
member.  
Moreover, seen by the proliferant states as an effective military tool, as well as an 
effective instrument of terror, the use of CW could also have a dramatic effect on NATO 
troop performance, particularly in out-of-area operations; it could even inflict profound 
political consequences by sapping the NATO forces’ will to fight. In addition, given the 
Western aversion to casualties, the use, or even the threat, of biological and chemical 
weapons might weaken the host nation’s support (particularly if the local civilian 
population is affected). This could be perceived by the aggressor as a viable means to 
break the cohesion and resolve of the Alliance.  
During the early stage of a campaign this could seriously undermine the NATO 
forces’ ability to achieve their objectives if adequate protective measures have not been 
taken. Thus, the ability of the NATO allies to cooperate in order to defeat the threats 
against their common interests might well be impaired if hostile regimes in the Middle 
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East hold Istanbul, Rome, Paris, Berlin, and London hostage to retaliatory attacks. In the 
absence of effective missile defenses, by targeting Alliance populations, potential 
adversaries could profoundly disturb NATO’s ability to intervene beyond its borders. 
  In the case of NBC-backed aggression against Turkey, aggressors might well 
believe that Turkey’s Western Allies would not trade their cities to protect Istanbul or 
Ankara.   The presence of deployed U.S. troops throughout Europe, including Turkey, 
could also complicate any unilateral military action by the United States even if North 
American cities were not vulnerable to the aggressor’s possible WMD retaliation. Even 
NATO contingency planning regarding the defense of Turkey itself might be altered by 
potential NBC use in the region.  At minimum this exposure to the retaliatory 
consequences of Western intervention could sharpen the existing debates about Western 
access to Turkish bases and defense cooperation between the European allies and 
Turkey.282 
NATO’s ability to address WMD proliferation risks is still being developed. The 
Alliance needs to overcome a number of obstacles. First, the questions of how the Allies 
perceive the threat and whether they see NBC and missile proliferation as a fundamental 
threat in the new security environment are still unresolved.   Public opinion in Western 
Europe is barely prepared, for the time being at least, to discuss risks and threats 
involving the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 283 There is no consensus on 
addressing the specific regions or the threats posed by nations of proliferation concern 
due to economic ties and the relatively good relations of some allies with some states of 
proliferation concern. The Alliance even has problems in reaching a consensus on risk 
assessments of certain countries. There are still unanswered political questions about the 
for Alliance’s ability to fully implement NATO’s new counter-proliferation programs. 
Moreover, competing priorities, especially in a context of NATO enlargement and its 
associated costs, decreasing defense budgets, and the lack of an immediately perceived 
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WMD threat to European territory and populations make NATO European Allies 
unenthusiastic about funding any ambitious WMD defense programs.284 
 Another issue of concern is that the Allies disagree about how to deal with WMD 
proliferation challenge and specific proliferant states. For example, the difference in 
approaches concerning key proliferators such as Iraq and Iran, suggests that discord 
within the Alliance may exist about dealing with these “rogue” states.  Some capitals in 
Europe are still unwilling to abandon their emphasis on traditional non-proliferation 
prevention policies and programs. 285  The belief that nonproliferation regimes are still 
sufficient to meet WMD challenges may preva il in these capitals, especially when they 
are confronted with domestic opposition and fiscal constraints.  The same European 
Allies may even see counter-proliferation measures as counterproductive and damaging 
to current nonproliferation efforts. They may also argue that the potential proliferant 
could misinterpret counter-proliferation measures as a Western attempt to use force 
preemptively. 286 
Under these circumstances, some allies might be deterred from participating in an 
intervention in which the risk of WMD use is high.287 In interventions beyond Europe, 
the Alliance might need to conduct counterforce operations in response to an NBC attack 
against NATO territory. Such operations could involve preventive, preemptive, or 
retaliatory strikes.  However, given the diverse allied perspectives about how to counter 
WMD threats, the prospects for a preventive NATO strike against WMD production 
facilities or the possible preemptive destruction of WMD agents and missile launchers 
would be quite limited.288 As Michael Rühle put it:  
 NATO, given its democratic, multinational, and defensive nature, is 
incapable of any deliberately planned offensive action .… It is simply 
inconceivable that NATO Allies would find the political will to launch a 
preventive military strike even against the facilities of a state which 
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persisted in its development of WMD in the light of international 
opposition. 289    
 Moreover, intra-alliance discord could become more acute in crises with a 
WMD-armed aggressor. In this case, the origins of the crisis and the different views 
about how to deal with an NBC-armed aggressor could be the decisive factors in the 
Alliance’s decision to intervene.290 Naturally, the reactions of most allies would depend 
in part on competing economic interests and, domestic opposition and above all, the 
hesitations stemming from undertaking risky military operations in an NBC 
environment.291  
Indeed, even if NATO was prepared to respond to WMD use, a key question 
about NATO’s security guarantees to Turkey is whether all occasions of WMD use 
against Turkey would generate a NATO reaction. By covertly developing NBC weapons, 
an aggressor might do much to hide its intentions to use WMD against Turkey. In this 
case, NATO leaders might have incentives to abandon efforts to confront the NBC-
backed challenger in order to avoid risks to their homelands, especially if U.S. and 
European cities are vulnerable to missile attacks.292  
For instance, CW may prove to be much less certain in their political effects and 
thus may not provoke a comprehensive NATO response unless the victim nation suffers 
mass casualties. Moreover, when used on the battlefield, the effects of chemical weapons 
may prove localized and short- lived, especially if the targeted forces are protected to a 
certain degree. Therefore, although the adversary might use chemical weapons 
extensively in operations against Turkish forces, their use on the battlefield might not 
automatically evoke the same level of Alliance political interest as the use of nuclear 
weapons or the large-scale use of biological weapons. Depending in part on the 
circumstances, Turkey could have a hard time in convincing some of its allies about the 
massive use of these weapons against Turkish forces on the battlefield. As the use of CW 
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in the late stages of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War proved, CW use on the battlefield can 
occur with little international notice. 293 
As far as biological weapons are concerned, their potential for mass destruction 
and their potential use in a surreptitious fashion are very clear. If the threat they pose is 
little noticed, little understood, or widely disputed, their effect would be very difficult to 
predict. Therefore, a biological weapon’s use against Turkey might even not be 
understood until the devastating effects of the agents begin to surface. There are options 
for covert use of biological weapons, which would effectively mask the perpetrator and 
potentially disguise whether an attack has actually happened. As the natural occurrence 
of many agents suggests, in some cases it may be impossible to distinguish between a 
natural outbreak of a disease and a covert use of biological agents. The use of biological 
agents could be tailored to specific local areas or to theatre-wide regions, and their effects 
could be calibrated from low to high levels of lethality, which would make confirmation 
of a biological weapons attack even more difficult. In addition, a determined and robust 
adversary could employ biological weapons against military targets to cause maximum 
disruption but could deliberately seek to avoid large-scale fatalities. Such attacks could 
have a significant psychological impact on the populations of the U.S. and European 
allies while further blurring the criteria for intervention on behalf of Turkey. 
Indeed, within the alliance, the political responses to a biological weapons attack 
against one of the allies seem unpredictable—at least for the moment; and this may make 
a timely and an effective response even more difficult.294  Moreover, given the inherent 
dual-use nature of the equipment and precursor materials used to produce some types of 
biological weapons and the challenges to detect and to acquire intelligence about the BW 
programs of the aggressor, conducting preventive or preemptive operations at the last 
minute would be more difficult.  
Currently neither individual member states nor the Alliance as a whole are 
capable of mounting an effective and integrated defensive response to a BW attack. This 
decreases the likelihood of sufficient indications and warning and increases the risk of a 
strategic surprise. Indeed, if non-state actors such as the PKK or the Hisbollah could 
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effectively employ large-scale BW agents, such threats could constitute Article 5 
contingencies, obliging all the Allies to participate in a collective defense of the 
threatened ally, assuming that the perpetrators could be identified and proven to be acting 
on behalf of a foreign government. However, non-state actors could create distinct 
challenges for the alliance, especially for intelligence sharing and coordinated action 
against NBC terrorism. 295 This could critically prolong the time required for the alliance 
to respond and would require the Alliance to think beyond traditional planning.      
Indeed, in the active defense arena, NATO has made efforts to develop (TMD) to 
protect its forces and its European territory against attacks by ballistic missiles based in 
the Middle East or North Africa.296 However, Europe is safer today than at any time over 
the past 50 years and thus, for most Europeans, who do not feel threatened by 
developments outside Europe, European missile defense is virtually unimaginable.297 
Therefore, the European Allies are hardly likely to make missile defense a high priority 
for themselves. They even generally view missile defense as an unwanted distraction. 
Thus, few European governments are prepared to invest substantial political efforts or 
financial resources in territorial missile defense to preserve NATO’s freedom of action to 
conduct military interventions outside Europe.298   
Even if the Europeans come to accept the need for an allied missile defense in 
principle, any practical effort to build such a system would be faced with the stubborn 
realities of declining defense spending and competing defense and non-military 
priorities.299  In this context, one might easily ask, would it make sense for NATO 
European allies to deploy a missile defense system to preserve the credibility of NATO’s 
military intervention at the expense of acquiring the capabilities required for effective EU 
power projection? Indeed, at a time when many EU countries cannot even find the 
                                                 
294 Ibid. 
295 Brad Roberts and Victor Utgoff, “Coalitions against NBC-Armed Regional Aggressors: How Are They 
Formed, Maintained, and Led?” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 16, 1997, p. 247-48 
296 Summer Benson, “Will NATO Deploy European Missile Defenses?” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 16, 
1997, p. 385. 
297 Ibid. 
298 Ibid. 
299 David Yost, “ The NATO Capabilities Ga p and the European Union,” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 4, Winter 
2001-01, pp. 97-128. 
98 
necessary resources for ESDP, it would be unrealistic to assume that they will find the 
resources to undertake the more expensive and politically controversial commitment to 
build a European missile defense system. 300 
Therefore, TMD does not offer a panacea for avoiding political controversy over 
the Alliance’s responsibilities. At least for the foreseeable future, it would be fair to 
conclude that if NATO is vulnerable to NBC risks and missile attacks, expecting an 
effective and (more importantly) timely response to NBC-armed aggression against 
Turkey by the Alliance as a whole may be imprudent, at least in some circumstances.  
2.  Unilateral U.S. Response?  
From Turkey’s perspective, the U.S. extended deterrence commitments—
particularly U.S. nuclear guarantees—remain a crucial element of NATO’s security 
guarantees to Turkey.  First, Turkey’s provision of “host nation facilities for United 
States nuclear capable forces” makes the U.S. security commitments, and thus the 
transatlantic link, visible both to Ankara and to Turkey’s potential enemies.301 Second, 
U.S. nuclear forces in Turkey send a deterrent message to Turkey’s potential adversaries, 
thereby convincing them about the genuineness of the US commitments to Turkey. 302  
Indeed, apart from U.S. nuclear guarantees, the United States has many 
reasonable incentives to honor its commitments to Turkey: the centrality of Article 5 for 
maintaining NATO and the U.S. leadership role in European security affairs; the 
importance attached to the U.S.-Turkish strategic relationship in particular, owing in part 
to Turkey’s well-earned reputation as a reliable ally and its geographical position; and 
above all, the U.S. need to uphold the credibility of its security commitments to sustain 
its leadership role in other parts of the world. After all, other U.S. allies and security 
partners would be watching U.S. behavior. These considerations can be deemed 
important factors that that can be expected to motivate Washington to honor its explicit 
commitments to Turkey in the case of an armed aggression.  
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However, when the U.S. nuclear guarantees are considered, in thinking through 
the challenges of potential military confrontations between Turkey and its Middle Eastern 
neighbors armed with nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) weapons one must ask 
whether the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation would be credible and effective against 
states that possess chemical and biological weapons. Indeed, the perception of an absence 
of U.S. vital interests in a regional conflict could raise questions in the minds of both 
potential aggressors and Turkey about how committed the United States would be in 
deterring or reversing efforts by an NBC-armed neighbor to exploit its weapons of mass 
destruction arsenal. In recent years, the United States has shown a tendency not to 
intervene in conflicts unilaterally. Therefore, the United States is highly unlikely to 
choose to engage in a war against an NBC-armed adversary alone, and will probably 
prefer to try to form a coalition of the willing.303 However, with Europe vulnerable to 
missile attacks from the Middle East, the United States could face serious challenges in 
forming and maintaining military coalitions to defeat and reverse an act of regiona l NBC-
backed aggression. 304  The presence of CBW and ballistic missiles in the arsenal of the 
aggressor would certainly change the dynamics of coalition formation.  
If faced with an NBC-backed aggressor, the United States could become even 
more reluctant to get involved in a risky conflict that could entail massive casualties.  The 
statement of then U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in 1991 in the aftermath of the 
Gulf War gives some clues about the difficulties of engaging the United States in all 
contingencies: 
  I think caution is in order …. This happens to be one of those times when 
it is justified to … send American forces into combat to achieve important 
national objectives. But they are very rare. Just because we do it 
successfully this once, it doesn’t mean we should therefore assume that 
it’s something we ought to fall back on automatically as the easy answer 
to international problems in the future. We have to remember that we 
don’t have a dog in every fight that we don’t want to get involved in every 
single conflict….305  
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Therefore, the United States might not honor Ankara’s expectations of a unilateral 
U.S. response in all circumstances. Indeed, one could argue that it would be unwise to 
assume that the only sensible U.S. response would be the use of nuclear weapons. As the 
world’s only superpower, the United States has a wide array of conventional military 
response options that would enable it to respond effectively to an NBC aggression against 
Turkey without resorting to nuclear weapons. However, if a nuclear response option was 
considered, some Americans might argue that retaliating with nuclear weapons in 
response to a chemical or biological weapons attack against Turkey would be 
inappropriate.306 Moreover, some Americans might favor reserving the nuclear retaliation 
option for more extreme contingencies rather than using nuclear weapons in a limited 
regional conflict if the number of allied casualties was limited and/or if the effects of 
WMD use were unclear. In this case, some American opinion leaders would certainly 
demand caution and restraint from the U.S. government. Therefore, it would be unwise to 
think that the United States would break the nuclear taboo in retaliation for a small-scale 
use of chemical or biological weapons against a U.S. ally.  
The influence of local ethnic lobbies or arms deals between the United States and 
Turkey is hardly on the same level with the U.S. security commitments to Turkey. More 
importantly, such factors could not be compared with the significant strategic interests 
the United States has in Turkey as a strategic partner. Nonetheless, in some 
circumstances anti-Turkish ethnic lobbies within the U.S. Congress and U.S. domestic 
policy circles—notably the Armenian and Greek lobbies—might be effective in limiting 
and/or constraining U.S. response options to deter or to reverse NBC aggression against 
Turkey even if the US government was willing to act. It should be recalled that these 
lobbies have been influential in shaping United States policy toward Turkey, and that 
they successfully lobbied for Armenian “genocide” bills in some states and constantly 
managed to block arms sales to Turkey. As a result Washington has put obstacles in the 
way of Turkey’s desire to buy American military equipment and, at times, Ankara has 
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felt itself to be under a de facto arms embargo.307  In this respect some policy circles in 
Turkey seriously doubt U.S. credibility—as opposed to ability.  
There are, indeed, grounds for the Turkish pessimism about the genuineness of 
the United States commitments to Turkey. The historical tendencies in the nation toward 
isolationism, and the resurgence after the Cold War of national debate about the nature 
and extent of U.S. commitments abroad, raise questions in the minds of Turkish decision 
makers. Moreover, although the American sensitivity to casualties seems to apply more 
clearly in operations that are seen as “optional” and more importantly not tied to vital 
and/or strategic U.S. vital interests, American hypersensitivity to casualties raises 
questions about whether it would be possible to keep the United States engaged in the 
war on behalf of Turkey if an aggressor could inflict large-scale casualties on U.S. forces, 
particularly with weapons of mass destruction. 308  Furthermore, although Somalia, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo were all cases in which U.S. vital and/or strategic interests were not 
(and are not) engaged, the United States government’s decisions to disengage from 
conflicts as casualties began to mount—as was the case in Somalia—fuel the Turkish 
perception that it would be difficult to engage the United States in some of Turkey’s 
regional contingencies in which large-scale CBW use on the battlefield is likely. At a 
minimum, the possibility of U.S. noninvolvement in regional conflicts in which the 
adversary might pursue asymmetrical strategies suggests that Turkey should not be 
totally dependent on the U.S. extended deterrence commitments and should take the 
necessary NBC defensive measures and acquire the required capabilities to defend its 
forces, popula tion and territory against a potential NBC attack. Indeed, from the 
adversaries’ perspective, the U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983 might, in fact, have 
encouraged Saddam Hussein as well as Iranian and Syrian leaders about how to take 
advantage of this U.S. sensitivity in any future confrontation in the region. 
If an aggressor armed with WMD was convinced that the United States would not 
use its nuclear arsenal in response to WMD aggression against one of its allies due to 
strong pressure at home and abroad, then, it might not be deterred by U.S. nuclear 
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threats.309 Moreover, even if the United States threatened to retaliate with nuclear 
weapons in response to a chemical or biological attack (to maintain its international and 
domestic reputation for honoring commitments), the U.S. efforts to deter an NBC-armed 
aggression against Turkey might still fail. If the adversary was convinced about the 
genuineness of U.S. determination to protect Turkey by using nuclear weapons against 
WMD aggression, the perceived risk of US nuclear retaliation might even increase the 
likelihood of accidental or unauthorized use of chemical and/or biological weapons 
against Turkey in response to a false warning of an imminent US nuclear attack.310  It 
should be recalled from chapters II and III that both Iran and Iraq have predelegation 
procedures and could release the authority to use WMD in response to a nuclear attack 
risk to the battlefield commanders as a part of their command and control structures. 
Moreover, Iraqi Unit 224 missile units and Iranian IRGC units retain high- level of 
autonomy within both armed forces of Iran and Iraq, thereby increasing the risk of 
accidental or unauthorized use of NBC weapons against their neighbors such as Turkey 
and Israel. 
Another problem with U.S. nuclear threats as deterrents to NBC use is that 
employing nuclear weapons would be deeply controversial. This could constrain the US 
from carrying out its threats (i.e., nuclear retaliation) due to the international pressure of 
defying an international “norm.” The U.S. government has made commitments, most 
recently before the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension conference, 
that it will neither use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear 
member state of the NPT. 311  Fearing that such a use of nuclear weapons could undercut 
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these global norms, legitimize nuclear weapons threats by other nuclear powers, and 
encourage non-nuclear states to develop nuclear arms to deter NBC-backed aggressors, 
the U.S. may be reluctant to back away from such promises.312 Moreover, if the U.S. 
used nuclear weapons, fundamental questions would inevitably be raised in neighboring 
states and would get harsh reactions from major powers, particularly from Russia, China 
and France. Indeed, as Lawrence Freedman has observed, there are many difficulties for a 
Western nuclear response against chemical or biological weapons use: 
It is hard to see how Western countries can make explicit nuclear threats to 
deter chemical or biological weapons use. Apart from legal obligations not to use 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, it would be difficult to make 
retaliation automatic, given that such an attack might turn out to be poorly 
targeted and to have limited results.313 
Finally, the reaction of the American public and the international reaction to the 
use of nuclear weapons by the United States would probably be scenario-dependent. 
However, given the long nuclear taboo of the Cold War era, nuclear weapons use in 
retaliation for chemical or biological weapons use seems likely to provoke a great deal of 
public and international reaction and might be regarded as disproportionate.314 Thus, the 
prospects for a U.S. unilateral response might be highly limited and dependent on the 
circumstances of the case. 
D.   IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKISH SECURITY 
Among the NATO members, Turkey is one of the states most concerned with the 
implications of WMD proliferation since Ankara has disputes that could lead to serious 
conflicts with several potential proliferant states, including Iran, Iraq and Syria. One 
should remember that Turkey’s relations with all three neighbors encompass flashpoints 
and could lead to a direct NATO involvement.315  However, as Ian O. Lesser has 
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observed, obstacles to an effective NATO response to NBC-armed aggression against 
Turkey could arise in some circumstances: 
Open conflict, or even a protracted period of brinkmanship with Syria, 
could cause Ankara to seek NATO backing on the basis that terrorists 
should not be allowed sanctuary, and the territory of a NATO member is 
threatened by Syrian behavior. Given the controversy over the PKK and 
Kurdish issues in Europe, many allies are likely to balk at the prospect of 
support for Ankara. NATO’s failure to provide a determined response 
would strongly reinforce existing Turkish concerns about “selective 
solidarity.”316 
However, all these obstacles to an effective NATO or unilateral U.S. response 
could be perceived as possible preconditions for the dissolution of the Alliance’s resolve 
and solidarity and might send the wrong message to Turkey’s potential adversaries. 
Assuming that NATO or the U.S. might not support Ankara, the aggressors might 
consider using these weapons whenever they deem it necessary.  NATO’s failure to 
provide a determined response to NBC-backed aggression against Turkey could further 
enhance the adversary’s objective of using these weapons as a political tool to prevent a 
NATO or U.S. intervention on behalf of Turkey under the Article 5 provisions. 
Therefore, given the numerous obstacles to an effective NATO response, relying on 
NATO and/or U.S. security guarantees to deter WMD aggression against Turkey may 
provide little relief for Turkish security planners. As Jack Snyder concluded: 
 A combination of factors including a reduced US presence in and 
commitment to Europe’s security, lack of Western resolve in addressing 
the Balkan crises, and an increasingly visible and aggressive Russian 
military presence in the Caucasus region, suggest to Turkey that its iron-
clad links to NATO and the West are more fragile than they have been in 
several decades.317 
For example, some Turkish diplomats and foreign policy officials have asked in 
1996, “Why should Turkey contribute to the defense of Europe if there is no guarantee 
that WEU would come to the defense of Turkey?”318 As one former Turkish foreign 
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minister said, “It is unacceptable that Turkey is treated as a European country only when 
it comes to ensuring Europe’s security and defense but not the other way around.”319 
Such statements reflect Turkish concerns about the credibility of NATO’s security 
guarantees to Turkey. NATO’s security guarantees, as well as the U.S. extended 
deterrence commitments to Turkey, are essential and indivisible elements of Turkey’s 
security. However, these elements might not be sufficient to deter the use of WMD 
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VI.  TURKEY’S DETERRENT 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
For Turkey, WMD proliferation is a relatively new concern. Despite Turkey’s 
growing exposure to proliferation risks, Turkey was initially slow to respond to the 
acquisition of missiles and weapons of mass destruction by its Middle Eastern 
neighbors.320  Even in the early 1990s, Turkey felt protected against a potential Iranian or 
Iraqi attack by the U.S./NATO umbrella.321 However, for example, during the Kuwait 
crises, U.S. and NATO anti-missile batteries had to be deployed in southeastern Turkey 
to defend against potential Iraqi missile attacks. When Saddam Hussein threatened to 
attack Turkey if it continued to allow U.S. and British fighter planes to use Operation 
Provide comfort (OPC) facilities at the Incirlik airbase in early 1999, the United States 
deployed a first generation Patriot battery composed of eight launchers at the Incirlik 
base in southern Turkey to bolster air-defenses against a possible attack by Iraq.322   At 
the request of the Turkish government, elements of the Patriot missiles were deployed 
from Germany as a prudent precaution in the face of Saddam Hussein’s threats to Turkey 
for hosting coalition forces.  
The absence of a Turkish anti-missile capability makes Turkey vulnerable to 
Syria, Iraq and Iran, which are amply equipped with WMD. Turkey is paying growing 
attention to this threat, and countering it is an important part of Israel-Turkish military 
cooperation. Indeed, Turkish decision makers are concerned that U.S. efforts of 
preventing proliferation by pressuring arms exporters—namely Russia, China, and North 
Korea—not to supply these neighbors of Turkey with advanced missile technologies, in 
general has not been terribly successful and leaves Turkey vulnerable to potential attacks 
or intimidation from Syria and Iran. 323    
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In recent years, Turkey’s threat perceptions have heightened, particularly as a 
result of Tehran’s long-range Shabab missile program and Baghdad’s clandestine efforts 
to develop weapons of mass destruction. In contrast, Turkey’s trust in NATO and/or the 
U.S. extended deterrence commitments has diminished. After ignoring the spread of 
ballistic missiles in the region, Turkey has embarked on efforts to enhance its deterrent 
capabilities against its neighbors.324 In this context, Turkey has redefined its military 
strategy in terms of deterrence, superior mobility, forward abilities, endurance and the 
capability of rapid intervention in crises.325  
B.  TURKEY’S DETERRENT POSTURE  
1.  Active Defense Capabilities 
Turkey’s southeastern neighbors, particularly Iran, view Turkey as a powerful 
neighbor with a large military machine, strong security and military ties with the West 
and a substantial Turkish military presence on all three country’s borders.326 Turkey’s 
membership in NATO and its cooperation with Israel also raise the most difficulties in 
the military calculations of its three southeastern neighbors.   
In this context, the Turkish defense strategy is based on deterrence, including its 
NATO membership and air force strike capability. 327 Moreover, Turkey has a credible 
ability to defend its territory should deterrence fail. As can be seen in Table 3, the 
military balance in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is in favor of Turkey 
with a large, strong and mobile army and a large part of its budget (about 4.3 to 4.8 
percent of its GNP) dedicated to defense expenditures. Moreover, with a growing 
capacity for mobile operations, combat experience and with years of cross-border 
campaigns in northern Iraq, Turkey’s Armed Forces are superior to the armed forces of 
its Middle Eastern neighbors in many aspects.328  The most telling difference, however, 
is Turkey’s air superiority. Turkey’s armed forces’ experience both on the ground and in 
the air in northern Iraq over the past decade has immensely increased confidence and 
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personnel morale. Most of the young officers have actual combat experience and guerilla 
fighting skills as a result of the 14 year-old struggle against the PKK terrorists. This 
conventional military superiority over Iran, Iraq and Syria is reinforced by Turkey’s 
military cooperation with Israel, which offers a deterrence dividend for Ankara. A policy 
of modernizing and upgrading Turkey’s conventional military capabilities since 1996 at a 

















Iraq (1) 350,000 
(estimated) 
n/a 231 3 n/a n/a 
    Iran 500,000 2,725 447 29 450+ n/a 
Greece 166,100 4,317 342 47 None None 
Israel 177,500 9,548+ 583 18 360+ n/a 
Syria 425,000 5,810+ 511 18 300+ None 
Turkey 516,600 8,650+ 519 55 72(2) None 
Notes: 
 1. Iraqi figures are estimates. 
 2. In delivery.  
 
Table 3:   Regional Military Balance329 
 
During the Persian Gulf War, Turkey faced the stark reality that it lacked defenses 
against chemical, biological weapons and tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs). For the time 
being, Turkey still lacks a missile defense system that could protect its territory and 
population centers. In the event of an NBC-armed aggression against Turkey, Ankara has 
based its strategy on detecting and retaliating against WMD production facilities and 
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missile launching sites (including mobile launchers) in neighboring countries.330  
Therefore, it can be concluded that, presently Turkey’s deterrence against WMD threats 
originates from its superior conventional forces and its capability to occupy large areas 
with highly mobile and strong ground forces. Until the early 1990s, Turkey’s strategic 
depth—approximately 780.580km²—was also an important factor against a potential 
WMD or missile attack by its neighbors. However, with the increased range of Iranian 
(Shabab-3, 1,300 km) and Syrian (Scud D, 600 km), and (despite UN sanctions) reported 
Iraqi possession of Scud missiles that have ranges exceeding 600 km, Turkey’s advantage 
over strategic depth has diminished considerably.331   
In the air, Turkey has a significant deterrent capability. In fact, possibly because 
of the increasing Turkish exposure to WMD and missile threats from its neighbors, the 
airbalance with regard to its neighbors has recently become central to strategy of the 
Turkish defense planners. Indeed, Turkey has made airforce modernization a priority, and 
some observers believe air power has been the leading vehicle for Turkish assertiveness 
in the region. After Israel, Turkey has the second largest air power in the Middle East 
with a large fleet of Turkish manufactured F-16s in its inventory and has the technical 
capacity to improve its airforce without relying on any outside supplier. Turkey has 
roughly 240 F-16s as well as upgraded F-4s and highly skilled pilots who regularly fly 
actual combat missions in the mountainous eastern Turkey and northern Iraq. In the case 
of a WMD aggression, Turkey’s fleet of long-range F-16 and modernized F-4 and F-5 
fighters could be used in a pre-emptive strike to neutralize missile facilities as far away as 
Iran, Iraq and Syria. It should be recalled that a precedent for such action has already 
been established in the region following the Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 
1981. In this regard, Turkish pilots were reported to have trained in the Negev Desert for 
missions to destroy the missile sites, a technique the Israelis had developed with 
devastating effect against the Syrians in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley in 1982.332 Moreover, 
to have the ability to penetrate enemy air defenses and conduct surprise counterforce 
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operations, Turkish pilots have also undergone electronic warfare training in Israel. These 
bilateral flights within each other’s (Israel and Turkey) airspace also act as a deterrent 
against Syria, Iraq and Iran.  
Despite Turkish strategic planners’ frequently pronounced doubts about their 
credibility and sufficiency against WMD threats, Turkey’s NATO alliance and US 
nuclear guarantees constitute a credible deterrent against Turkey’s potential aggressors 
along its southern borders. Turkey’s is an ally of the United States and it has been a 
NATO member for fifty years. The Turkish military’s Incirlik airbase, which the U.S. 
uses to enforce of the no-fly zone over Northern Iraq, could be considered a potential 
launching pad for U.S and NATO military action in the case of aggression against 
Turkey. Moreover, the strategic importance of Turkey to the United States would be 
enough to deter any foolish military action by Iraq, Iran or Syria against Turkey. Thus, 
Turkey’s Western alliances and NATO/or U.S. forces in Turkey is regarded as a powerful 
deterrent facing the Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian regimes and illustrates the value of Turkey’s 
membership to NATO, which bolsters Turkey’s deterrence.    
The Turkish-Israeli alliance that materialized in 1996 is also another contributing 
factor enhancing Turkey’s deterrence. The cooperation of the two countries, which have 
the most powerful military forces in the region, has altered the Middle East’s balance of 
power significantly and enhanced both states’ regional status and deterrent capabilities. 
Although both governments state that their relationship is not intended to threaten any 
other states, it is certainly clear that any regional government or potential aggressor 
would be forced to think twice before challenging such a formidable partnership. As 
Israel’s former defense minister, Yitzak Mordechai, clearly stated in 1998, “When we 
lock hands we form a powerful fist … Our relationship is a strategic one.”333   
With a highly modernized and mobile conventional military capabilities and a 
strong regional alliance with Israel, Turkey’s deterrent posture with regard to its three 
neighbors has been strengthened considerably. Recently, convinced about its military 
superiority Turkey has been more assertive and willing to use force if needed while 
pursuing its strategic interests in the Middle East. In this context, recent events suggest 
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that Turkey’s conventional military capabilities, and its Western and regional alliances 
constitute a credible deterrent against its southeastern neighbors as well as against Greece 
and Cyprus.  In this regard, Turkey’s military stance on Syria’s border in 1998 was a case 
in point. Turkey forced Syria, pinioned between Turkey and Israel, to cease supporting 
the PKK separatists.This eventually led to PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s capture in 
Kenya in February 1999. Syria also lost its leverage with Turkey in its dispute over the 
Euphrates, while Ankara was able to tighten its control over the supply of water to both 
Syria and Iraq. 334 
The second illustration was is the S-300 crises of December 1998 between 
Turkey, Cyprus and Greece. When the Greek Cypriots moved to deploy long-range S-300 
anti-aircraft missiles in the divided island, the threat of military action by Turkey stopped 
them cold.335 The Greek Cypriots abandoned their plans to deploy the sophisticated 
Russian air defense systems on the island, fearing a strong Turkish response—most likely 
a military strike—regardless of the potential repercussions. The presence in northern 
Cyprus  of 35,000 mechanized and well- trained troops capable of invading the whole of 
Cyrus in a short time was also a contributing factor in bolstering Turkey’s strategic 
deterrent.336 These two incidents suggest that, at least for the moment, Turkey’s deterrent 
posture works effectively against any potential aggressor who might dare to confront 
Turkey. 
2. Passive Defense Capabilities 
For an effective defensive response to an NBC attack, maintaining a robust 
passive defense capability is essential.  For example, deploying better and adequate 
protective suits, masks and protective gears, as well as detectors for both chemical and 
biological agents is very critical for denying the enemy benefits of using CBW against 
Turkish forces.  Providing an accurate and timely warning so that effective measures can 
be instituted into peacetime planning is also very critical for NBC defense. Above all, 
warning and reporting is essential for battlefield commanders to be fully informed about 
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the potential risks they might face on the battlefield and to be able to carry out their tasks 
by taking the necessary measures to protect their deployed forces. In addition, an 
advanced medical response, an integrated and well-organized consequence management 
and an intensive exercise and training based on realistic NBC-threat scenarios on 
individual, unit and joint levels constitute the building blocks of a robust passive defense 
capability.  
Within the Turkish Armed Forces force structure, there is an NBC-school in 
Adapazari. There is an NBC-company within the force structure of every Corps level 
units. However, most of the information, concepts, doctrine and training programs and 
equipments used in passive defense area are mostly WW II concepts and methods. The 
Army’s NBC equipments are very old and mostly out of order. Most of the gas masks, 
protective suits and gears are non-usable because they effective use date have expired 
long ago. Therefore, most of the protective NBC equipment in the military storage 
facilities has no protective value and is no remedy for an effective passive defense. There 
is a gas mask factory in Ankara, producing protective masks and suits for Turkish Army. 
However, the level of production is insufficient to equip all military personnel, not to 
mention the civilians. NBC defense training is given at the individual level as a part of 
basic military training to the conscripts at the military basic training centers. However, 
basic NBC training is mostly conducted theoretically and the personnel mostly do not 
have any practical or actual expertise on NBC defense. Every soldier has a gas mask and 
every company has a radiacmeter for CW detection. However, these are either mostly out 
of order or usually expired. Very few protective shelters are present and most protective 
suits have already lost their protective features. Although substantial progress has been 
achieved in some areas of passive defense, there are huge capability shortfalls in NBC 
equipment, detection, decontamination, doctrine and training that must be dealt with 
urgently. 
C.  FUTURE CAPABILITIES AND PROCUREMENT PLANS 
1.  Air Force  
Recently, the Turkish air force has undergone great advancements. In this regard, 
some $45 billion has been earmarked for the air force under Turkey’s 25-year 
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modernization program.337 Turkey’s procurement plans include electronic warfare 
systems, command control communication and intelligence (C³I) systems, air- launched 
precision guided weapons and air defense missiles. The air force has been increasing its 
holding of F-16 fighters and the co-production of a first batch of 240 aircraft has been 
completed in two phases of 160 and 80 aircraft. The airforce is also planning to procure 
145 attack helicopters with an initial order of 50 from Bell Helicopter Textron King 
Cobra AH-1Z Company to fulfill Turkey’s attack helicopter requirements. The purchase 
of attack helicopters might be aimed at hunting Syrian Scud missile launchers in northern 
and central Syria and the mobile missile launchers in Iraq.   Meanwhile, under the 
“Vision-2005” document, the Turkish Armed Forces plan to add the 4th generation Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF) to its inventory. This will replace its current fleet of F-16C/D 
multimission aircraft by the end of 2015. Moreover, Turkey is participating in the 
engineering and manufactur ing development (EMD) stage of the program at a cost of  $1 
billion. 338 The Turkish air force also expressed interest in acquiring up to 40 US-made F-
15E Strike Eagle fighters. A five-year modernization agreement with Israeli Aircraft 
Industries to upgrade Turkey’s 54 F-4E aircraft is also among the procurement plans. 
Israeli air force has already delivered eight of 54 modernized F-4E Phantoms, elevating 
them to the Phantom 2000 standard. 339  These aircraft are configured to carry Popeye 
precision-guided stand-off missiles.   
In order to boost the capabilities of the air force, the Turkish government decided 
to make a major acquisition of tanker aircraft that would increase the flight range of the 
Turkish air force (TUAF)’s F-16 and F-4 fighter aircrafts. In this regard, it purchased 
seven U.S. KC-135r tanker aircraft in late 1997 and deliveries were completed in 1998. 
Meanwhile the air force also leases two U.S. KC-135 tanker aircraft. The purchase of 
tanker aircrafts to increase the flight range of Turkish fighter planes would allow the 
Turkish air force to fly deep inside the enemy territory, especially on missions for 
detecting and identifying WMD production facilities and mobile missile launchers, as 
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well as to pursue retaliatory strikes and conduct counterforce operations beyond enemy 
territory. Such a capability would also allow the Turkish air force to be more aggressive 
and to take greater risks when attacking targets in northern Syria and Iraq. 
In April of 1996, the Turkish military announced a 30-year $150 billion co-
production deal with foreign partners. The program includes plans for the acquisition of 
640 combat aircraft, 750 helicopters and the purchase of four airborne early warning 
(AEW) aircraft for delivery by 2003. The building of 24 additional F-16 fighters and 
modernizing and upgrading of seven tanker aircraft, donated by the USA are also among 
the procurement plans. In November of 1996, Turkey revealed plans to buy Popeye II 
missiles from Israel for its modernized F-4 fighters and to co-produce another 120. In 
September 1997 Turkey reportedly considered buying Israel’s Rafael manufactured 
Phyton-4 air-to-air missiles for the air force. It was also reported that the Turkish air force 
was proposing to acquire stand-off munitions and jammers, along with high-speed anti-
radiation (HARM) missiles for the air force’s F-16 Block 50 aircraft. 
Presently, Turkey’s punitive strategy with regard to WMD and ballistic missile 
threats solely relies on its superior air force, particularly on F-16s, F-4s and other capable 
aircraft, which have the capability to launch Popeye II precision guided missiles to targets 
as far as 150 miles in range.  
2.   Intelligence and Early Warning  
The Turkish Armed Forces are also improving their assault, defense 
reconnaissance/surveillance and early warning capabilities.340 The TUAF embarked on a 
project to acquire mobile radars and aerial warning and control aircraft and to negotiate 
the possible purchase of U.S. early warning planes (AWACS).341 The objective is to 
eliminate deficiencies in low-altitude radar coverage against enemy missile and air 
attacks. In January 2000, the minister of national defense, Sabahattin Cakmakoglu, stated 
that Turkey would purchase four AWACS planes. In December, it was announced that 
Turkey was to begin negotiations with a Boeing- led team to meet a requirement for six 
737 airborne early warning and control (AEW & C) aircraft, with an option for a seventh, 
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plus ground support elements.342 The Defense Industries Undersecretariat (SSM) has 
asked Boeing to transfer the software source codes and other key modification and 
integration technologies associated with the sale of six to eight Boeing 737 airborne early 
warning and control aircraft (AEW&C).343 
The Turkish Armed Forces have also followed a three–phased approach for 
acquiring the necessary capabilities to improve their intelligence gathering and early 
warning capabilities, especially in the face of increased missile risks to Turkey’s territory 
and forces. The first phase is Turkey’s plan for advanced reconna issance that began last 
year (2000) when it ordered high-altitude long-range oblique photography (LOROP) 
systems from Israel for use on its 42 RF-4 Phantom reconnaissance aircrafts.344  
The second phase is a joint requirement for long- and short-range unmanned air 
vehicles (UAVs) which will be procured by local production with foreign partners: four 
long- and short-range UAV for the army, three long-range UAVs for the navy and two 
long-range UAVs for the air force.345 The $350 million program involves the production 
of a total of 23 systems of long-range (300km) and eight medium range (200-300 km) 
which will enable Turkey to gather intelligence and intelligence photographs, particularly 
of WMD production facilities and mobile missile launchers that might need to be 
destroyed deep within the Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian territory. 346  In this regard, recently 
Turkey’s military has decided to accelerate the procurement of unmanned air vehicles to 
bolster preparations for any regional conflict. It was reported that the military would buy 
up to six UAV systems for the air force to bolster its reconnaissance capability within the 
next three months.347   
The third phase is a satellite reconnaissance capability. In order to fulfill this 
requirement, Turkey has made a $240 million deal with France’s Alcatel, and a Turkish 
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spy satellite will be sent into space by the year 2005.348  As a result, with a capability to 
launch unmanned reconnaissance flights along its border with Syria, Iraq and Iran by 
using long-range cameras and electronic sensors that see deep into all three neighboring 
countries and to monitor troop and missile launcher deployments from space, Turkey 
would be able to derive real-time data about a potential WMD or ballistic missile attack 
on Turkish territory. 
3.  Theatre Missile Defenses  
Turkey has considered acquiring a theatre missile defense (TMD).  This is partly 
in response to Iranian moves to develop the 1,300 km range Shabab-3 medium-range 
ballistic missile, which is capable of reaching most parts of Turkey. Several vital military 
facilities and some Turkish major cities including Ankara are practically defenseless 
against missile threats from its southeastern neighbors. For example, it was reported that 
the Turkish armed forces favored a multi- tier ballistic missile defense (BMD) concept to 
counter the ballistic missile threat.349 According to this concept, an enemy missile is 
intercepted high in the atmosphere by a long-range missile. If this intercept is 
unsuccessful, there will be a second chance to intercept the missile by a shorter-range 
system as the missile descends toward its target. Ankara officially adopted a two-tier 
TMD concept. It will soon start discussions on choosing the specific systems to acquire. 
The U.S made Patriot systems and U.S.-Israeli Arrow are the likeliest options for anti-
aircraft and anti-missile defenses for Turkey. 
 In mid-1999, Turkish officials stated that deploying a missile defense system is a 
top defense priority and announced procurement plans for medium and long-range air-
defense systems.350 In a related move, Ankara expressed interest in buying Israel’s 
Arrow-2 anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) systems. 351 The Arrow missile defense 
plan involves a layered defense, a possible boost-phase interceptor, new battle 
management systems and sensor and also close cooperation with the U.S.352 In this 
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regard, in January 2000, Turkey participated in a simulated-theatre-missile defense 
exercise under the auspices of the Turkish bilateral working group on theatre-missile 
defense.353 Since then, Ankara established a simulation system in Turkey to test theatre- 
missile defence concepts. Indeed, the Arrow project is appealing not only because of its 
advanced stage of development (the only one of its kind to become operational by the 
year 2000) and its high level technology, but also because of U.S. involvement.354  
Israel’s Arrow system was successfully tested again in August 2001 and can intercept the 
most advanced ballistic missile developed in the Middle East, including Iran’s Shabab-3 
and Syria’s Scud-D missiles, which have ranges of 1,300 km and 700 km 
subsequently.355  
The U.S. Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Patriot surface-to-air (SAM) 
system is also seen as the other most likely candidate. The U.S. PAC-3 system was 
successfully flight- tested in October 2001 and is expected to be ready for an operational 
test phase quite soon. 356 The tests have proven successful and the PAC-3 missile system 
was suggested to be fully capable of defeating the entire WMD threat to Turkey, such as 
tactical ballistic missile, cruise missiles and aircraft and the United States is expected to 
begin full- rate production in September 2002.357 Within a NATO Theatre Missile 
Defense (TMD) context, Turkey has also expressed interest in the Medium Extended Air 
Defence System (MEADS) being developed on a trilateral basis by the US, Italy and 
Germany. The MEADs is planned to be fielded by the year 2005. Perceiving 
vulnerability to potential missile attacks from its southeastern neighbors, the Turkish 
Defense Ministry also plans to bolster the nation’s airspace. The ministry’s plans will 
procure of 148 low altitude anti-aircraft batteries and a network of batteries to protect 
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against low-flying missiles.358 The batteries will be composed of Turkish-produced 
Harpoon and Reckle systems that will protect Turkey’s airports and military bases.359 
Ankara also supports the U.S. plans to deploy a national missile defense system 
(NMD). Turkey’s proximity to states of proliferation concern encourages support for the 
project. Therefore, Turkey is  much more sympathetic to President Bush’s missile defense 
plan than most European NATO allies. Turkey considers itself a potential host to NMD 
interceptors, probably including a defense base in Turkey. 360  The U.S. plan opts for a 
boost-phase missile defense system, which would attack Iraqi or Iranian ballistic missiles 
shortly after launch. According to Phil Gordon, the U.S. National Security Council’s 
director for southern Europe, “ It would be necessary to base interceptor missiles near 
those countries’ borders (Iran and Iraq) in southeastern Turkey. Even if a boost-phase 
system is not selected, deployment of early warning stations to Turkish territory is 
likely.”361 
Turkey is also embarking on the design and production of its own short range-
range missiles, and could move to develop longer-range systems.362 Under a 10-year 
program, Turkey and the UK will co-produce 841 Rapier Mk 2B missiles for the Turkish 
Land Forces and the Turkish Air Force (TUAF) in Turkey at the Turkish facilities near 
Ankara.363 It should be also noted that 120 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) 
missiles were transferred to Turkey in December 1995.364 With a range of 165 
kilometers, ATACMS is effective against high-value targets deep behind the battlefield, 
including deployed ballistic missile launch sites, surface-to-air missiles and command 
and control units.365 These missiles can be launched from the Multiple Launch Rocket 
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System, of which Turkey already possesses twelve and offers at least some protection 
against Iran, Iraq and Syria. Turkey’s efforts to acquire tactical missiles suggest that its 
incentives to develop its own retaliatory capabilities as opposed to defensive efforts is 
increasing, as Turkish cities become more and more vulnerable to missiles launched from 
areas near Turkey. 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKISH SECURITY  
Turkey’s conventional military capabilities put Turkey in a superior position vis-
à-vis its southeastern neighbors. In the case of an armed aggression, Turkey’s 
procurement and military modernization programs suggest that Turkey plans to strike the 
WMD production facilities and missiles launching sites in the enemy territory with its 
highly capable air power. At the same time, by penetrating behind the enemy lines and by 
destroying the enemy missile launchers and other potential delivery means with its 
special forces, Turkey plans to neutralize enemy’s asymmetrical capabilities (WMD) 
before they are deployed to forward storage positions.  
 Conventional superiority, however, might not be sufficient to deter many 
potential adversaries under all circumstances.366 A country’s war-winning capabilities 
might not always mean war-deterring capabilities. It could be a challenge for Turkey to 
make its conventional capabilities visible to an NBC-armed adversary so that these 
capabilities may become part of the adversaries’ risk calculation.   For example, Israel’s 
conventional superiority and more importantly nuclear ambiguity did not deter Iraqi 
missile attacks at Israel during the Desert Storm. In contrast, Iraq fired nearly 90 Al 
Hussein missiles at Israel and the Arabian Peninsula during Desert Storm. 367 Even while 
dealing with adversaries that are deterrable, denying the aggressors’ expectations of a 
quick military victory and political gain by pursuing asymmetric strategies would be very 
important. And if deterrence fails and NBC-backed aggression occurs, Turkey’s threats to 
use conventional military force to inflict suffering and massive destruction on the 
aggressor is less likely to force the aggressor to back down or to capitulate. Thus, it is 
essential that Turkey acquire the capabilities to deny the enemy the political and military 
benefits of WMD acquisition. Therefore, analyzing Turkey’s possible defense options 
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and necessary measures to counter the increasing WMD risks to its security in the 
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VII.     CONCLUSION: COUNTERING WMD USE 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The nations adjacent to Turkey pose one of the greatest challenges to Turkish 
security. The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction capabilities and missiles of ever 
increasing ranges by Iran, Iraq and Syria have emerged as a major Turkish concern in the 
post-Cold War Turkish security environment.  The continued proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, particularly chemical, biological weapons and ballistic missiles in 
Turkey’s immediate vicinity, has made their use by an adversary increasingly likely. 
Current proliferation trends among Turkey’s southeastern neighbors suggest that future 
sub-regional contingencies involving Turkey might include the use of chemical or 
biological weapons against Turkish forces or strategic assets with a wide array of effects 
from small-scale and/or theatre-wide use on the battlefield to large-scale use on Turkish 
population centers. Ironically, several vital military assets and some major Turkish cities 
including Ankara are practically defenseless against missile threats.  
Turkey’s new security environment is rather different from the past, and now all 
three of Ankara’s southeastern neighbors are seeking to acquire advanced weapons of 
mass destruction and ballistic missile capabilities. It is questionable whether a 
conventional superiority would deter an NBC-armed adversary unless Turkey has the 
capability to protect itself against a potential WMD attack. Protecting Turkey from an 
NBC attack is particularly challenging. The inadequate defenses (especially effective BW 
defenses) to counter an NBC attack that now exists reveal how difficult it is for a nation 
to deter and to defend against such weapons. Moreover, the inadequate quantity of CW 
detectors and the absence of standoff early warning BW detectors, the lack of vaccines 
for many BW agents and the inability to decontaminate people, equipment and areas 
exposed to BW agents could complicate Turkey’s ability to prevail in future 
contingencies. Therefore, to counter the increasing WMD threats, Turkey must adopt a 
political-military approach to WMD defense, across the spectrum from policy to 
acquisition, to doctrine and training and finally to the conduct of operations. 
124 
B.  DETERRING WMD USE  
Turkey’s best defense against a potential WMD aggression will be a robust 
deterrent posture. Therefore, deterrence should remain the first and preferred line of 
defense against a WMD aggression. 368 In this regard, the basic tenets of deterrence must 
be maintained and strengthened.  
One essential element of deterrence is maintaining a credible capability from 
active to passive defenses and to counterforce capabilities. This will enhance Turkey’s 
ability to deter its potential adversaries. However, traditional approaches to deterring 
NBC use in unstable regions such as the Middle East are inherently uncertain. 369 
Moreover, traditional models of deterrence will likely fail against an aggressor who 
might be seeking asymmetrical strategies to pursue its politico-military objectives.370 The 
conditions during the Cold War that had successfully established a country’s deterrence 
credible—such as mutua l understandings, open communication lines and shared interest 
and risks—simply may not apply to an NBC-armed aggressor.371 Moreover, countries 
such as Iraq, Iran and Syria are much more prone to risk-taking and willing to confront a 
conventionally superior adversary, especially when their militaries are supported with 
unconventional capabilities. As a consequence, the threat of retaliation and punishment is 
necessary but is not likely to be sufficient to deter and—if deterrence fails—to protect 
Turkish forces in future regional contingencies, especially if certain thresholds are 
already passed.  
 In the same manner, the growing ability of Turkey’s southeastern neighbors to 
deliver these weapons at extended ranges might undercut Turkey’s deterrence incredibly.  
This is most visible with Iran, who successfully tested the 1,300 km range Shabab-3 in 
July 2000. Syria has also made extensive efforts to increase the ranges of its missile by 
modifying its Scuds. Reports of the Iranian work on Shabab-4 and Shabab-5 missiles 
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suggest they could strike a number of European capitals, including Ankara. This could 
complicate Turkey’s defense. 
Expanding capabilities of Iran, Iraq and Syria that will enable them to strike most 
parts of Turkey might undermine Turkish military force’s confidence in conventional 
superiority and naiveté in hoping for a purely conventional theater war. The increased 
capabilities of Ankara’s southeastern neighbors make it essential to develop and to 
deploy new defensive capabilities to counter chemical and biological warfare threats, and 
be prepared to survive, fight and prevail in future military engagements. However, 
although not adequate by itself, a Turkish military with an overwhelming retaliatory 
capability still remains critical for Turkey’s deterrence of both initial use and follow-on 
use of NBC weapons by Iran, Iraq and Syria. Therefore, Turkey’s conventional military 
capabilities must be complemented with effective counter-proliferation capabilities.  
Given the potential strategic and operational impact of the use of NBC weapons, 
Turkey must focus on protecting its forces. In fact, being prepared for the use of NBC 
weapons and missiles, and being able to mitigate and overcome their effects, is an 
essential element in deterring their use.  While in some aspects, Turkey is slowly moving 
forward in acquiring the necessary capabilities to counter the full range of NBC 
capabilities, much more still needs to be done.  
C.   PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO WMD USE  
For an effective defensive response to NBC threats, the Turkish defense planners 
must make an evolutionary shift in how they plan future warfare. Ensuring that Turkey is 
prepared for the WMD threats can only be managed by institutionalizing counter-
proliferation in every facet of Turkish military activities. Countering the WMD threat, 
particularly the chemical, biological and missile threats, must be a high priority in 
defense planning. In this regard, simultaneously improving intelligence and logistics 
support and the active and passive defense and counterforce capabilities is required.372 
Conventional ballistic missiles, chemical and biological weapons will be likely 
condition of future warfare, especially in contingencies on Turkey’s periphery. Therefore, 
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ensuring that the emerging NBC threat is realistically incorporated into service and joint 
doctrine and operational planning is essential.373 The Army, Navy and Air Force and the 
field commanders should embed counter-proliferation in their planning and training and 
above all, in their thinking. All military exercises—including routine individual, unit, 
joint and combined training exercises—should incorporate counter-proliferation 
concepts, equipment, and tasks as well as realistic chemical and biological threat 
scenarios.374 The services should place increased importance on counter-proliferation 
strategies and WMD defense requirements especially in their acquisition programs, 
training, and doctrine. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Turkish General 
Chief of Staff must ensure that the four areas of counter-proliferation—counterforce, 
active defense, passive defense, and consequence management—are fully considered in 
their planning, policies, doctrine, acquisition, and other functions. Turkey also should 
work with the U.S., Israel and its allies in Europe to enhance its counter-proliferation 
capabilities. 
In this context, two critical research questions need to be analyzed in detail:  
1) What are Turkey’s defense options to counter the increasing weapons of mass 
destruction threats to its security? 2) What are the tasks of policy and required 
capabilities that Turkey must posses for the likelihood of WMD use against Turkish 
forces, and population centers?  
D.   TURKEY’S DEFENSE OPTIONS  
1. Active Defenses 
 a. Counterforce Options  
While deterrence must remain the crucial element of Turkey’s response to 
WMD threats, Turkey should undertake prudent defense measures realizing that 
deterrence might fail. As a part of Turkey’s emerging counter-proliferation policy, 
Ankara should consider taking effective defense measures against increasingly longer-
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range ballistic missiles by increasing its counterforce capabilities with a highly capable 
Air Force and deploying effective missile defenses. 
 Currently, Turkey’s deterrent posture against WMD threats results from 
its superior conventional forces with a capability to occupy large areas.  Such a capability 
should be enhanced with a strong air force and air defense assets.  In the case of an 
imminent WMD or ballistic missile attack, Turkey should possess highly capable long-
range fighterplanes with skilled pilots that can preemptively strike any enemy missile 
launchers and WMD facilities before these weapons can be used against Turkey. In the 
case of aggression, Turkey should maintain the necessary retaliatory capabilities and be 
able to punish the aggressor by inflicting enormous destruction and thus raise the cost for 
the aggressor’s behavior. The Turkish air force should be able to strike deep underground 
targets as well as protect its ground forces from the release of agents. Moreover, both the 
Air Force and Army should adopt a targeting doctrine, especially for critical mobile 
targets, such as missile launchers, deep in enemy territory.  
b.   Missile Defenses 
 In the missile defense arena, the best defense option for Turkey would be 
a Boost Phase Intercept system, which can also help with deterrence, since part of the 
attacking missile will fall in the country launching it.375 A missile defense cooperation 
would also reinforce Turkey’s defense ties with both NATO and the emerging EU 
security institutions and would decrease the Turkish incentives to develop its own WMD 
retaliatory capabilities. 
A boost-phase system could serve as the first line of defense not only for 
Turkey but also for the United States and other NATO allies by complementing future 
ground- and sea-based missile defense systems that might be deployed within NATO 
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1. Ground-based boost-phase interceptors and X-band radars could be deployed in 
southeastern Turkey to counter an Iraqi ballistic missile threat to Turkey and to NATO 
and US territory.   
 
2. These ground-based boost phase interceptors could be supplemented by deploying 
sea-based boost-phase interceptors in the Black Sea to defend against Iranian ballistic 
missiles launched from bases in northern Iran. 
 
3. The U.S. AWACSs equipped with the Airborne Laser system could be deployed 
to Turkey and operate from Turkish air bases as a component of this system to detect and 
to identify ballistic missiles launched from sites in Syria, Iraq in the south and Iran. 376 
 
A major benefit for the boost-phase system to be based in Turkey would 
be the opportunities for cooperating with the U.S. and with other NATO allies. In 
addition to Turkey, those NATO allies current ly planning to field theater-missile defense 
systems, or those who might acquire them in the future (such as Germany, Italy, or the 
Netherlands) could deploy these capabilities to defend Turkish-missile defense sites and 
other Turkish facilities. In crises, NATO countries could also deploy combat aircraft or 
naval assets to Turkey to defend sea-and air-based missile defense systems operating 
from the Black Sea and from Turkish airfields.  
Deploying a boost-phase missile defense system in Turkey would also 
have a positive effect on U.S.-Turkish and Turkish-NATO relations, which are strained 
over particular issues from time to time. Given Turkish threat perceptions as a result of 
increased WMD and missile capabilities of its southeastern neighbors mentioned in 
Chapters II, III and IV, Ankara’s extensive participation in a defensive system would also 
be supported by the Turkish public, since it would boost Turkey’s influence and freedom 
of action in regional crises and status within NATO. This would help Turkey feel less 
isolated and marginalized because of the recent developments in the European Defense 
Initiative. Moreover, Turkey’s participation in a defensive system within a NATO 
framework against Middle Eastern threats would be less threatening to the Iranians, Iraqis 
and Syrians than a US-Israeli-Turkish trilateral Arrow missile defense system. This could 
put Turkey directly on these nations’ lists of missile targets. If, in fact, it has not already 
                                                 




been placed on such lists. Moreover, such a unilateral Turkish move outside of NATO’s 
defense posture could also create new polarizations in the Middle East. For both technical 
(since it would not violate ABM treaty agreements of 1972) and operational reasons, 
Turkish-based systems based on boost-phase technologies would also be less threatening 
to the Russians because the missile interceptors would be located too far from Russian 
missile sites to intercept Russian missile launches in the boost-phase. Moreover, such a 
missile defense systems would be in a NATO framework in which Russia could also be 
included.377  
Turkey should therefore encourage the United States and its NATO 
European Allies to share the responsibility for Turkey’s defense. For example, in return 
for actively participating in a missile defense program, Turkey could demand that the 
United States help Ankara boost the country’s air defenses. Access to the U.S. developed 
radars, sensors and battle management components of a missile defense system would be 
needed. Such a division of responsibilities could allow Turkey to adopt the appropriate 
defense systems depending on its threat perceptions (which is currently very high when 
compared to its European counterparts) and assessments of the appropriate missile-
defense technologies and basing modes would best meet Ankara’s national defense 
requirements. Launching a missile defense umbrella, by this way, and the deployment of 
early warning stations and interceptor missiles on Turkish territory will contribute to 
Turkey’s deterrent posture.  
2.  Passive Defenses 
An effective NBC defense response should fully integrate the following 
requirements for an effective passive defense into all planning and operational activities 
of the Turkish Armed Forces: 
a.   Detection and Identification:  
Timely and reliable detection and identification of BW agents is very 
difficult but is very critical.  Detection and identification will be the essential basis for all 
subsequent defensive or retaliatory actions against an NBC-aggression. For an effective 
NBC defense, timely reporting of CBW use, medical surveillance, medical diagnosis of 
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affected personnel (military and civilian), and the routine collection of environmental 
samples will be needed. The most challenging task will especially be confirming a 
biological weapon use on the battlefield.  As a result, detection and identification 
information will be the essential basis of an appropriate and robust defensive response to 
a potential NBC use against Turkish forces. 
b.  Warning and Reporting:  
Timely reporting and warning of an NBC threat or attack is a key 
requirement that must be integrated into operational planning. Once the existing NBC 
threats are assessed and interpreted or an attack is believed to have occurred, appropriate 
warning and reporting procedures must be disseminated and facilitated. Effective 
communication links must be established and maintained between deployed forces, 
regional commands and civil authorities. In order to accomplish this, there is a need to 
improve intelligence assessments and adapt existing concepts, doctrine, plans, training 
standards and exercises to meet the NBC challenge. For a timely and accurate 
intelligence to warn of a pending attack developing NBC attack scenarios, ranging from 
early use of CBW on the battlefield against staging areas, ports and airfields to the use of 
CBW as a last resort to create massive casualties in population centers is essential. 
c.  Physical Protection:  
Deploying sufficient and better suits, masks and protective gears, as well 
as detectors for both and chemical and biological agents will be needed. While individual 
respiratory protection by existing protective masks currently forms the main foundation 
of CBW defense and offer acceptable levels of protection, principally for chemical 
weapon use, they may not fully eliminate the possibility of biological agents exposure. 
However, using low cost masks may still be an effective means to limit the potential 
impact of a BW attack. In this regard, rapid production of protective BW vaccines for 
specific agents in the potential adversaries inventory and vaccination of forces in 
peacetime will increase the overall effectiveness of a robust NBC defense.  
d.  Consequence Management: 
 Following a CBW attack, limiting the spread of CBW contamination and 
decontaminating personnel and equipment will be necessary. Especially, the food and 
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water supplies as well as other natural sources in the area should be protected form 
contamination. Likewise contaminated or infectious food and material should be 
destroyed and disposed of. In the case of contamination of food and equipment, 
alternative logistic supplies should be planned in peacetime. 
e.   Medical Countermeasures and Support:  
An advanced medical response is critical for an effective defense against 
an NBC attack. Medical countermeasures, such as pre- and post-exposure vaccination, 
prophylaxis and treatment, will be crucial in mitigating the potential operational impact 
of NBC attack. The medical response should include planning and training for post-
exposure, diagnosis, the capability for mass treatment, mass casualty preparedness, 
medical evacuation, quarantine and restriction of movement. 
f.  Training and Exercising:  
Planning all joint and individual military exercises that are designed to 
address the capability and training shortfalls against NBC attacks will be fundamental in 
preparing for an effective NBC defense response. Special training standards for NBC 
defense should be identified and military forces should receive individual and collective 
training on NBC risks, protective-countermeasures and consequence management to be 
able to operate effectively in an NBC environment and to conduct the assigned missions 
in all circumstances. Therefore, realistic NBC scenarios should be incorporated into all 
military programs.  
E.   RECOMMENDATIONS  
All the steps reviewed above are necessary to mount an integrated Turkish 
response to an NBC attack. Therefore all these considerations should be reflected in 
revised doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures and incorporated into operationa l 
plans. Understanding the nature of the WMD threat and responding to the risks are the 
most important requirements. This will help identify Turkey’s vulnerabilities and 
capability shortfalls in WMD defense. The key findings and overall recommendations for 
an effective Turkish response to WMD threats can be outlined as follows:  
· Being prepared for chemical, biological, and nuclear contingencies should 
be an urgent new priority for the Turkish military in planning for future 
regional contingencies, force projection scenarios, expeditionary 
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operations and peacekeeping operations. The Turkish military should have 
the ability to operate in a contaminated environment. 
· Effective active and passive defenses against biological attack are a key 
unmet need. Maintaining and enhancing the capability to achieve military 
objectives in the face of a WMD threat without absolute or total 
dependence on NATO and U.S. extended guarantees are also priorities.  
· This puts a premium on conducting joint or national NBC defense 
exercises based on realistic threat scenarios in which Turkish forces can 
receive individual and collective NBC defense training against NBC 
threats and develop experience with protective-countermeasures. 
· Turkish defense planners must adapt existing military strategies, doctrines, 
concepts and force structures to the requirements of counter-proliferation 
to be able to conduct counterforce operations and (if necessary) to conduct 
countervalue strikes.  
· Turkey must participate in a regional ballistic missile defense and/or the 
U.S. missile defense system, in which permanent missile defense 
interceptors and radar systems will be stationed in Turkey. 
· Chemical and biological self-protection gear and medical countermeasures 
and treatments for distribution to military personnel and civilian 
populations in cities falling within range of Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian 
missiles are essential for reassuring the civilian population and avoiding 
panic in crises and war. In this regard, Turkey should immediately procure 
the protective equipment necessary for its forces and civilians. 
· Turkey might not be able to meet all of these needs on its own, however, 
and should encourage its NATO allies to provide additional NBC defense 
equipment and related materials to equip military and civilian personnel. 
· Turkey should make every effort to create baseline capabilities of its own 
in peacetime while counting on its NATO allies to supplement Ankara’s 
capabilities in crises or war. 
· In the phase of escalation, a common NATO response would be 
preferable. However, in the absence of effective NATO backing, an 
overwhelming unilateral Turkish conventional retaliation will be 
necessary. A credible U.S. extended deterrence commitment with a robust 
U.S. nuclear weapons presence in Turkey might enhance Turkey’s 
deterrence posture against its adversaries. 
· Ankara should use its existing NATO alliance and strategic military 
cooperation with Israel to pursue a broader counter-proliferation dialogue. 
Emphasizing NATO’s commitment to defend Turkey in the case of armed 
aggression will be necessary. 
· Turkey’s commitment to arms control agreements can also play a vital 
role in strengthening the international legal framework for invoking an 
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international and/or NATO response to NBC-backed aggression against 
Turkey. Turkey’s adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) could help create an international consensus 
in which compliant states, like Turkey, could orchestrate a political 
campaign against WMD aggression. 378 
 
F.    CONCLUSION  
  Although still not really commensurate with the degree of the threat of WMD 
proliferation, interest in and understanding of NBC-related issues seem to be growing in 
Turkey, especially after the 1990-1991 Gulf War. To respond effectively to WMD 
challenges on its periphery, Turkey must increase its national defense capabilities by 
adopting an effective counter-proliferation strategy both politically and militarily. Turkey 
must have the ability to protect its forces and to ensure that they can operate effectively in 
an NBC environment. This requires the maintenance of effective conventional forces as 
well as detailed contingency planning for deterrence and defense in future regional 
contingencies. It also requires that both active and passive defenses be given high 
priority. Without these tools, the risk of a failure of conventional deterrence will be 
higher and the likelihood of WMD use against Turkey will increase. 
 Dramatic changes have occurred in Turkey’s security environment, but NATO’s 
security guarantees and U.S. extended deterrence commitments with a robust nuclear 
presence in Turkey remain essential elements of Turkey’s security.  Therefore, NATO’s 
security guarantees, which hinge ultimately on the U.S. nuclear presence and U.S. 
extended deterrence commitments in Europe, and Turkey’s own national defense and 
deterrence posture must remain convincing and credible to Turkey and to nations that 
possess WMD and potential WMD proliferators in the region.  As Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, 
a prominent professor of international relations at Bilkent University of Ankara, has 
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observed, “Turkey needs to be reassured that it would be protected against proliferation if 
and when it indeed occurs.”379  
But, in case deterrence fails, Turkey should have military options developed in the 
framework of deterrence based on denial and punishment. Moreover, Iran, Iraq and Syria 
must be made to understand that the employment of weapons of mass destruction would 
not provide any political or military advantage but, rather, would cause them to suffer 
enormous risks and destruction. Moreover, Turkey’s military posture should demonstrate 
to any potentially hostile proliferant that Turkey could not be coerced or defeated by the 
threat or use of WMD and that Turkey has the will and ability to respond effectively to 
new threats to its security as they emerge. At minimum, Turkey should have—and be 
perceived as having—the capability and will to retaliate against an enemy by holding at 
risk the enemy’s strategic assets that can be attacked and destroyed if the enemy 
undertakes any foolish action against Turkey. 380 Therefore, it is essential for Turkey to 
acquire the capabilities to deny an enemy the benefits of using WMD. These 
capabilities—including active and passive defenses as well as improved counterforce 
capabilities—would offer the best option to strengthen deterrence and provide the best 
hedge against deterrence failure.381 
Yet, there is a long way to go. In military and contingency planning and military 
exercises, Turkish defense planners must re-evaluate how to deter and to defend against 
new and emerging NBC threats on the country’s periphery. The challenges and the 
dilemmas Turkey is facing today are enormously complex and difficult. However, 
Turkey has the necessary determination and ability to defend its forces, population and 
territory against WMD challenges by every means possible. Since its foundation, Turkey 
has deterred and defended its territorial integrity successfully. Neither fr iend nor 
adversary should forget that the challenges Turkey faced in the past have only made the 
nation more formidable and determined to preserve its integrity in the future. 
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